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ABSTRACT 
Closing Up Shop:  
Meditations on the Departmental/Programmatic Elimination Experience 
 
By  
Susan Beth Donoff 
Dr. Vicki J. Rosser, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Higher Education 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 Departmental and programmatic eliminations represent a new paradigm in the 
history of American higher education.  Hastened by a national economic recession and 
competing state funding priorities, public post-secondary institutions have turned to 
academic attrition as a solution to continuous budgetary shortfalls.  As a means of 
addressing the lived experience of faculty members and department chairs, the following 
qualitative case study explores perceptions of implementing departmental and/or 
programmatic eliminations.   
Utilizing uncertainty reduction theory as a conceptual framework, interviewed 
faculty in saved units experienced considerable strategic uncertainty, failing to 
understand why they had been selected for elimination. Guided by a college-wide 
strategic planning process, faculty in eliminated units understood the rationale for 
abolishing departments, though they experienced considerable structural uncertainty in 
terms of adjusting to a new, non-academic reporting structure.  These findings indicate 
that a transparent strategic planning process diminishes strategic uncertainty, while the 
elimination of traditional departmental structures heightens structural uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
 Formerly the favorite son of American enterprise, higher education has become 
the tortured stepchild of state government.  Too valuable to expel and too large to sustain, 
public institutions walk a precarious line between dependence and autonomy.  As such, 
while Medicaid, corrections, public safety, and K-12 compulsory education consume 
ever-increasing shares of state budgets, the percentage of public aid allocated to higher 
education continues to dwindle (Holmwood & Bhambra, 2012; Hovey, 1999).  With an 
ability to generate instant income via tuition increases, public colleges and universities 
are often prime targets for reductions in state-level appropriations during periods of 
economic recession (Slaughter, 1993).  Functioning as a budgetary balance wheel, higher 
education’s revenue-generating capability allows the state to shift its scarce fiscal 
resources to those entities which have no financial failsafe (Okunade, 2004).  However, 
while tuition increases may help to balance the state’s budget, this inequitable public 
policy has forced many institutions to walk a precarious line between affordability and 
accessibility of educational services (Kissler, 1997).   
With the entrenched model of exponential growth supplanted by the economic 
reality of recession, departmental and programmatic eliminations have become a new 
paradigm in higher education (Crano, 1995; Eckel, 2003; Fedler, Carey, & Counts, 1998; 
Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995).  Indeed, as higher education slowly recovers 
from the most recent financial downturn, anecdotal accounts have become increasingly 
common, underscoring the scope and breadth of the nation’s academic reversals (Carlson, 
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2011; Glenn, 2008; Reed, Cooper, & Young, 2007; Rosser, 2012; Wasley, 2008; Wilson, 
2009).  Though it is undeniable that this phenomenon is sweeping the scholarly 
community, academic literature addressing the lived experience of eliminating a 
department or program is noticeably lacking.  By exploring the perceptions of faculty and 
department chairs in eliminated units, it may be possible to contribute to the intellectual 
discourse on an under-researched, though increasingly prevalent facet of academic life.     
Review of the Literature 
 The literature on departmental/ programmatic discontinuance tends to address two 
broad categories: historical/financial context and human actions/agency.  Provided the 
emergent nature of academic attrition, it is imperative to chronicle both the historical and 
financial forces which have combined to create this phenomenon, and the effect that this 
phenomenon has had upon individuals in the academy.  Though recent scholarly works 
have combined these interrelated categories, the preponderance of scholarship treats these 
issues as separate constructs.  The following literature review attempts to outline the 
confluence of events which has precipitated this paradigm, providing additional context 
for this emergent trend in American higher education.         
Predicated upon mutual beneficence, the “social contract” between the federal 
government and higher education has changed dramatically since its post-war inception 
(Perorazio, 2001).  Forged in 1944 with the passage of the GI Bill, this groundbreaking 
legislation granted WWII veterans a free collegiate education based upon length of 
military service (Thomas, 1997).  Though the GI Bill did not place restrictions on courses 
of study, many veterans selected disciplines which closely matched their military roles 
(Thomas, 1997).  In this manner, the federal government came to value the limitless 
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research potential of post-secondary institutions.  With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, 
research universities gained even greater prominence, as federal funds flowed freely in an 
effort to improve America’s technological and cultural competitiveness (Freeland, 2007).       
 Though Cold War conflict sustained the social contract through the 1950s and 
early 1960s, America’s involvement in Vietnam radically altered this symbiotic 
relationship. As the Baby Boomer generation supplanted WWII veterans at the nation’s 
colleges and universities, military and domestic affairs converged to create a new 
paradigm for American higher education (Geiger, 2005).  Influenced by televised footage 
of the Vietnamese conflict, college students came to connect the oppression of peoples of 
color abroad with the injustices perpetrated against African Americans at home (Cohen, 
1998).  Reinvigorating the long-simmering civil rights movement, college students of all 
races and creeds protested institutional racism through sit-ins, campus protests, and 
counter-cultural expression (Geiger, 2005).  Moreover, progressive academics and like-
minded students began to demand a more diverse curriculum, forging new disciplinary 
offerings in African American, Asian, Chicano, and Women’s studies (Crowley, 1999; 
Trombley, 1970).  Though these demonstrations succeeded in widening the scope of 
academia, they failed to engender widespread support amongst the American 
establishment (Lazerson, 2007).  Indeed, politicians and the public at large soured on 
their commitment to higher education, believing it to be a hotbed for radical, anti-
government expression. This disconnect disproportionately affected certain areas of the 
liberal arts—such as history and American studies—while leaving pre-professional and 
professional disciplines—such as business and engineering—relatively unscathed.   
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 With the passing of this watershed moment, the federal government recast higher 
education as a private, economic benefit as opposed to a public, societal good.  In tandem 
with the Reagan revolution of the 1980s, institutions of higher education came to espouse 
a more market-oriented philosophy, emphasizing research productivity, revenue 
generation, and graduate earnings (Ginsberg, 2011; Holmwood & Bhambra, 2012; 
Zusman, 2005).  In the public sector, in particular, precipitous declines in state 
appropriations jeopardized the traditional liberal arts and non-scientific specialty 
programs, as these units often failed to conform to free market indicators (Trow, 2010).  
As illustrated by Slaughter (1993) and Brint, Turk-Bicakci, and Levy (2005), academic 
retrenchment became the preferred vehicle for the downsizing of academe, as higher 
education turned away from the liberal arts towards vocational, revenue-generating 
degree offerings.   
 In the 1990s, the struggle between market alignment and educational altruism 
reached its tipping point, as several anecdotal accounts of departmental and 
programmatic eliminations surfaced in the academic literature.  Underscoring the 
vulnerability of the liberal art and social scientific disciplines, authors Crano (1995), 
Fedler, Carey, and Counts (1998), Reinardy and Halter (1994), and Seiler (1995) 
published cautionary tales of selective attrition in higher education.  Indeed, as economic 
recession prompted declines in state revenue, the leadership in these post-secondary 
institutions turned to degree elimination as a means of meeting budget reduction targets.  
Amid discussions of research productivity and external funding streams, disciplines with 
lower-than-average levels of production became easy targets for eradication (Crano, 
1995; Fedler et al., 1998; Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995). 
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 As a function of the post-September 11
th
 economic recession, the aforementioned 
trends have only intensified, engendering a new financial paradigm in American higher 
education.  Forced to contend with diminished coffers and increased demand for services, 
state governments across the country have radically altered their funding priorities, 
leading to diminished resources for public higher education (Fethke & Policano, 2012; 
Layzell, 2007).  A discretionary item on a budget ledger, higher education often functions 
as a “balance wheel,” receiving disproportionate increases during a flush economy, and 
disproportionate decreases during an economic recession (Hovey, 1999).  With its ability 
to generate income via tuition revenue, higher education finds itself in a unique position 
relative to other state funding priorities. 
 In this manner, state governments devote roughly 60% of their budgets to K-12 
education, Medicaid, and corrections—services which have no financial failsafe (Layzell, 
2007).  When compounded by swelling elderly and school-aged populations, states have 
little choice but to allocate their limited resources to compulsory programs and social 
services which benefit the greatest proportion of the residential population (Cheslock & 
Hughes, 2011).  Forced to contend with diminished legislative allocations, public post-
secondary institutions have accelerated their search for external funding streams.  While 
this entrepreneurial orientation undoubtedly benefits STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, and math) disciplines, education, liberal arts, and the social sciences are not 
as closely aligned with this commercial facet of academe (Zusman, 2005).  In his classic 
case study of department eliminations at four Carnegie-classified research institutions, 
Eckel (2003) elaborated on this very point, noting that liberal arts, education, and 
communications disciplines were disproportionate targets for academic attrition.  
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Highlighting the importance of “campus power circles” (p.114) in brokering department 
elimination decisions, Eckel (2003) underscores individual discourse as a critical 
component of the larger decision-making process.                     
 Provided this overarching environment, I now turn to the human element of 
departmental/programmatic eliminations.  In the context of the current study, department 
chairs and faculty members are the individuals most affected by academic attrition, due to 
their jeopardized livelihood as educational professionals.  As such, it is imperative to 
discuss department chair roles and the department chair/faculty relationship, as they 
pertain to this phenomenon.  Likened to the Roman god, Janus, “with faces oriented in 
opposite directions,” (Gmelch & Burns, 1993, p.260) academic department chairs must 
balance the many stresses associated with the duality of this position. As an administrator 
with a faculty members’ perspective, department chairs must attend to the bureaucratic 
aspects of leadership, as well as nurture the professional growth of the faculty members 
within their unit (Hendel & Horn, 2008).   
 Placed in this exceedingly difficult position, department chairs must effectively 
assume a variety of role orientations in order to engage in successful management of an 
academic unit (Tucker, 1993).  While it is impossible to delineate the exhaustive 
responsibilities of an academic department chair, several scholars (Carroll & Gmelch, 
1992; Leaming, 2007; Lees, 2006; Wolverton, Gmelch, Wolverton, & Sarros, 1999) 
agree that communication, resource management, and faculty development are significant 
duties of any department chair.  Taking a holistic approach to the position, Berdrow 
(2010) discovered a significant “disconnect between stakeholder views of the DC role” 
(p.508).  While department chairs focused the majority of their energies addressing daily 
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administrative tasks and faculty needs, stakeholders voiced varied opinions on where 
department chairs should devote the bulk of their time, demonstrating a lack of 
institutional understanding as to the nature of the position. 
 In this regard, as the “king among kings,” (Berdrow, 2010, p.508), the department 
chair’s rapport with his/her faculty colleagues is among the most crucial of all academic 
interactions.  During times of retrenchment, in particular, department chairs bear 
responsibility for navigating this murky academic terrain and motivating their faculty to 
press forward in the midst of job-related uncertainty (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, & 
Callan, 2004; Wheeler, 2007).  Provided these less-than-ideal circumstances, department 
chairs must work doubly hard to create a coherent faculty unit (Tierney, 1997), forge a 
positive working environment (Lindholm, 2003; Zorn & Boler, 2007), and protect faculty 
identity (Hakala, 2008).  Indeed, the leadership and cohesion of an academic unit are 
critical components of any effort to counteract departmental and/or programmatic 
elimination proceedings—an under-researched phenomenon in American higher 
education (Eckel, 2003).           
Conceptual Framework 
 The changing historical and financial landscape of public post-secondary 
education has and will continue to affect individual department chairs and faculty 
members across American higher education.  A complex and convoluted process, the 
elimination of a department and/or program is a highly emotional occurrence plagued by 
various iterations of uncertainty (Department Chair X, personal communication, April 7, 
2011).  As such, this study employs uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004) as a 
guiding theoretical framework.   
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 An adaptation of Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) seminal work, Bordia et al. 
(2004) posit three iterations of uncertainty during organizational change: strategic, 
structural, and job-related.  In this regard, strategic uncertainty refers to uncertainty 
regarding organization-level issues, such as reasons for change, planning and future 
direction of the organization, its sustainability, the nature of the business environment the 
organization will face, and so forth.  Further, structural uncertainty refers to uncertainty 
arising from changes to the inner workings of the organization, such as reporting 
structures and functions of different work units. Finally, job-related uncertainty refers to 
uncertainty regarding job security, promotion opportunities, changes to the job role, and 
so forth.  Tested via a Likert-type survey, the combinations of strategic, structural, and 
job-related uncertainties informed individuals’ appraisal of organizational change.  For 
the purposes of the present study, the findings elicited by the Bordia et al. (2004) 
conceptual framework warrant further application.  Indeed, the similarities in 
organizational type (state government organization), unit of analysis (the individual), and 
organizational context (change) identify this study as a viable candidate for transference 
to qualitative methodology.   
Purpose  
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore department chair and 
faculty perceptions of implementing a departmental or programmatic elimination.  
Specifically, this study addressed the extent to which strategic, structural, and job-related 
uncertainties prevail during a departmental or programmatic elimination. This study took 
place at a public, research intensive institution located in the western region of the United 
States (hereafter referred to as Mountain University), and focused on the events leading 
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up to and including the implementation of the state’s 2011-2013 legislative appropriation 
for higher education.   
Research Design 
 As the purpose of this dissertation is to explore individual, lived experiences, I 
selected a qualitative research design to accomplish this objective.  In accordance with 
Merriams’s (1998) case study protocol, the intent of this inquiry is to gain and “in-depth 
understanding…of a single unit or bounded system” (p.19). In this multiple, embedded 
case study, the bounded systems were four academic departments impacted by 
departmental or programmatic eliminations at Mountain University during the 2011-2013 
biennial budgetary cycle.  In an effort to illuminate this broader construct, I examined 
four instrumental iterations (Creswell, 2007) of a departmental/programmatic 
elimination: two units slated for elimination but ultimately saved, and two units 
eliminated outright.  Within these iterations, I interviewed the department chair and two 
faculty members, in an effort to understand the resultant individual experiences 
characteristic of these three unique outcomes. 
 Moreover, the rationale for selecting Mountain University for this case study was 
directly attributable to the institution’s fiscal predicament as a public institution.  Forced 
to contend with an overall decline in state revenue, the Mountain State legislature 
significantly reduced appropriations to Mountain University during the 2011-2013 
budgetary biennium (Lake, February 16, 2011).  As a means of meeting the reduction 
targets mandated by the Mountain State legislature, Mountain University elected to 
eliminate selected academic departments and programmatic units.  Based upon the 
qualitative concept of purposive sampling (Bernard & Ryan, 2010), department chairs 
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and faculty members in these units represented the individuals qualified to participate in 
this study.  All eligible department chairs received a physical letter of contact inviting 
them to participate in this study.  The willingness of the department chair to participate in 
this study determined which units were ultimately selected for inclusion. Faculty in units 
with participating department chairs were then contacted for inclusion in this study.   
 In accordance with case study protocol, I included multiple sources of information 
and employed several analytic methodologies throughout this dissertation.  Though semi-
structured interviews formed the foundation of this study, I supplemented these narrative 
accounts with observations, public records, and personal documents (Merriam, 1998).  
Aided by the qualitative software package of ATLAS.ti, I constructed codes, categories, 
and themes using a variety of methodological techniques (Lewins & Silver, 2004).  
Guided by uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004), I employed constant 
comparison and analytic induction in an effort to explicate the essence of the narrators’ 
lived experiences.  Within-case analysis and cross-case analysis ensued upon completion 
of data collection, resulting in a comprehensive narrative account of the 
departmental/programmatic elimination process at Mountain University (Merriam, 2009).   
Research Questions 
 Upon review of the relevant literature, it became apparent that the departmental 
and programmatic elimination process is an under-researched topic of inquiry.  In an 
effort to remedy this oversight, I aimed to address the following research questions 
during the course of this study:   
1. How do individuals experience a potential departmental/programmatic 
elimination? 
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2. To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest 
themselves during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations? 
3. How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainties?  
4. How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between 
saved and eliminated units?  
These research questions flow from the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction 
theory, highlighting the complex interaction between faculty members and department 
chairs during a departmental/programmatic elimination.   
Definition of Key Terms 
 The following definitions are provided to clarify the terms used throughout this 
study: 
Academic Department: The strategic unit within colleges and universities in 
which faculty and department chairs serve the constituents of the department and where 
faculty fulfill their teaching and research interests (Leaming, 2007).    
Academic Program: A cohesive arrangement of college level credit courses and 
experiences designed to accomplish predetermined objectives leading to the awarding of 
a degree, diploma, or certificate (Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, 2009). 
Across-the-Board (Horizontal) Cut Backs: The most frequently used institutional 
cost-saving strategy; these approaches are not concerned with intentionally changing the 
ways in which the organization interacts with its environment (Eckel, 2003).    
Department Chair: The official designated leader of an academic department in a 
college or university (Leaming, 2007).  
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Financial exigency: An imminent financial crisis that threatens the survival of the 
institution as a whole and that cannot be alleviated by less drastic means (AAUP, 2009).   
Job-related uncertainty: Uncertainty regarding job security, promotion 
opportunities, changes to the job role, and so forth (Bordia et al., 2004).  
Latent content: The deep structural meaning conveyed by a message (Berg, 2007). 
Manifest content: The surface structure present in a message (Berg, 2007).  
Strategic uncertainty: Uncertainty regarding organization-level issues, such as 
reasons for change, planning and future direction of the organization, its sustainability, 
the nature of the business environment the organization will face, and so forth (Bordia et 
al., 2004).  
Structural uncertainty: Uncertainty arising from changes to the inner workings of 
the organization, such as reporting structures and functions of different work units 
(Bordia et al., 2004).    
Targeted (Vertical) Cutbacks: Institutional cost-saving strategy where particular 
units or programs face deeper reductions, or even elimination.  These targeted cuts 
consist of an evaluation of one unit against others based upon criteria to maximize the 
organization-environment fit (Eckel, 2003).     
Uncertainty: An individual’s inability to predict something accurately (Milliken, 
1987).  
Limitations 
 Limitations are a natural component of any research design; no study can 
encompass all aspects of a phenomenon in its entirety.  As such, this study is limited by 
its institutional-level focus and small pool of potential participants.  Furthermore, though 
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an abundance of official documentation exists in relation to the budgetary woes of 
Mountain University, it is wise to consider the sanitized nature of this form of 
communication.  Formal accounts in administrative reports, newspaper interviews, and 
authorized meeting minutes may not truly reflect the highly contentious nature of 
university downsizing.  With insufficient access to private correspondence and 
confidential communications, I readily acknowledge the limits of documental 
triangulation. 
 In addition to aforementioned constraints, it must be noted that all participants in 
this study were full-time, tenured faculty members gainfully employed at Mountain 
University.  During departmental/programmatic elimination proceedings, non-tenured 
faculty and visiting professors are generally the first individuals to be terminated, as their 
contracts are not guaranteed beyond yearly appointments. Furthermore, the perceived 
instability of an institution embroiled in this type of organizational change often prompts 
tenured faculty to retire early or seek employment elsewhere, limiting the pool of 
potential participants.  As such, the perspectives of the individuals highlighted in this 
study should be taken within this institutional context.   
 Moreover, facets of qualitative interview methodology place additional 
limitations on the findings of this study.  Indeed, retrospective reflection on past events is 
limited by the narrator’s memory, his/her perceptive lens, and a natural inclination to 
present one’s self in the best possible light.  Controversial actions and personal 
conversations relevant to the study may be purposefully withheld from the researcher, in 
order to protect the narrator and attendant institutional confidantes.  Furthermore, 
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narrators may temper their responses for fear of institutional identification and retributive 
repercussions.   
Additionally, as the conduit for data collection, the researcher brings her own 
inherent limitations to bear on this study.  As the quality of dialogue is dependent upon 
the interviewer’s ability to provide appropriate prompts, probes, and directional guidance, 
my value as a researcher will hinge on the aforementioned standards.  Moreover, the 
conversion of raw interview data into robust explanatory content is limited by my 
analytical ability to triangulate ideas, discern motivations, and analyze themes.  Past 
experiences and integrated knowledge of the related literature may well introduce 
unforeseen biases; these can only be remedied by extensive explication by the researcher 
in areas appropriate for first-person commentary. 
Significance of the Study 
 As a function of the current economic downturn, the concept of “budget cuts” is 
firmly entrenched in the public mind.  However, abstract figures on institutional balance 
sheets do not adequately address the human toll of financial retrenchment.  While 
declining state support for higher education is well documented from a quantitative 
standpoint, qualitative analyses are few and far between.  Indeed, there is no available 
scholarship on the implementation of departmental or programmatic elimination 
directives.  As such, the current study stands to fill a noticeable gap in university 
leadership literature.  In addition to the numerous roles and responsibilities already 
assumed by department chairs and faculty members, it is increasingly evident that 
departmental and programmatic attrition has become a new facet of academic life. Given 
this burgeoning trend of academic downsizing, it is critical that those at the forefront of 
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this phenomenon have the ability to research and learn from the experiences of their 
colleagues.     
Summary 
 This chapter provided a brief overview of the research topic and introduced the 
basic tenets of the study’s design.  In an effort to explicate the phenomenon of academic 
attrition, the following sections were included in this chapter: a succinct summary of the 
relevant literature, an explanation of the study’s conceptual framework; the purpose of 
conducting the study; research questions; research design; definition of key terms; 
limitations; and significance of the study.  The following chapter will provide a more 
comprehensive review of the related literature, with reference to the broader historical 
and financial context of the departmental/programmatic elimination movement in higher 
education.  Through a more nuanced understanding of pertinent scholarship, uncertainty 
reduction theory will emerge as the intellectual scaffolding undergirding the present 
study.      
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 The contextual factors which influence departmental and programmatic 
eliminations are indeed numerous, and draw from a variety of disciplinary frameworks.  
An emergent paradigm in higher education, departmental/programmatic eliminations 
have forced academics to reconsider the multifarious purposes, priorities, and politics 
inherent in public university systems (Eckel, 2003).  As such, the purpose of this 
qualitative case study is to explore department chair and faculty perceptions of 
implementing departmental and/or programmatic eliminations at one public, research 
extensive institution.  Through this analysis of lived experience, it may be possible to 
contribute to a burgeoning body of practical scholarship on academic attrition.  As such, 
this study aims to assist institutional stakeholders across the country who are struggling 
to understand this emergent phenomenon in higher education.   
 Chapter 2 provides a review of the pertinent scholarly research and theory on 
departmental and programmatic eliminations, department chair roles and responsibilities, 
and the relationship of the department chair to his or her faculty colleagues.  The chapter 
begins with a chronological overview of academic expansion and attrition in American 
higher education, followed by a discussion on the external environmental factors 
impacting public post-secondary funding streams.  Having addressed the historical and 
economic conditions undergirding this phenomenon, the second part of the literature 
review focuses on the human element of department/program eliminations.  Following 
this explication of department chair roles, responsibilities, and attendant faculty 
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relationships, the chapter concludes with a detailed explanation of the conceptual 
framework underpinning this study.                       
Historical Background on Department/Program Eliminations 
The relationship between the federal government and American higher education 
is often characterized as a “social contract” (Perorazio, 2001).  In this symbiotic 
exchange, public investment in post-secondary education resulted in a series of civic 
gains benefitting society at large.  In addition to economic and cultural development, 
advances in education, technology, medicine, and modern science are all attributable to 
the strong linkages forged between higher education and the federal government 
(Perorazio, 2001).  However, in the past thirty years, fissures in this seemingly 
unbreakable social contract have surfaced, resulting in a competitive disciplinary 
hierarchy in higher education (Geiger, 2005).  Indeed, as the private economic benefits of 
post-secondary education supplanted the old paradigm of societal betterment, an 
individual’s return on investment came to dictate the relative worth of various 
departments and degree programs (Cohen, 1998).  Reflecting on historical cross-currents 
from World War II to the present, it is apparent that cycles of departmental/programmatic 
growth and attrition in American higher education have occurred in concert with broader 
national developments.         
History of Higher Education 1945-1960s 
 The immediate post-war period to the mid-1960s is often referred to as the 
“golden age” of American higher education (Freeland, 2007).  Confronted with the 
possibility of civil unrest and rampant unemployment upon the return of tens of 
thousands of U.S. soldiers, the federal government drafted legislation designed to retool 
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these newly minted veterans of World War II (Thomas, 1997). The Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944 (more commonly referred to as the GI Bill), underwrote the 
post-war higher education boom by providing a sizable financial incentive to enroll in a 
post-secondary institution.  Covering tuition, books, and a housing stipend for full-time 
students based on years of military service, the GI Bill retrained soldiers for careers in the 
burgeoning post-war economy (Cohen, 1998).   
 Though the GI Bill did not restrict veterans as to discipline of study, a series of 
national events heightened the attractiveness of selected career paths.  Indeed, just as the 
European combat phase was winding down, an ideological conflict erupted between the 
backers of American-style capitalism and those in favor of Soviet communism (Lazerson, 
2007).  Winning this quasi-military conflict, known as the Cold War, became the top 
priority of the federal government, resulting in significant ramifications for higher 
education (Geiger, 2005).  Following the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957, 
the Eisenhower administration took decisive action to improve America’s technological 
and cultural competitiveness (Freeland, 2007).  In August 1958, Congress passed the 
National Defense Education Act, providing additional federal grant aid to students 
studying foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, and the new educational 
technologies of television and radio (Furman, 1958).    
 As higher education became inexorably intertwined with national security, federal 
funding flowed freely to sustain and strengthen this mutually beneficial enterprise. In 
tandem with the Sputnik scare of 1957, President Eisenhower’s Committee on Education 
Beyond the High School published a report detailing the alarming shortage of Ph.D.’s in 
higher education (Freeland, 2007).  With demand for doctorates outpacing supply, 
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graduate programs and faculty salaries grew exponentially, elevating the status of 
academia to previously unforeseen heights (Freeland, 2007).  As competition for federal 
research dollars accelerated, institutions devised generous compensation packages to 
attract top scholars in a variety of disciplines (Geiger, 2005).  Through the creation and 
generous funding of several agencies in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably the National 
Science Foundation, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, the National 
Institutes of Health, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, the federal 
government institutionalized a national infrastructure to support scholarly achievement in 
higher education (Geiger, 2005).  Devised out of economic necessity and sustained by 
synergetic purpose, this reciprocal relationship insured a booming American economy 
and laid the foundation for a superior system of higher education.  However, as national 
interests turned to a new foreign conflict and social issues took center stage on American 
campuses, this seemingly unbreakable bond began to unravel, forever altering public 
perception of the social contract.                   
History of Higher Education 1960s-1970s 
 As the Baby Boomer generation supplanted WWII veterans at the nation’s 
colleges and universities, military and domestic affairs converged to create powder keg 
conditions for American higher education.  With the century’s largest eighteen-to-twenty-
one-year-old age cohort (Geiger, 2005) occupying the hallowed halls of academe, 
changing political headwinds threatened to disrupt this extended period of postwar 
prosperity.  Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, escalating combat 
operations in Vietnam eventually turned a cold war of words into a full-blown military 
engagement (Cohen, 1998). As advances in information technology beamed horrific 
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wartime footage to television sets across the country, college students came to connect 
the oppression of peoples of color abroad with the injustices perpetrated against African 
Americans at home (Cohen, 1998).   
 Reinvigorating the long-simmering civil rights movement, college students of all 
races and creeds protested institutional racism through sit-ins, campus protests, and 
counter-cultural expression (Geiger, 2005).  Within the ivory tower, progressive 
academics and like-minded students questioned an outmoded curriculum founded on the 
preeminence of Western civilization.  Reflecting on this curricular change, higher 
education historian Roger Geiger (2005) made the following observation:  
 One clarion call of the student rebellion was for relevance in university studies.   
 Relevance indeed became a hallmark of the new era but in ways not anticipated  
 by student activists.  They had advocated a tendentious relevance predicated on  
 the university’s role as an aloof critic of society. Thus, they urged universities to  
 study and seek to ameliorate problems stemming from the Vietnam War, racial  
 inequality, poverty, and the environment. These topics long remained  
 preoccupations on campuses, but more powerful trends toward relevance were 
welling up.  Students sought a more tangible form of relevance by turning away 
from the arts and sciences and toward more vocational or professional majors 
(p.65).  
 
Indeed, just as departments of African American, Asian, Chicano, and Women’s studies 
emerged on the academic landscape, (Crowley, 1999; Trombley, 1970) flagging student 
interest caused degree production in the liberal arts disciplines to decline from a high of 
47% in the heyday of the 1960s to just over 25% in the 1970s (Geiger, 2005).  Moreover, 
the “demonstrations, strikes, and violence during the 1960s and early 1970s divided 
higher education from within and diminished enthusiasm for it among politicians and the 
public at large as they questioned whether higher education had become yet another 
mistaken entitlement of the welfare state” (Lazerson, 2007, p. 794). Undeniably broken, 
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the sacrosanct social contract shifted from public societal good to private economic 
benefit with the passing of this watershed moment in American higher education.   
History of Higher Education 1980s 
 In sharp contrast to the rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960s and 
1970s, a new conservatism accompanied the Reagan revolution of the 1980s (Geiger, 
2005).  This powerful political paradigm pervaded the nation, redefining the discourse on 
public-private enterprise.  In this manner, the private economic benefits of post-
secondary attainment slowly superseded the social democratic function of higher 
education.  As a function of this decisive shift, institutions of higher education came to 
espouse a more market-oriented philosophy, emphasizing research productivity, revenue 
generation, and graduate earnings (Zusman, 2005).  In the public sector, in particular, 
precipitous declines in state appropriations jeopardized the traditional liberal arts and 
non-scientific specialty programs, as these units often failed to conform to free market 
indicators (Trow, 2010).     
 In one of the first articles to address this phenomenon, Slaughter (1993) analyzed 
seventeen faculty dismissal cases reported by the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) in Academe from 1980-1990.  Dealing specifically with downsizing, 
financial exigency, and programmatic reduction, this case study provided an enlightening 
overview of the burgeoning retrenchment phenomenon in higher education.  Utilizing 
critical feminist and neo-Marxian theories to guide her study, Slaughter (1993) situated 
her findings in larger political, economic, and patriarchal discourses.  Linking abrogation 
of tenure to the recession of 1983 and the conservatism of the Reagan/Bush eras, 
Slaughter (1993) examined the restructuring of professional labor, the managerial 
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practice of retrenchment, and faculty response to downsizing, drawing conclusions as to 
the identifiable patterns in all seventeen cases.   
 Slaughter’s (1993) findings indicated that state budgetary shortfalls and property 
tax limitations often precipitated programmatic reductions, and that these “intimations of 
financial crisis consolidated power and authority in institutional administrations” (p.260).  
Moreover, this concentration of influence allowed administrators to fundamentally 
restructure higher education under the guise of retrenchment. Breaking down the 
seventeen AAUP cases by field, Slaughter (1993) discovered that “72.9 percent of the 
firings occurred in the social sciences, liberal arts, and education,” (p.270) 
disproportionately impacting female faculty and the female students who gravitated 
toward those disciplines. Furthermore, “faculty who were not retrenched (science, 
engineering, medicine, business, law) were generally in fields close to major mission 
agencies, had powerful external constituencies, and were routes to highly paid careers 
that enabled graduates to donate monies to colleges and universities” (p.273).  Lending 
credence to Slaughter’s (1993) prescient discovery, authors Brint, Turk-Bicakci, and 
Levy (2005) drew similar conclusions when analyzing the decline of the liberal arts in 
American higher education.  Expounding on this phenomenon, Brint et al. (2005) 
concluded:  
The smaller arts and sciences disciplines, particularly area studies and foreign 
languages and literatures, have faced significant downsizing and even elimination, 
while interdisciplinary majors in the arts and sciences have grown more popular 
among administrators, sometimes as much for economic as for intellectual 
reasons (p.172) 
 
Provided the larger economic and political pressures to conform to the free market, it is 
small wonder that higher education turned away from the liberal arts towards vocational, 
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revenue-generating degree offerings in this business-oriented decade.  In the coming 
years, state fiscal crises would accelerate this trend, solidifying the academic 
preeminence of STEM (science, technology, engineering, math) disciplines (Brint, 
Proctor, Murphy, & Hanneman, 2012).     
History of Higher Education 1990s-Present 
 Moving into the 1990s, it is clear that market factors continued to shape the 
academic landscape.  In this manner, several authors (Crano, 1995; Fedler et al., 1998; 
Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995) provided anecdotal evidence of departmental 
elimination battles in vulnerable liberal art and social scientific fields.  Just as the 
recession of 1983 precipitated many of the AAUP cases in Slaughter’s (1993) study, 
economic downturns in the 1990s placed faculty in social work (Reinardy & Halter, 
1994), communication studies (Crano, 1995; Seiler, 1995) and journalism (Fedler et al., 
1998) in the unenviable positions of having to defend their respective disciplinary merits.  
Indeed, discussions of research productivity (Fedler et al., 1998), external funding 
(Crano, 1995; Seiler, 1995), and a disproportionate impact on women (Reinardy & 
Halter, 1994) pervade this literature, lending credence to Slaughter’s (1993) predictive 
prowess.   
 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the sporadic literature on 
programmatic reduction reached its tipping point, culminating in Eckel’s (2003) case 
study of four Carnegie classified research universities. Using a multi-lens organizational 
framework to study institutional structure, human resources, politics, and symbolism, 
Eckel (2003) examined the process, effects, and common themes of program 
discontinuance.  Like the aforementioned studies, Eckel’s (2003) institutions were forced 
24 
 
to contend with declining state-level resources, thus prompting the discussions of 
program closure.  In the tradition of Slaughter (1993), Eckel (2003) analyzed suspected 
reasons for program discontinuance, delving deep into the institutions’ culture via 
multiple stakeholder interviews and pertinent document analysis.  Moreover, Eckel 
(2003) juxtaposed stated elimination criteria with suspected termination rules, revealing a 
stark dichotomy between official communications and stakeholder messages. 
Though mission centrality, quality, cost, and demand permeated the official 
discourse on program discontinuance, this ostensible display of shared governance was 
undercut by mitigating intra-institutional factors.  Referencing the units targeted for 
elimination, overwhelmingly liberal arts, education, and communications disciplines, 
Eckel (2003) made the following observation:  
The administrative leaders at these four institutions additionally worked to make  
politically defensible decisions…The closed programs at all four campuses tended  
to have low numbers of faculty, students, and alumni. The units did not have  
champions on or off campus willing to take up their cause.  Departmental  
leadership tended to be novice or ineffectual; their alumni small or dispersed; and  
their faculty disconnected from campus power circles. (p.114). 
 
Eckel’s (2003) commentary underscores the internal politics and dearth of data-driven 
decision-making during the programmatic elimination process.  Unfortunately, recent 
scholarship (Reed, Cooper, & Young, 2007) and spate of articles published by the 
Chronicle of Higher Education (Carlson, 2011; Glenn, 2008; Wasley, 2008; Wilson, 
2009), largely confirms the aforementioned trends. Forced to contend with declining state 
revenues, public institutions of higher education are cutting departments, programs, 
(Carlson, 2011; Glenn, 2008; Reed et al., 2007; Wasley, 2008) faculty, (Wilson, 2009) 
and staff (Rosser, 2012) in earnest in order to compensate for unprecedented, state-level 
budget reductions.     
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Concluding Remarks on the History of Department/Program Eliminations  
 Though the social contract remains a powerful ideal in American higher 
education, it is evident that conditions facilitating this once strong linkage have since 
dissolved.  While diverse scholarly productivity propelled the United States to economic 
and cultural supremacy post-World War II, the perception of college campuses as 
hotbeds of anti-government radicalism heralded the decline of this fortuitous union 
(Cohen, 1998).  As public perception shifted from admiration to suspicion, higher 
education eventually became a means to an end, thus supplanting the fundamental 
intellectual journey (Lazerson, 2007). With limited high-paying job opportunities, 
students rebuffed the liberal arts, education, and communication disciplines in favor of 
lucrative careers in STEM-oriented fields (Geiger, 2005).  Prompted by state fiscal crises, 
higher education administrators acceded to this trend, eliminating departments and 
programs which did not have lucrative research potential, wealthy alumni, or powerful 
external constituencies (Eckel, 2003).  As a result of these changing political, economic, 
and social circumstances, an unspoken disciplinary hierarchy now permeates American 
higher education, jeopardizing the long-term legitimacy of general knowledge degree 
programs.  
Financial Background on Department/Program Eliminations 
 Though academic publications often distinguish between “public” and “private” 
higher education, the increasing financial similarity between these two categories of 
institutions is certainly cause for public concern.  Buoyed by state subsidies, public 
universities provide their services at a significant discount to consumers, underscoring the 
assertion that an educated citizenry is a significant state-wide asset.  However, long-term 
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fiscal trends, exacerbated by economic recessions, point to “an increasing privatization of 
higher education” (Massy, 2001, p. 458).  Forced to compete with other civic priorities 
for scarce shares of state revenue, public higher education has become progressively 
tuition-dependent as a substitute for shrinking state appropriations (Delta Cost Project, 
2009). In the state of Nevada, where structural deficits and inelastic revenue streams 
dominate the fiscal landscape (Hovey, 1999), the most recent financial downturn has 
aggravated these long-simmering national trends, resulting in the elimination of entire 
departments and programs from its university system (Lake, 2011).  Through the 
examination of macro-level financial indicators in public higher education, it is apparent 
that substituting tuition for state subsidy has and will continue to transform a not-for-
profit entity into a profit-conscious enterprise.       
State Funding Priorities 
 In order to comprehend the financial predicament facing public higher education 
more fully, it is important to understand the relative distribution of state funding 
preferences.  Ranking atop the priority list are federally mandated expenditures on 
compulsory education and low-income health care, comprising 40-50% of state 
budgetary outlays (Zusman, 2005).  As several authors have noted (Cheslock & Hughes, 
2011; Ehrenberg, 2006; Hauptman, 2001; Jones, 2009; Layzell, 2007; McGuinness Jr., 
2005; Reindl & Reyna, 2011), K-12 and Medicaid spending will only increase in the 
coming decades, as a result of demographic and economic trends.   
Elaborating on this financial forecast, policy analyst Harold Hovey (1999) points 
to the growth in school-aged and elderly populations as catalysts for state spending 
decisions.  As K-12 enrollments swell, the budget for this area must rise accordingly, as a 
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means of accommodating additional construction, maintenance, and instructional 
expenditures.  While it is certainly within the purview of state decision-makers to refuse 
to fund these additional expenditures, cutting compulsory education is a politically 
unpopular option.  The combined force of teachers, parents, and school board members 
represents a powerful ideological constituency—and a voting bloc able to make or break 
a political candidacy (Hovey, 1999).   
In much the same manner as the K-12 community, senior citizens have become an 
influential interest group in American politics.  With the eminent retirement of the Baby 
Boom generation on the horizon, the needs of the elderly will indeed become a driving 
force in the state budgetary process.  With savings accounts and retirement plans 
decimated by the most recent recession (SHEEO, 2011), increasing numbers of senior 
citizens have met the means-test for Medicaid eligibility (Hovey, 1999).  Moreover, as 
health care and nursing home costs escalate, the percentage of state expenditures 
dedicated to Medicaid will assuredly continue to climb (Layzell, 2007). 
Though corrections’ spending is not tied to federal mandates, multitudinous 
factors contribute to its prominence on the state balance ledger.  First and foremost, being 
“tough on crime,” is a winning political posture, and enactment of strict sentencing laws 
constitutes a campaign promise fulfilled.  Furthermore, popular “Three Strikes and 
You’re Out” bills have contributed to lengthened and longer-served sentences, driving 
operating costs upward (Cohen, 1998). As a function of these punitive policies, the 
number of inmates in state correctional facilities has increased annually by 5% since the 
early 1990s (Hovey, 1999).  With scores of new prisoners to house, feed, and otherwise 
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maintain, it is no wonder that prison construction, staffing, and upkeep are outpacing 
state funding for higher education (Okunade, 2004).    
With roughly 60% of a state’s budget expended on K-12, Medicaid, and 
corrections alone, it is evident that higher education is competing for a shrinking slice of 
the state revenue pie.  Considered a discretionary expenditure, higher education 
represented approximately 11.8% of general fund spending in fiscal year 2005 (Layzell, 
2007).  However, these pre-recession figures do not account for the dramatic declines in 
state revenue since 2008 (SHEEO, 2011).  As articulated by Hovey (1999), higher 
education’s funding levels are closely tied to the overall economic health of the nation.  
Therefore, in a strong economy, higher education typically receives a substantial 
appropriation relative to other state services.  Conversely, during tough fiscal times, 
higher education bears a larger brunt of the shared financial sacrifice.  In this manner, 
fluctuations in spending levels “stem from the use of higher education as a balance wheel 
in state finance” (Hovey, 1999, p.19).  Unwilling and unable to rely on an unstable 
revenue stream, public institutions of higher education have increased their revenue-
generating capacity to account for these significant declines in state appropriations.  
Furthermore, as states struggle to close major budget deficits, financial necessity will 
force higher education institutions to hasten these alternative fundraising efforts 
(Cheslock & Hughes, 2011).   
Institutional Revenue Sources  
 In order to understand how reductions in state appropriations have impacted 
public universities, it is imperative to examine the historical origins of higher education 
revenue.  In 1975-1976, the four largest revenue sources were state government (31%), 
29 
 
tuition and fees (21%), sales and services (19%), and the federal government (16%).  
Twenty years later, in 1994-1995, these revenue sources reflected the following 
distributions: tuition and fees (27%), sales and services (23%), state government (23%), 
and the federal government (12%) (Cohen, 1998).  Between 1995 and 2006, the shift 
from state subsidy to private burden became even more pronounced, as “the dominant 
revenue pattern across public institutions was the growing dependence on tuitions as a 
primary source of revenue” (Delta Cost Project, 2009, p.13).  Some states, such as 
Florida, have decided that tuition differentials that once allowed for enhanced academic 
programs should instead supplant funds diverted from universities due to budgetary 
shortfalls, tax cuts, or other incentives that place a growing burden on students.  In 1990, 
state funding covered seventy-one percent of the costs to educate students in Florida’s 
public universities; twenty years later, that percentage dipped to forty-nine percent while 
students shouldered the burden through tuition increases (USF Oracle Editorial Opinion, 
2012). 
 In tandem with this escalating reliance on tuition revenue, public post-secondary 
institutions are becoming more entrepreneurial in their quest to generate funds from 
individual donors and private industry.  As noted by Hauptman (2001), “fundraising is 
increasingly part of the responsibilities of public sector officials,” as indicated by the 
“growth of foundations at public colleges and universities” (p.119). In addition to more 
frequent and aggressive capital campaigns, public institutions have become reliant upon 
sponsored research as a substitute for state revenue (Massy, 2001).  Driven to increase 
their proportion of extramural funds, state universities have made substantial investments 
in elaborate research parks in the hopes of attracting private corporations to campus 
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(Cohen, 1998).  Though many perceive this enterprising behavior as a positive means of 
financial adjustment, the pressure to generate alternative revenue has recalibrated the 
public mission of state institutions.  Forced to behave like a business, the priorities of 
public higher education have shifted accordingly.         
Institutional Funding Priorities  
 In the new paradigm of higher education finance, public institutions will 
disproportionately allocate scarce resources to activities that will generate the greatest 
perceived return on investment.  As indicated by the Delta Cost Project (2009), an 
independent non-profit organization which tracks trends in college spending, 
expenditures per student on instruction declined between 2002 and 2005 at public 
institutions.  Provided that classroom teaching does not produce revenue, and in fact 
detracts from instructors’ ability to conduct lucrative research, this downturn in 
instructional allocations is unsurprising (Ginsberg, 2011).  As a result of this shift in 
institutional policy, undergraduate time-to-degree at public institutions has lengthened 
considerably, with students requiring an average of 5-6 years to complete a traditional 
four-year degree (Hauptman, 2001).  
While these overall decreases in instructional expenditures are common 
knowledge within the higher education community, the patterns of decline amongst 
specific academic disciplines are not nearly as prominent.  Indeed, academic attrition 
does not affect all departments and degree programs equally, as instructional allocations 
generally follow the fiscal principles previously discussed.  As noted by Zusman (2005): 
…fields unable to tie themselves to market needs may be disproportionately cut.  
Over the next decade, humanities and social science programs may be at risk if 
institutions implement budget systems that require departments to generate 
income equal to their costs (p.122).      
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In times of economic downturn, especially, entrepreneurial executives may move 
aggressively in this direction under the guise of financial necessity.  According to Massy 
(2001): 
Administrators may harbor secret lists of programs that have outlived their 
usefulness, but which would be politically difficult to close in normal 
circumstances. A budget-cutting climate offers the opportunity to move against 
these “targets of opportunity,” usually in the context of speeches about “making 
hard choices” (p.450).   
 
Unfortunately, these “hard choices” have come to redefine the academic landscape, 
privileging market-oriented disciplines over less lucrative general knowledge and liberal 
arts fields.      
Concluding Remarks on Financial Aspects of Department/Program Eliminations 
 Though substituting alternative revenue sources for state subsidy has temporarily 
stabilized higher education finance, it is evident that the long-term consequences of this 
shift significantly outweigh the short-term benefits.  Indeed, as the fiscal foundation of 
state appropriations continues to erode, public institutions have less incentive to offer 
services aimed at altruistic ends.  As a tone of “let those who use it pay for it” (Cohen, 
1998, p.453) pervades higher education, financial demands will place mounting pressure 
on institutions to offer degree programs in line with this economic theory.  As posited by 
Massy (2001), the answers to two critical questions shall define the course of higher 
education in the twenty-first century: 
How will market forces affect that most fundamental objective of the classic 
university—to nurture the community of scholars that since ancient times has 
conserved and advanced mankind’s intellectual and cultural heritage? Under what 
conditions will academic institutions be able to defend intellectual autonomy in 
the face of privatization? (p.460). 
Absent a renewed commitment to state subsidies to higher education, the comeback to 
this call to action may not measure up to the desired response.  By removing the “public” 
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from public higher education, heightened tuition rates pale in comparison to the broader 
intellectual repercussions on the imminent horizon.      
Department Chair Roles/Responsibilities 
 Torn between the various responsibilities of faculty life and administrative 
protocol, the position of academic department chair encompasses a plethora of related 
roles and responsibilities.  Likened to the Roman god, Janus, “with faces oriented in 
opposite directions,” (Gmelch & Burns, 1993, p.260), academic department chairs must 
balance the stresses associated with the duality of this position.  Indeed, in a survey of 
department chairs at 101 research and doctorate-granting institutions, Gmelch and Burns 
(1993) found that an unmanageable workload ranked first in an analysis of serious 
stressors affecting workplace productivity.  In a more recent survey, Hendel and Horn 
(2008) discovered an empirical link between workload overload, role conflict, and 
employment at a public higher education institution.  Furthermore, this conflict is 
exacerbated by a lack of training programs (Friel, 2010; Wolverton & Ackerman, 2006) 
designed to ensure a smooth transition to this hybrid position.   
 Provided the aforementioned parameters, it is important to outline the vast and 
varied tasks associated with the department chair position.  An under-researched segment 
of scholarship, Tucker (1993) elevated the profile of department chairs by delineating 
fifty-four discrete responsibilities associated with the position.  Encompassing 
governance, instruction, faculty affairs, student affairs, communication, budget and 
resource allocation, office management, and professional development, Tucker’s (1993) 
research illuminated the need for further empirical investigation. Tucker’s 
contemporaries, Carroll and Gmelch (1992), complemented this field of study through 
33 
 
factor analysis, discovering four typologies associated with effective chairperson 
performance.  Based upon a survey of one hundred department chairs at Carnegie 
classified research and doctorate granting institutions, Carroll and Gmelch (1992) 
identified leader-chairs, scholar-chairs, faculty developer-chairs, and manager-chairs, 
associating task competencies with the respective positions. Far from a sinecure, 
leadership at the departmental level necessitates knowledge of administrative 
organization, resource management, faculty development, and effective cooperation 
(Wolverton, Gmelch, Wolverton, & Sarros, 1999).   
 In more recent years, as a function of economic circumstance and stakeholder 
expansion, the communicative aspects of the department chair position (Leaming, 2007; 
Lees, 2006) have gained prominence.  Indeed, as the public financial commitment to 
higher education continues to decline (Hovey, 1999) and institutional budgets 
accordingly constrict, chairs have had to become deft in the art of departmental advocacy 
(Eckel, 2003).  Expounding on this burgeoning trend, Lees (2006) underscores the 
relationship between resource allocation and effective academic leadership, noting: 
 In some cases, programs may be eliminated.  Such programs would likely be  
 identified by a cost analysis indicating that they cost far more than they generate 
 and by an academic analysis indicating that they are not likely to produce degrees 
 that will be in high demand…Chairs will play a critical role in articulating the  
 interrelationships among programs so that, if necessary, such reductions happen  
 in ways that allow the institution to emerge stronger (p.251).  
 
In addition to working within the familiar landscape of academe, department chairs must 
increasingly communicate with external constituents, including alumni, legislators, the 
news media, and the general public, as a means of promoting the department’s 
contributions to the community (Leaming, 2007). Indeed, the complexity of managing a 
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contemporary academic department has even prompted the emergence of discipline-
specific scholarship (Aggarwal, Rochford, & Vaidyanathan, 2009).  
 Exemplifying a recent scholarly turn, Berdrow (2010) rejects the study of the 
department chair in isolation in favor of a more nuanced understanding of the department 
chair’s place in the larger academic hierarchy.  Taking a 360º approach to the position, 
Berdrow (2010) examines “the role of the department chair by analyzing it in the context 
of the institution’s goals and expectations, the stakeholders affecting and affected by the 
department chair, and the chair’s own capabilities” (p.499).  Harnessing theories of 
managerial human capital, managerial social capital, managerial cognition, organizational 
complexity, and role socialization to frame her study, Berdrow (2010) conducted 
interviews and focus groups with current liberal arts and business department chairs, 
former department chairs, and institutional stakeholders at a private business university in 
the Northeastern United States.   
As a consequence of this study, Berdrow (2010) categorized department chair 
roles as either managerial (faculty development, student development, communication 
and representation, and operations and administration) or transformational 
(catalyst/innovation and climate enhancement).  Moreover, in addition to the myriad 
demands encompassed in these six designations, Berdrow (2010) discovered a significant 
“disconnect between stakeholder views of the DC role” (p.508).  While department chairs 
focused the majority of their energies on daily administrative and climate maintenance 
functions, stakeholders voiced varied opinions on where department chairs should devote 
the bulk of their time, demonstrating a lack of institutional understanding as to the nature 
of this position.  While Berdrow’s (2010) study of a single, private institution limits the 
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transferability of these findings, the scarce scholarship on department chairs supports a 
broader incidence of department chair role ambiguity across academia.       
The Department Chair/Faculty Relationship 
 The effectiveness of an academic department chair is often dependent upon the 
successful cultivation of interpersonal relationships (Moye, Henkin, & Floyd, 2006).  As 
the “king among kings,” (Berdrow, 2010, p.508) the department chair’s rapport with 
his/her faculty colleagues is among the most crucial of all academic interactions.  Under 
the auspices of servant leadership, department chairs bear responsibility for establishing a 
positive working environment, empowering faculty members, and ensuring equitable 
productivity (Wheeler, 2007).  However, none of these objectives can be achieved in the 
absence of frequent and effective communication (Leaming, 2007).   
 In a classic and highly cited piece on organizational socialization, Tierney (1997) 
argued that the enculturation of faculty is of critical importance to academic 
administrators.  Applying dueling modernist/postmodernist perspectives as a theoretical 
framework, Tierney (1997) analyzed three hundred interviews of tenure-track faculty in 
eight four-year colleges and universities.  Aggregating these responses into relevant 
themes and conceptual categories, Tierney (1997) proposed “a schema for how we might 
think about organizational socialization and how we might develop policies that 
contribute to the successful socialization of faculty into the academy” (p.2).  In this 
manner, Tierney (1997) locates faculty socialization in the contestable culture of 
academic life, whereby individual faculty members alternatively contribute to and are 
influenced by the multifarious perspectives of other organizational colleagues.  
Highlighting the importance of institutional context, Tierney (1997) underscores the 
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“cultural act” (p.6) of socialization, through which faculty mediate the significance of 
teaching, research, and service in their particular departments.  Emphasizing the 
department chair as a principal mediator of cultural norms, Tierney (1997) stresses 
implicit expression as a crucial complement to explicitly communicated directives in the 
organizational socialization of academic faculty.   
 Building on Tierney’s (1997) seminal work, Trowler and Knight (2000) applied 
the concept of organizational socialization to an international context.  In an effort to 
generate a grounded theory of this complex process, Trowler and Knight (2000) 
interviewed twenty-four new faculty members at ten Canadian and English universities, 
in order to discover ways in which to improve transition into the academic profession.  
Influenced by activity system theory, a conceptual framework rooted in the discipline of 
psychology, Trowler and Knight (2000) conclude that the “discourses and practices” 
(p.28) of a particular department is of paramount importance to a newly appointed faculty 
member.  Highlighting communication, especially department chair communication, as 
“the key to the development of intersubjectivity,” (p.31), Trowler and Knight (2000) 
further refine this process as “provisional and influenced by power relations” (p.32).  As 
such, activity systems, aka academic departments, are “highly permeable” (p.33) entities, 
greatly influenced by the “micro-politics” (p.33) of academic life.  An individual faculty 
member’s “construction of personal and professional identity” (p.33) is therefore highly 
dependent upon the dynamic social interactions facilitated by the leadership, mentorship, 
and discursive style of the academic department chair.   
 Linking faculty work environment to perceived institutional “fit,” Lindholm 
(2003) locates organizational socialization as a primary influence on “the nature and 
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intensity of individual motivation” (p.126).  In an effort to create “more socially 
responsive” institutions (p.126), Lindholm (2003) qualitatively examined faculty 
members’ perceptions of their institutional working environment.  Using structural 
contingency theory as a conceptual framework, Lindholm (2003) conducted a case study 
of thirty-six tenure-track faculty in four departments at a public research university.  
Employing analytic induction, Lindholm (2003) noted the following: “for the vast 
majority [of faculty] the most salient layer in considering organizational fit issues is their 
disciplinary department” (p.133).  Building on this foundational assessment, Lindholm 
(2003) uncovered the nexus among perceived institutional fit, individual motivation, and 
departmental leadership.  Addressing this phenomenon, Lindholm (2003) commented: 
“Widely described as an “essential” factor in creating the structural conditions that 
maximize congruence between faculty members’ needs and departmental realities, the 
chair’s position was widely respected but rarely envied, given its “highly time-
consuming” and “largely thankless” nature” (p.141).  Thoroughly researched and 
convincingly presented, Lindholm’s (2003) study effectively demonstrates the substantial 
role of the department chair in maximizing the physical and emotional resources of a 
disciplinary unit.    
 Addressing this very issue, authors Norman, Ambrose, and Huston (2006) 
assessed faculty morale at a small, Research I university from 2002-2003.  Using 
narrative theory to frame their study, Norman et al. (2006) conducted semi-structured 
telephone interviews with one hundred twenty-three current and former faculty members 
regarding work life satisfaction within their academic departments.  They then hired a 
playwright to review these transcripts, remove identifiable data, and compose teachable 
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scenarios out of the composite narratives.  These fictionalized accounts, encompassing 
issues of collegiality, leadership, mentoring, and promotion, were then presented to 
current faculty members by department chairs from other disciplines, which were trained 
as facilitators for the purposes of this study.  As a result of opening this communicative 
avenue, Norman et al. (2006) discovered a cathartic avenue for both faculty members and 
faculty leadership, with one chair commenting “that he was becoming a better department 
head as a result of what he had learned” (p.362).  While this study represents a unique 
experience at a single institution, the rich, thick description of events coupled with the 
inclusion of interview protocols and fictional scenarios, solidifies this study as an 
exemplary instance of qualitative research.   
 Observing the critical mass of literature on emotions and educational leadership, 
authors Zorn and Boler (2007) reviewed and analyzed the myriad publications pertaining 
to this topic.  Arguing that “emotions need to be understood as publically and 
collaboratively formed”…and “leadership needs to be seen as an enacted, emergent 
phenomenon” (p.137), Zorn and Boler (2007) situate their findings in the broader realm 
of organizational theory.  Emphasizing the importance of emotional understanding in 
educational leadership, Zorn and Boler (2007) make the following observation:  
It is only by foregrounding relations of power that define emotional experience 
and communication that new research can resist the tendency to individualize or 
universalize emotional experiences. It is not enough that educational leaders show 
consideration for emotions and their social and organizational dimension.  Within 
education, as in the wider culture, emotions are a site of control and a mode of 
political resistance (p.148) 
 
As such, it is imperative that departmental leaders understand their role in mediating “the 
emotions that motivate a person to change and which also make change discomforting 
and something to be resisted” (Zorn & Boler, 2007, p.146).  Indeed, in setting the tone of 
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organizational discourse, department chairs play a formative part in framing the social 
context of the departmental unit.   
 Connecting the increasingly entrepreneurial orientation of the modern research 
university to issues of academic motivation, Hakala’s (2008) study incorporates themes 
salient to the emergent topic of departmental and programmatic elimination.  Though this 
particular study takes place in Finland, the qualitative construct of transferability 
(Merriam, 2009) invites parallels to similar cross-currents in American higher education.  
Like many capitalist countries, Finland’s system of higher education has struggled to 
balance “competition for external research funding, increased emphasis on efficiency and 
contributions to economic and social development” (Hakala, 2008, p.174).  This powerful 
confluence has ushered in a new institutional paradigm, in which “the traditional 
framework for understanding academic work and identity is rendered invalid by the 
ongoing changes in academia” (Hakala, 2008, p.178).  In an effort to explore the impact 
of this new academic model on the future academic workforce, Hakala (2008) 
interviewed a total of twelve Finnish Ph.D. students in four research-oriented disciplines 
as to their sources of intellectual motivation.  Finding a fundamental shift in the scholarly 
profession, Hakala (2008) made the following determination: “The future academic is 
primarily an expert who is able to produce new knowledge across disciplinary boundaries 
and together with those who eventually use the knowledge” (p.177).  Indeed, this 
international clarion call to practicality has considerable ramifications for organizational 
restructuring in American higher education.  In a climate of diminished resources and 
heightened accountability, departmental leaders must secure the survival of their 
academic units by increasing their interdisciplinary orientation and partnering with key 
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stakeholders in the surrounding community.  By confronting rather than avoiding 
academic uncertainty, departmental leaders have the ability to motivate their faculty to 
embrace new conceptualizations of scholarly organization.     
Conceptual Framework 
In an effort to explicate the aforementioned phenomenon, this study will employ 
the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, 
Gallois, & Callan, 2004).  A notable facet of organizational change, Milliken (1987) 
defines uncertainty as “an individual’s inability to predict something accurately” (p.136).  
As organizations respond to changes in both internal and external environments, 
uncertainty assumes a central role in the lives of organizational employees. In the 
bureaucratic context of a public university, where process, paperwork, and procedure 
define the work lives of employees, a new and as yet unregulated undertaking can cause 
the involved individuals to experience anxiety, hesitancy, and confusion (Morgan, 2006).  
Given the relatively recent institutional paradigm of departmental and programmatic 
eliminations, most institutions have not had the time to develop comprehensive 
guidelines for achieving this aim (Eckel, 2003).  In this procedural vacuum, the shadow 
of uncertainty looms large, inserting a troublesome component into an already unpleasant 
academic event.     
  As a means of describing the various types of uncertainty experienced during 
organizational change, Bordia et al. (2004) developed a three-factor conceptual model 
comprising strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty.  Based on the approaches of 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) and Jackson, Schuler, and Vredenburgh (1987), Bordia et al. 
(2004) differ from their theoretical predecessors by focusing on the individual level of 
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analysis, as opposed to a three-pronged approach encompassing organizational, group, 
and individual levels of scrutiny.   
 Concentrating on “the subjective experience or appraisal of different uncertainties 
by individuals in a changing organization” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.509), the research team 
posited three overarching themes as the locus of organizational uncertainty.  In this 
regard, strategic uncertainty “refers to uncertainty regarding organization-level issues, 
such as reasons for change, planning and future direction of the organization, its 
sustainability, the nature of the business environment the organization will face, and so 
forth” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.510).  Furthermore, structural uncertainty “refers to 
uncertainty arising from changes to the inner workings of the organization, such as 
reporting structures and functions of different work units” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.510).  
Finally, job-related uncertainty “includes uncertainty regarding job security, promotion 
opportunities, changes to the job role, and so forth” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.511).  Under 
the auspices of this conceptual model, the three types of uncertainties interact “in a 
cascade-like fashion,” whereby “strategic uncertainty is likely to lead to structural 
uncertainty which, in turn, contributes to job-related uncertainty” (Bordia et al., 2004, 
p.511).   
 Rooted in the traditions of psychology and human resource development, Bordia 
et al. (2004) tested their conceptual model via a Likert-type survey at a state government 
department in the midst of organizational change. Recently separated from another state 
entity, the selected government department was dealing with the various ramifications of 
a statewide election, including: funding ambiguity, leadership turnover, internal 
restructuring, and a change in mission and business strategy.  In order to assess the extent 
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to which uncertainty prevailed in this environment, surveys were mailed to all 1,283 
organizational employees; 877 employees returned the survey, achieving a response rate 
of 68.4%.      
 Using regression analysis, Bordia et al. (2004) determined that the results 
supported the predicted model, underscoring the empirical relationship among strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainties. Discussing this outcome, Bordia et al. (2004) 
make the following observation: 
 The organization had recently completed a de-amalgamation and experienced  
 a change in government, both of which contributed to high levels of  
 organizational instability.  This was characterized by uncertainty about the  
 business strategy, identity and role of the separate department, the new reporting 
 relationships within the department, and different task and job demands upon  
 employees.  Employees were aware that the change in government signaled the  
 need for the department to realign its business strategy and reanalyze the  
 organization’s work processes.  In this context of heightened ambiguity, 
 employees were experiencing all three types of uncertainties (p. 523-525).  
 
In presenting the results of this research, the authors acknowledge the limited 
generalizability of public sector studies to private enterprise, and additionally conceded 
the drawbacks of self-reported surveys.  However, for the purposes of the present study, 
the findings elicited by the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework warrant further 
application.  Indeed, the similarities in organizational type (state government 
organization), unit of analysis (the individual), and organizational context (change) 
identify this study as a viable candidate for transference to qualitative methodology.   
Though Bordia et al. (2004) adapted uncertainty reduction theory to 
organizational change, Berger and Calabrese (1975) pioneered uncertainty reduction 
theory as an explanatory model for understanding initial interactions between strangers.  
Uncertainty reduction theory assumes that when “strangers meet, their primary concern is 
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one of uncertainty reduction or increasing predictability about the behavior of both 
themselves and others in the interaction” (p.100).  This process of uncertainty reduction 
proceeds in three phases: the entry phase, the personal phase, and the exit phase.  In the 
entry phase, communication content is limited to demographic data, as a means of 
determining basic social information.  The subsequent period is a personal phase, 
whereby values, attitudes, and problems emerge as topics of conversation.  Finally, 
during the exit phase, the strangers determine the viability of future contact.   
 Elaborating on this theoretical construct, Berger and Calabrese (1975) posit 
several axioms related to verbal communication and the reduction of uncertainty.  For the 
purposes of the present study, Axiom 3 serves as a guiding theoretical construct: “High 
levels of uncertainty cause increases in information seeking behavior” (p.103).  Due to 
the heightened uncertainty of departmental and programmatic eliminations, this axiom 
applies to both inter-unit communication and intra-unit communication. Thus, as 
department chairs and faculty members communicate within their departmental unit to 
discuss attrition procedures, they may also seek counsel from individuals outside this 
bounded entity.       
 While Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) study stands as a classic theoretical piece, 
the authors acknowledged the need for “broader boundary conditions” (p.110).  Indeed, 
Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) construct assumes a relatively benign interaction among 
strangers.  Provided this caveat, it is imperative to include tenets of Kramer’s (1999) 
motivation to reduce uncertainty model as an ancillary to Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) 
Axiom 3.  In his response to the originators of the theory, Kramer (1999) makes the 
following observation: “Berger and Calabrese (1975) present uncertainty reduction as an 
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autonomous determinant of information seeking.  However, communicators have 
multiple, often conflicting goals or motives that they must balance rather than 
maximizing any particular one” (p.309). Elaborating on this aim, Kramer (1999) points 
out the competing desires of avoiding costs while maximizing benefits.  In order to 
reduce uncertainty under these constraints, Kramer (1999) posits a continuum of 
information-seeking behaviors, stating: “There are obtrusive (solicit/overt request) and 
unobtrusive (observe/indirect) ways of gaining information that range from passive 
(unsolicited) to active (overt/indirect)” (p.310).  For the purposes of the present study, the 
relative balance of obtrusive information-seeking to unobtrusive information-gathering 
will provide a theoretically-grounded means of analyzing interview transcripts.  
Summary 
 Though scholarship on departmental and programmatic eliminations has yet to 
reach critical mass, the few academic publications addressing this topic herald a 
paradigm born of complementary historical and financial phenomena.  Indeed, the 
untimely confluences of curricular change, economic recession, and consequent revenue-
generating institutional orientation have combined to create the conditions necessary for 
academic downsizing.  Forced to contend with shrinking monetary resources, many 
collegiate administrators now perceive a narrowed scope of academic offerings as the 
only viable financial solution.  Underscoring the importance of external environmental 
pressures on the internal workings of a public-sector organization, this body of literature 
exemplifies the critical function of contextualization in case studies of academic attrition.   
 While outside forces certainly constrain an institution’s decision-making capacity, 
faculty advocacy constitutes a significant impediment to the implementation of 
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departmental and/or programmatic eliminations. A highly politicized process, the 
successful defense of academic hegemony is highly dependent upon the actions (or 
inactions) of the department chair.  Elected by his or her disciplinary colleagues, the 
department chair is expected to negotiate multifarious role orientations and interpersonal 
interactions.  The extent to which department chairs successfully execute these role 
orientations and effectively communicate with their faculty colleagues is theorized to 
contribute to the reduction and mitigation of strategic, structural, and job-related 
uncertainties.             
 Chapter 3 will explicate the methodology utilized to explore department chair and 
faculty perceptions of eliminating their unit or an affiliated program.  Features of this 
chapter include an outline of the chosen research design, in addition to the rationale for 
site selection and the parameters for participant inclusion.  In accordance with qualitative 
case study protocol, this chapter also describes the various modes of data collection, 
encompassing numerous primary and secondary perspectives.  An explication of 
analytical procedures follows this breakdown, leading to discussions of credibility, 
transferability, consistency, and ethics.  Meditations on a related pilot study conclude this 
chapter, reflecting the highly emotional context of this qualitative inquiry.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 The lived experience of implementing departmental and programmatic 
eliminations is a burgeoning area of research in American higher education.  Chapter 2 
provided an overview of the relevant literature on this emergent topic, highlighting the 
historical, financial, and social developments which have precipitated this trend.  Though 
solid empirical scholarship is lacking in the field of academic retrenchment, a few 
seminal works do touch on the organizational (Brint et al., 2005; Eckel, 2003; Kissler, 
1997) and broader intellectual implications (Slaughter, 1993) of departmental and 
programmatic discontinuance.  As such, while Eckel (2003) remains the gold standard in 
this domain, his suggestions for future research underscore the breadth of untapped 
scholarly inquiry.  Heeding Eckel’s (2003) call to “explore the impact of program 
discontinuance more deeply” by “focus[ing] on similar questions at an individual level” 
(p.166-167), this chapter presents the qualitative research methodology necessary to 
achieve this aim.   
Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions 
Prior to discussing the mechanics of research design, I would like to take the 
opportunity to share the ontological and epistemological assumptions which undergird 
this study.  In this regard, a foundation of qualitative inquiry is the existence of multiple, 
subjective realities as opposed to a singular, universal truth (Creswell, 2007).  
Furthermore, the relationship between the researcher and participants is collaborative in 
nature, privileging research “in the field” over artificial laboratory settings (Creswell, 
2007, p.18).  As such, this study will juxtapose authorial characterizations and individual 
quotations, as a means of reinforcing my choice of thematic constructs.       
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In addition to these ontological underpinnings, I wish to disclose my personal 
epistemological philosophy with respect to this project.  As emphasized by Koro-
Ljungberg, Yendol-Hoppey, Smith, and Hayes (2009), “epistemological awareness is an 
important and informative part of the transparent research process that needs to be 
addressed and communicated to readers” (p.687).  Heeding their call, I identify this study 
as constructivist in nature.  In this regard, I aim “to describe individuals’ perspectives, 
experiences, and meaning-making processes” with respect to the departmental and/or 
programmatic elimination process (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, p.689). When writing 
from a constructivist perspective, it is the researcher’s duty to impart a detailed account 
of the practice under study; as an individual with first-hand departmental elimination 
experience (as a graduate assistant in an eliminated academic department), I believe I am 
in a unique position to offer keen analytical insight into this under-researched 
phenomenon. 
Design of the Study 
Utilizing the emergent, qualitative case study design advocated by Merriam 
(1998), my intent was to gain an “in-depth understanding…of a single unit or bounded 
system” (p.19).  In this instance, the bounded system was four academic departments 
impacted by departmental or programmatic eliminations at Mountain University during 
the 2011-2013 biennial budgetary cycle.  In an effort to illuminate this broader construct, 
I examined four instrumental iterations (Creswell, 2007) of a departmental/programmatic 
elimination: two units slated for elimination but ultimately saved, and two units 
eliminated outright.  Within these iterations, I interviewed the department chair and 
anywhere from one to three faculty members, in an effort to understand the resultant 
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individual experiences characteristic of these unique outcomes.  According to Yin (2009), 
a multiple, embedded case study has significant advantages over the traditional, single 
case format.  In this regard, “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more robust” (Yin, 2009, p.53).       
    In addition to the aforementioned structural attributes, I also elected to delimit 
or “bind” the case study design via the unit of analysis and time period under 
consideration (Creswell, 2007).  As such, the exclusive focus on individual department 
chairs and faculty members organizationally confines this study to the department, but 
with an individual level of analysis.  Furthermore, the chosen time period spans the initial 
awareness of a possible departmental or programmatic elimination and runs through the 
implementation of the official directive to close the department or program.  In general, 
this timeline encompasses a 1-2 year time period, with variations by participant, and 
departmental iteration.  For instance, individuals in the “saved” unit had a shorter 
timeline, as they did not have to comply with a directive to close their unit.  However, 
individuals in the “saved” unit were invited to comment on how the specter of 
elimination has or has not changed their individual orientation and the orientation of the 
departmental leadership.    
Purpose  
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore department chair and 
faculty perceptions of implementing a departmental or programmatic elimination.  
Specifically, this study addressed the extent to which strategic, structural, and job-related 
uncertainties prevailed during a departmental or programmatic elimination. This study 
took place at a public, research intensive institution located in the western region of the 
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United States (hereafter referred to as Mountain University), and focused on the events 
leading up to and including the implementation of the state’s 2011-2013 legislative 
appropriation for higher education.   
Research Questions 
 Upon review of the relevant literature, it became apparent that the departmental 
and programmatic elimination process is an under-researched topic of inquiry.  As such, I 
aimed to address the following research questions during the course of this study:   
1. How do individuals experience a departmental/programmatic elimination? 
2. To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest 
themselves during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations? 
3. How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainties?  
4. How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between 
saved and eliminated units?  
These research questions flow from the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction 
theory, highlighting the complex interaction between faculty members and department 
chairs during a departmental/programmatic elimination.   
Site Selection 
 The rationale for selecting Mountain University for this case study was directly 
attributable to the institution’s fiscal predicament as a public institution.  A microcosm of 
the broader national recession, the extreme financial plight of Mountain state forced the 
legislature to enact drastic cuts to the 2011-2013 Mountain University biennial budget.  
According to the budget proposed by the state’s governor, Mountain University needed to 
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eliminate $47.5 million from its operating expenses over the next two years (Lake, 
February 16, 2011).  As a consequence of this 29.1% reduction in state appropriations, 
the executive leadership of Mountain University decided to cut $25 million in academic 
affairs as a partial means of meeting the overall $47.5 million target (Mountain 
University senior administrator, personal communication, February 15, 2011). 
 Furthermore, due to substantial budget reductions totaling $49.6 million for the 
fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, Mountain University faced the grim reality of financial 
exigency (Mountain university senior administrator, personal communication, February 
15, 2011).  Akin to institutional bankruptcy, financial exigency is a legal declaration that 
allows fiscal decision-making to proceed without regard to contractual obligations.  At a 
research intensive institution such as Mountain University, where salary commitments 
encumber the majority of appropriated expenditures (Woodward, Burchell, Wagner, & 
Knight, 2004), financial exigency generally refers to the ability to fire or substantially 
reduce the salaries of tenured faculty members (Lake, February 16, 2011).  Provided this 
scenario, academic departmental and programmatic eliminations became the means by 
which to reduce the substantial salary obligations of faculty members, placing Mountain 
University at the forefront of this new paradigm in public higher education.   
Selection of Participants 
 Selection of participants was based upon purposive sampling.  Bernard and Ryan 
(2010) encourage the use of purposive sampling “in the study of special and hard-to-find 
populations” (p.365).  Furthermore, “purposive sampling is based on the assumption that 
the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select 
a sample from which the most can be learned” (Merriam, 1998, p.61). As the intent of 
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this study was to examine the perceptions of department chairs and faculty members in an 
eliminated department or program, the pool of participants that meet these criteria was 
necessarily limited.  Through a review of publically available Mountain University 
institutional documentation, I was able to determine which departments/programs met 
this criteria, and formed a contact list using the Mountain University electronic directory.  
Individuals with whom I had contact on a personal or professional level were excluded 
from this study; however, this represented less than 5% of eligible participants.  All 
individuals contacted and ultimately interviewed were strangers in the following sense: I 
had never met or spoken to these individuals prior to the present study.        
In this regard, I selected thirteen representative individuals: the department chair 
and anywhere from one to three faculty members in four distinct departmental units (two 
saved units and two eliminated units).  All eligible department chairs received a physical 
letter of contact inviting them to participate in this study.  The willingness of the 
department chair to participate in this study determined which units were ultimately 
selected for inclusion. Faculty in units with participating department chairs were then 
contacted for inclusion in this study.  Responses to the physical letters of contact and a 
subsequent electronic follow-up email yielded between one and three participating 
faculty members per unit. As such, random selection was not employed as there were 
never more than three faculty members in any of the four units who were willing to 
participate.  However, variations by gender and rank (assistant, associate, and full 
professors) were obtained through this recruitment.    
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Data Collection Procedures 
 Upon receipt of institutional review board (IRB) approval, data collection and 
recruitment proceeded in earnest.  Interviews were conducted in a natural setting 
(Mountain University faculty offices), lasted between forty-five minutes and one and a 
half hours, and were of the semi-structured variety.  Though the intent of this interview 
process was to ask the same (or highly similar) questions of all participants, Merriam 
(1998) advised a more flexible interview format.  Given the probability of mid-interview 
adjustments, differences in organizational outcome, (ex: eliminated or “saved”) and the 
prevalence of narrative variations, it was best to allow individuals the opportunity to 
“define the world in unique ways” (Merriam, 1998, p.74).  Interview guides, consisting of 
7-8 broad questions, structured the interviews [see Appendices A-D for complete 
interview protocols].  Furthermore, interviews were recorded both on audio cassette and 
in digital format, in order to account for possible equipment failures (Yow, 2005).  
Extensive notes were taken in lieu of recording for individuals who did not wish to have 
their interviews taped; only two individuals out of thirteen declined to have their 
interviews recorded.       
 Additional observation of pertinent public meetings (ex: Faculty Senate meetings, 
governing board meetings, etc.) complemented the aforementioned formal interviews.  
Furthermore, document collection coincided with and in many instances preceded the 
formal interviews.  In accordance with case study protocol (Merriam, 1998), document 
collection encompassed “public records, personal documents, and physical material” 
(p.113).  Public records included newspaper accounts, identifiable internet postings, 
television programming, meeting minutes (of Faculty Senate meetings, governing board 
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meetings, etc.), and institutional publications (official Mountain University e-mails, 
website postings, and accounting documents).  Personal documents included private 
written or emailed correspondence, anonymous internet postings, and confidential 
internal documentation associated with the individual and/or department.  The sum of 
these documents represented the unobservable “paper trail”—a key facet of case study 
methodology (Merriam, 1998, p.114).                
Data Analysis Procedures  
 According to Merriam (1998), “data collection and data analysis is a simultaneous 
activity in qualitative research” (p.151).  In this regard, data analysis began with the 
collection of the first public document related to the study, and began in earnest when all 
relevant interviews and private correspondence were collected.  Constant comparison and 
analytic induction comprised the bulk of the data analysis, and was applied to documents, 
interview transcripts, and observations (Merriam, 1998).  To assist with data 
management, I used the qualitative software program ATLAS.ti to organize my codes 
and construct my categories (Lewins & Silver, 2004).  Moreover, the conceptual 
framework of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004) and Berg’s (2007) 
concept of latent and manifest messaging aided in the identification of key themes for use 
in the final written analysis (Merriam, 1998).  Given the emergent nature of case study 
research, additional thematic selections emanated from the personalized depictions of the 
study’s participants [see Appendix E for a more detailed explanation of data analysis].     
Furthermore, given the selection of a multiple case study design, within-case 
analysis and cross-case analysis occurred in reference to this study.  As delineated by 
Merriam (2009): 
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For the within-case analysis, each case is first treated as a comprehensive case in 
and of itself.  Data are gathered so the researcher can learn as much about the 
contextual variables as possible that might have a bearing on the case.  Once the 
analysis of each case is completed, cross-case analysis begins. A qualitative, 
inductive, multicase study seeks to build abstractions across cases (p.204).    
 
In this regard, Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral (p.151) provides a visual 
representation of the analytic process used to transform qualitative evidence into a 
coherent narrative account.   
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral 
Moving from data collection to the management, description, and final representation of a 
case, Creswell’s (2007) explanatory technique depicts the procedural methodology I 
employed during the phase of within-case analysis. Upon completion of this 
developmental aspect, I compared the two saved cases against the two eliminated cases in 
order to determine similarities and differences among the various iterations of 
departmental/programmatic eliminations.  Essentially, the overarching goal of this cross-
case analysis was to extend the literature on the departmental/programmatic elimination 
process through the comparison of two unique outcomes characteristic of academic 
downsizing.      
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Credibility (Internal Validity) 
 A variety of methodological techniques can enhance the credibility (internal 
validity) of case study research.  As defined by Merriam (2009), qualitative credibility 
“deals with the question of how research findings match reality” (p.213).  In this regard, 
three components of qualitative research deal directly with this concern: researcher as 
data collection instrument, triangulation, and member checking. Thus, the subsequent 
narrative addressed each component on an individual basis.     
In a departure from quantitative research, qualitative inquiry supports the use of a 
live investigator as an interpretive medium (Merriam, 2009).  As such, the internal 
validity of any qualitative study is inherently dependent upon the competence of the 
individual analyst.  In an effort to address this legitimate concern, I wish to disclose my 
academic qualifications.  From 2003-2009, I searched for qualitative truth via the 
discipline of history at the University of South Florida.  Having received undergraduate 
and graduate degrees from this four-year research institution, I enrolled at the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas to complete my doctorate in higher education leadership.  As a 
condition of the program, I completed two advanced research courses to fulfill my 
graduation requirement: advanced qualitative research and case study methodology.  
Provided my longstanding affiliation with and affinity for qualitative research, I believe I 
possessed the academic qualifications necessary to undertake and successfully analyze 
the proposed study.   
In addition to the aptitude of the research instrument, triangulation plays an 
integral part in ensuring the credibility of a qualitative study.  As defined by Creswell 
(2007), “in triangulation, researchers make use of multiple and different sources, 
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methods, investigators, and theories to provide corroborating evidence” (p.208). While 
the dissertation process is by nature an individual activity, I made use of multiple sources 
(ex: newspaper accounts, individual narratives, institutional documentation, etc.), 
methods (ex: interviews, observations of public meetings, document analysis), and 
theories (Bordia et al., 2004, and others as data warrants) in order to achieve this aim.  
Recognizing that the strength of my conclusions is dependent upon the preponderance of 
presented evidence, I provided confirmatory declarations from a variety of stakeholder 
perspectives.   
Having discussed research instrumentation and triangulation, I will now discuss 
member checking as the final component of qualitative credibility.  As defined by 
Merriam (2009), member checking allows you to “solicit feedback on your emerging 
findings from some of the people that you interviewed” (p.217).  Predicated on the 
principle of multiple lived experiences (Merriam, 2009), member checking ensures that 
research findings are consonant with the narrator’s reality.  Moreover, member checking 
provides a clear avenue for clarification, as it is unlikely that all imparted terminology 
and conceptual constructs will be interpreted by the researcher and narrator in the same 
fashion.  All individual participants were provided the opportunity to review their 
interview transcript or interview notes in order to clarify their positions on emergent 
research findings.           
Transferability (External Validity) 
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative studies do not claim applicability 
to other situations.  Indeed, the hallmark of a qualitative case study is its in-depth 
description of a unique and bounded occurrence.  Given this paradigmatic distinction, 
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qualitative methodologists reject the notion of external validity in favor of transferability 
(Merriam, 2009).  In employing this qualitative construct, “the burden of proof lies less 
with the original investigator than with the person seeking to make an application 
elsewhere” (Merriam, 2009, p.224).  As such, it was my obligation as the investigator to 
provide a narrative account sufficient to achieve this aim.  Thus, I presented detailed 
descriptions of individual experiences with the departmental and/or programmatic 
elimination process, providing the audience with the information necessary to determine 
transference.  As a goal of this study is to provide guidance to other individuals dealing 
with departmental/programmatic eliminations, I adhered to the highest standards of 
narrative description.           
Consistency (Reliability) 
In the same manner as external validity, reliability is not a stated aim of 
qualitative inquiry.  As highlighted by Merriam (2009): “Reliability is problematic in the 
social sciences simply because human behavior is never static” (p.220).  Thus, when 
dealing with personal experiences, the crucial question is “whether the results are 
consistent with the data collected” (Merriam, 2009, p.221). In this regard, I employed an 
extensive audit trail by “describing in detail how data were collected, how categories 
were derived, and how decisions were made throughout the inquiry” (Merriam, 1998, 
p.207).  In an expansion of this construct, Yin (2009) advocates the creation of “a formal, 
presentable database, so that in principle, other investigators can review the evidence 
directly and not be limited to the written case study reports” (p.119).  In addition, I 
included ample appendices as a means of enhancing the transparency of my actions.     
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Ethical Considerations 
 Due to the emotional sensitivity and political implications inherent in 
departmental and programmatic eliminations, participant anonymity was of paramount 
concern.  Considerable care was taken to safeguard the name of the department/program, 
as well as those narrators who agree to participate in the study. As such, pseudonyms and 
broad administrative terminology permeates my research findings.  In this manner, all 
participants (except for the pilot study) were assigned a nondescript pseudonym and 
referred to using male pronouns in order to guard against gendered identification.  I use 
the term “department chair” throughout this study in reference to department chairs, 
directors, and program chairs (Merriam, 1998).  Faculty rank and other identifiable 
demographic data were omitted from the findings in order to further ensure participant 
anonymity.  In order to guard against bias, I also took care to “switch back and forth 
between the emic and the etic perspectives”--thinking critically and challenging findings 
(Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p.110).  Finally, as a means of reciprocity (Creswell, 2007), 
participants received a copy of their interview transcript or interview notes, a copy of 
their signed informed consent, an electronic audio file of their interview (where 
applicable), a copy of the final dissertation, and a hand-written thank-you note.  As 
additional ethical issues arose throughout the course of this study, I discussed them with 
my dissertation chair in order to arrive at an appropriate solution.        
Pilot Study 
 As a means of testing the viability of the proposed project, I conducted a pilot 
study of my eliminated department chair interview protocol on April 7, 2011.  According 
to Yin (2009), a pilot study is a formative exercise which assists the researcher in 
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developing “relevant lines of questions—possibly even providing some conceptual 
clarification for the research design as well” (p.92).  In an effort to obtain this type of 
methodological guidance, I contacted Department Chair X, the leader of a Mountain 
University unit eliminated during the 2009-2011 budgetary biennium.  As a means of 
reinforcing the rationale for my proposed study, I detail the methodology, analysis, and 
findings of the April 7, 2011 pilot study below.   
Methodology of the Pilot Study 
The foundation of this pilot study was a one-hour, semi-structured interview.  
According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), semi-structured interviews are flexible entities, 
designed to allow individuals to “speak out, in their own terms” (p.29).  Though an 
interview protocol guided this process, broad questioning provided the narrator with 
ample opportunity to comfortably converse about this painful chapter in her academic 
career.  Examples of such overarching lines of inquiry included: “How is a departmental 
elimination carried out?” and “What have you learned from this departmental elimination 
process?” Gentle probes, mostly of the “tell-me-more” variety (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
p.32), guided the conversation.  Following the interview, I transcribed the conversation 
verbatim, with the resultant text forming the basis for my data analysis.      
 According to Creswell (2007), the use of a natural setting is a key characteristic of 
qualitative research, and a major component of studying an individual in context.  In 
keeping with this tradition, I conducted this interview in the department chair’s faculty 
office.  In order to account for possible equipment failures (Yow, 2005), I recorded this 
session on a traditional cassette recorder as well as digitally via a Livescribe smart pen.  
Utilizing Merriam’s (1998) advice for conducting effective interviews, I began with 
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“relatively neutral, descriptive information” (p.82).  As this first-order narrative 
(Creswell, 2007) progressed, responses became increasingly personalized, and flowed 
more freely than in the beginning of the conversation.  Indeed, as the interview wore on, 
the department chair’s narrative came to resemble a stream of consciousness, thus 
obviating my need for continuous probes.   
 In the interest of full disclosure, I would like to acknowledge my professional 
relationship with the department chair—she was previously known to me on a 
professional level.  Given this interaction, my rapport with the narrator was more relaxed 
and collegial than it would have been had I discussed this situation with a complete 
stranger.  As underscored by Merriam (1998): “The interviewer-respondent interaction is 
a complex phenomenon. Both parties bring biases, predispositions, attitudes, and physical 
characteristics that color the interaction and the data elicited. A skilled interviewer 
accounts for these factors in order to evaluate the data being obtained” (p.87).  
 Taking Merriam’s (1998) advice into account, I conducted this interview from the 
perspective of a future higher education professional, seeking to understand the context 
of a departmental elimination.  A complex and convoluted process, the department chair 
guided me through the cost-cutting drivers which precipitated the elimination, the 
administrative reports which singled out the department as a high-cost program, and the 
eventual realization that the department she had nurtured for twenty years would cease to 
exist.  Moving to the next phase of the interview, implementation of the elimination, it 
was evident that her ability to maintain multiple leadership roles allowed her to combat 
the strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties which characterized this process 
(Bordia et al., 2004).  Furthermore, the loss of this department was not without 
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unintended consequences (Eckel, 2003), including loss of quality researchers, declines in 
productivity, and an inevitable leadership drain due to the department’s inability to 
provide continued training for students in this department.   
Data Analysis  
 Using the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction theory advanced by 
Bordia et al. (2004) in conjunction with literature on department chair roles (Berdrow, 
2010), I engaged in the process of analytic induction (Merriam, 1998).  In this manner, I 
followed the guidance of Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral, reading and re-reading 
the transcript until I gained an acute awareness of the interview content.  Reflecting on 
the connections between the narrated account and the related scholarship (Berdrow, 2010; 
Bordia et al., 2004), I began the process of open coding in ATLAS.ti, where I matched 
the interview data with the major tenets of the research literature (Creswell, 2007).  This 
initial iteration yielded four codes: strategic uncertainty, structural uncertainty, job-
related uncertainty, and department chair roles.  In the subsequent axial coding phase, I 
broke department chair roles into several discrete entities, encompassing the various 
responsibilities associated with a departmental elimination. Upon completion of this 
phase, I used the network view in ATLAS.ti to engage in selective coding, assembling 
the various constructs into an interrelated explanatory model (Creswell, 2007).  During 
this process, I added new codes to strengthen the connections among the existing codes, 
resulting in a visual representation of the department chair’s account of her unit’s 
elimination.   
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Findings and Conclusion of the Pilot Study 
 Reflecting upon the departmental elimination process—a practice steeped in 
uncertainty—I asked myself the following question: “What is the root cause of this 
unfortunate state of affairs?”  After reading and re-reading the interview text, and staring 
at the mish mash of codes in my ATLAS.ti network view, I arrived at the following 
conclusion: a sense of urgency prompts the uncertainty, which in turn prompts the 
department chair to concentrate on a specific set of roles unique to her position.  Having 
settled on this interpretation, I then asked myself the following question: “What would 
diminish the sense of urgency precipitating this chain of events?”  Looking to the 
literature, I found guidance in Eckel’s (2003) seminal work on academic attrition.  In his 
case study of program discontinuance at four Carnegie classified research institutions, 
Eckel (2003) expounded on the centrality of campus-wide planning to a sound and 
rational decision-making process.  Provided Eckel’s (2003) commentary, and the findings 
elicited from Department Chair X, it is apparent that sound and rational decision-making 
includes planning for the process of departmental and programmatic eliminations, in 
addition to establishing a long-range vision for the reductions themselves.   
 Indeed, while Mountain University survived both the 2009-2011 and 2011-2013 
biennium, the long-term consequences of this budgetary biopsy remain shrouded in 
uncertainty.  In her interview for this pilot study, Department Chair X warned of lost 
research productivity, diminished morale, and a leadership drain as long-term 
consequences of departmental eliminations.  For Mountain University to remain 
competitive as a research institution, and continue to attract top-notch faculty and 
students, a long-term outlook must become part of the institutional culture.  In order to 
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diminish the sense of urgency prompting institutional decision-making, Mountain 
University must codify and delineate a concrete set of criteria by which to make 
institutional downsizing recommendations.  Clearly, academic attrition is about more 
than cost-savings on an institutional balance sheet.  It is imperative that Mountain 
University fulfill its obligations to the department chairs and faculty members who must 
implement elimination directives, by providing them with the guidance necessary to 
achieve these ends.    
Now that I have illustrated the functional importance of the pilot data, I will 
graphically display my plan for conducting the proposed qualitative study.  The table 
below explicates each of my research questions, the data sources I will use to answer 
each question, and the techniques I will employ to analyze these data sources.  The 
results of this process shall be outlined in the following chapter, providing the reader with 
a complete narrative description of the study’s findings.  The addition of data sources and 
analytical techniques may be required, as dependent upon the information elicited from 
respondent interviews.        
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Table 1   
Data Analysis Plan 
Research Question Data Source(s) Proposed Analysis 
Technique 
How do individuals experience 
a potential 
departmental/programmatic 
elimination? 
-Interviews with 
department chairs and 
faculty members 
-Observation of Faculty 
Senate meetings 
-Observation of governing 
board meetings 
-Public/private documents 
-Public meeting minutes 
Use of theoretical framework 
(Bordia et al., 2004) via 
analytic induction 
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept 
of latent/manifest messaging 
via analytic induction 
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in 
construction of codes/categories 
-Use of constant 
comparison/analytic induction 
 
To what extent do strategic, 
structural, and job-related 
uncertainties manifest 
themselves during potential 
departmental/programmatic 
eliminations? 
 
 
-Interviews with 
department chairs and 
faculty members 
-Observation of Faculty 
Senate meetings  
-Observation of governing 
board meetings 
-Public/private documents 
-Public meeting minutes 
-Use of theoretical framework 
(Bordia et al., 2004) via 
analytic induction 
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept 
of latent/manifest messaging 
via analytic induction 
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in 
construction of codes/categories 
-Use of constant 
comparison/analytic induction 
 
How does the department chair 
affect faculty perceptions of 
strategic, structural, and job-
related uncertainties? 
 
 
-Interviews with 
department chairs and 
faculty members 
-Observation of Faculty 
Senate meetings 
-Observation of governing 
board meetings 
-Public/private documents 
-Public meeting minutes 
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept 
of latent/manifest messaging 
via analytic induction 
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in 
construction of codes/categories 
-Use of constant 
comparison/analytic induction 
 
How does strategic, structural, 
and job-related uncertainty 
differ between saved and 
eliminated units? 
-Interviews with 
department chairs and 
faculty members 
-Public/private documents 
 
Use of theoretical framework 
(Bordia et al., 2004) via 
analytic induction 
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept 
of latent/manifest messaging 
via analytic induction 
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in 
construction of codes/categories 
-Use of constant 
comparison/analytic induction 
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Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology that will be used 
to conduct this study.  Topics encompassed a wide-range of methodological 
considerations, including: epistemological and ontological assumptions, research design, 
site selection, selection of participants, data collection procedures, data analysis process, 
and discussions of credibility, transferability, consistency, and ethics.  In an effort to 
bolster my choice of qualitative methodology, this chapter also included a detailed 
description of a related pilot study.  In this regard, the findings of the pilot study support 
my selections of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004), case study design 
(Merriam, 1998), and individual unit of analysis (Eckel, 2003) in this broader research 
proposal.  Aided by the analytical capacity of ATLAS.ti, I aim to expand the literature 
base on departmental and programmatic eliminations by offering a rich, thick description 
of lived experience (Merriam, 2009).  Chapter 4 shall explicate the results of this 
qualitative undertaking, with reference to each individual case and cross-case constructs.         
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 Though periodicals and trade publications decry the burgeoning trend towards 
academic downsizing, (Carlson, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2006; Lake, 2011) scholarly research 
on departmental and programmatic eliminations is still in its infancy (Brint et al., 2005; 
Eckel, 2003; Rosser, 2012; Slaughter, 1993). While no college or university is immune 
from revenue declines, budget crises, and attendant discussions of institutional 
retrenchment, public universities are particularly vulnerable to the political and economic 
whims of their situated state (Hovey, 1999; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2010).  
Unlike other state functions such as K-12 education, Medicaid, transportation 
maintenance, and corrections, higher education services are non-compulsory and have a 
failsafe method of external finance in the form of student tuition.  Legally committed to 
providing these other essential services, state legislatures have placed public post-
secondary institutions in the precarious position of choosing between substantial tuition 
increases and scaling back their educational offerings.  Recognizing the link between 
declines in student enrollment and significant tuition hikes, higher education 
administrators frequently blend the two approaches as a means of minimizing the impact 
of state revenue reductions.     
State Context 
 Reeling from the most recent national recession, Mountain State epitomized the 
aforementioned trends in public finance.  While the size of Mountain State’s population 
precludes the exponential increases in correctional spending seen in other areas of the 
country, the table below indicates that the percentage of the state budget devoted to 
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Health and Human Services, K-12 education, and transportation increased from fiscal 
year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, while the state’s commitment to higher education 
decreased during this same time period (Mountain State Open Government Initiative, 
2012).  Plagued by double-digit unemployment, Mountain State’s Health and Human 
Services department struggled to absorb the surge in welfare and Medicaid applicants, 
forcing the state to devote additional portions of the budget to cover these services.  
Though year-over-year population increases began to decline after 2008, Mountain State 
had added nearly 800,000 new residents in the preceding decade (Governor, 2011).  In 
turn, the influx of these new families necessitated improvements to the existing 
transportation infrastructure, as well as the construction of significant numbers of schools 
at the elementary, middle, and high school levels.  However, in keeping with Mountain 
State tradition, these objectives were to be accomplished via existing taxes on sales and 
discretionary services, and not thorough additional levies on personal or business income 
(Governor, 2011).   
Table 2 
 
Mountain State Expenditures on Top Five State Functions as a Percentage of Total 
Statewide Spending, FY 2008-2012 
 
FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 
HHS: 27.06% 
K12:  18.33% 
TRA:   9.36% 
HE:      9.17% 
PEB:    5.54% 
 
HHS: 27.01% 
K12:  19.70% 
TRA:   8.80% 
HE:      8.73% 
TRE:    6.15% 
 
HHS: 28.52% 
K12:  18.46% 
TRA:   8.63% 
HE:      8.30% 
TRE:    6.90% 
HHS: 29.31% 
K12:  18.80% 
TRA:   9.16% 
HE:      8.21% 
TRE:    7.33% 
HHS: 32.14% 
K12:  22.43% 
TRA: 10.80% 
HE:     6.10% 
PEB:   5.97% 
 
Note. HHS=Health & Human Services, K12=K-12 education, TRA=Transportation, 
HE=Higher Education, PEB=Public Employee Benefits, TRE=Treasurer’s Office 
Adapted from the Mountain State Open Government Initiative, Statewide Expenditure 
Summary by Department, FY 2008-FY2012.       
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Institutional Context 
Delivered to the state legislature on January 20, 2011, the Governor’s executive 
budget for the 2011-2013 biennium pledged no new taxes and significant cuts to state 
spending.  Reflecting on this decision, the Governor declared: “[Mountain State] families 
and businesses have made do with less through three long years of economic downturn, 
and it is my belief that state government must continue to do the same” (Governor, 2011).  
Taking a closer look at the analytical profile of Mountain University, it is clear that the 
national recession and shifting priorities of Mountain State had taken a significant toll on 
the composition of this institution. A research intensive university located in the western 
region of the United States, Mountain University is a relatively young, (less than 100 
years old) urban commuter institution with an enrollment of approximately 27,000 
students.  Roughly 80% of the student body is undergraduate, with the remaining 20% 
enrolled in graduate coursework.  As of Fall 2011, Mountain University employed nearly 
800 full-time instructional faculty members, defined as individuals at the professor, 
associate professor, assistant professor, and lecturer/instructor levels (Mountain 
University Institutional Analysis and Planning, 2011).   
While the aforementioned figures represent an accurate snapshot of the institution 
at present, a historical comparison of state funding allocations, faculty composition, and 
student enrollment provides an enhanced characterization of Mountain University.  As 
the tables below indicate, Mountain University had undergone significant changes in the 
years immediately following the 2007 recession and leading up to the 2011-2013 
budgetary biennium.  Like other institutions in the Mountain State System of Higher 
Education, Mountain University had seen its share of state general fund support diminish 
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over the past five fiscal years (ex: fiscal year 2008 occurred from July 1, 2007 through 
June 30, 2008).  As a means of offsetting these reductions in state support, Mountain 
University proposed tuition and fee increases, as well as departmental/programmatic 
eliminations (Mountain State System of Higher Education Approved State Budgets, FY 
2008-FY 2012).   
Table 3 
 
Percentage of Mountain University Operating Budget Derived from State General Fund 
 
Fiscal Year Percentage 
2008 64.16% 
2009 58.80% 
2010  36.53%* 
2011 60.98% 
2012 57.72% 
Note. The FY2010 budget included the infusion of one-time federal stimulus funds 
Adapted from the Mountain State System of Higher Education Approved State Budgets, 
FY 2008-FY2012. 
 
 Recognizing that no budgetary action occurs in a vacuum, it is important to note 
changes to the faculty and student profile of Mountain University during this same time 
period.  Though the most marked difference from Fall 2007-Fall 2011 is the significant 
reduction in full-time faculty members as compared to the relatively constant number of 
enrolled students, a closer examination of the institutional data yields additional 
conclusions.  From Fall 2007-Fall 2011, the percentage of faculty at the professor and 
associate professor ranks increased, while those at the assistant professor level decreased 
(Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning, 2012).  As those individuals at 
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the rank of assistant professor are generally untenured, this statistic is indicative of 
Mountain University’s priority of preserving the positions of tenured faculty members in 
the wake of departmental/programmatic eliminations.  However, given the significant 
reduction in overall faculty numbers relative to student headcount, it is clear that the 
workload of these remaining full-time faculty members would have to increase in order 
to make up for the loss of institutional colleagues.     
Table 4  
Full-Time Instructional Faculty by Rank, Fall 2007-Fall 2011  
Rank Fall 2007 Fall 2008 Fall 2009 Fall 2010 Fall 2011 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Professor 246 25.7 249 27.6 265 29.7 272 32.4 257 32.9 
Associate  317 33.1 309 34.3 303 34.0 301 35.8 275 35.3 
Assistant 300 31.4 263 29.2 241 27.0 191 22.7 171 21.9 
Lecturer 94 9.8 81 9.0 83 9.3 76 9.0 77 9.9 
Total 957 100 902 100 892 100 840 100 780 100 
Note. Figures include tenured and non-tenured full-time faculty members. Adapted from 
Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning.  
 
 In tandem with the shift in faculty composition, the student profile of Mountain 
University had also changed as a result of state budget reductions.  Though student 
headcount had steadily increased throughout the preceding decade due to the population 
surge in Mountain State, this trend reversed in Fall 2010 with the implementation of the 
2009-2011 biennial budget.  In addition to significant tuition increases, the 2009-2011 
budget reductions resulted in the elimination of entire departments as well as 
undergraduate and graduate degree programs. While undergraduate enrollment continued 
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to climb, graduate enrollment had dropped precipitously by Fall 2011, perhaps due in part 
to the greater economies of scale achieved in larger undergraduate courses.      
Table 5   
Total Student Headcount by Level, Fall 2007-Fall 2011 
Level Fall 2007 Fall 2008 Fall 2009 Fall 2010 Fall 2011 
Undergraduate 21,962 22,149 22,708 22,538 22,138 
Graduate 5,250 5,656 5,556 4,880 4,446 
Professional 796 812 822 804 794 
Total 27,988 28,605 29,069 28,203 27,364 
Note. Adapted from Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning. 
In the midst of these profound changes in institutional composition, I began to 
wonder how individual faculty members dealt with potential strategic, structural, and job-
related uncertainties.  Furthermore, I wanted to follow through on the findings of my pilot 
study with Department Chair X, in order to ascertain the effects of the department chair 
in mitigating the uncertainty of faculty colleagues.  Finally, I wanted to compare and 
contrast these uncertainties as they pertained to “saved” and eliminated units.  In a 
conscious effort to humanize a process often characterized by financial projections, 
balance ledgers, and other numeric depictions, I interviewed a total of thirteen faculty 
members (four “department chairs” and nine tenured faculty members) as to their 
experiences with departmental closure and programmatic elimination during the 2011-
2013 budgetary biennium at Mountain University.  These thirteen individuals represented 
four discrete units: Units 1 and 2 dealt with the potential elimination of their units but 
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were ultimately spared this fate, while Units 3 and 4 dealt with the actual elimination of 
their units.   
In the pages that follow, I will separately discuss each unit by providing a short 
vignette of the “department chair” and affiliated faculty members, thereby answering my 
initial research question: How do individuals experience a potential 
departmental/programmatic elimination?  Once I have accomplished this objective, I will 
move to my second research question: To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-
related uncertainties manifest themselves during potential departmental/programmatic 
eliminations? Then, I will conclude each unitary overview with a discussion of research 
question three:  How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainties? Once I have accomplished these objectives, I 
will compare and contrast the saved units (Units 1 and 2) and eliminated units (Units 3 
and 4) in order to answer research question four: How does strategic, structural, and job-
related uncertainty differ between saved and eliminated units?  A summary of findings 
concludes this chapter.   
Unit 1 
 In this section, I present four vignettes, each outlining the participant’s personal 
experiences with the 2011-2013 budget reduction process at Mountain University.  
Though their unit was ultimately saved from elimination, this fate was far from certain 
during the institution’s attempts to balance a decrease in state funding against outstanding 
budgetary obligations [see Appendix F for a timeline of 2011-2013 biennial budget 
process].  Interviewed approximately one year after this process unfolded, these faculty 
members were asked to reflect on this tumultuous time in their professional careers. 
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Dr. Smith: Chair of Unit 1 
 Cognizant of the legislative and gubernatorial rankling over the budget, Dr. Smith 
braced himself for the very real possibility of having to defend the existence of his unit.  
With fewer majors than many other units in the College, Dr. Smith recognized that 
“we’re potential targets” during any budget reduction discussion.  Though he had 
anticipated this outcome as early as mid-February 2011 (consistent with the Provost’s 
initial email directing Deans to make vertical cuts), confirmation of these suspicions 
occurred shortly thereafter.  Reflecting on these communiqués, Dr. Smith stated: “I heard 
the first week of March…from a colleague who was at some kind of council where they 
[Mountain University administrators] were talking that we were on the [cut] list there.  
And so I heard from somebody else.  And the Dean himself told me on March 8” (official 
release date of first budget reduction proposal).   
 Determined to avoid the elimination of his unit, Dr. Smith conjured his 
competitive spirit, describing himself as “just sort of consumed with it, as you would 
expect.”  Reinforcing this assertion, Dr. Smith recounted the following: 
 I would ask my [significant other], “Weren’t you in a line with Caroline Kennedy 
 one time, you know, where you guys were waiting…at the New York state fair,  
 and you were all excited to meet her?  Do you think she’d remember you?” Like  
 every night, I would lie awake and think like “Who do I know who is influential?” 
 
In addition to his sleepless nights, Dr. Smith’s experienced long, stressful days in his 
Mountain University office.  Concerned about the future of the unit, students turned to 
Dr. Smith for academic advice.  In describing these interactions, he stated: 
 I mean, I had students coming in every day saying “Should I change my major?” 
 Right?  “I heard this was going to be cut, so what are we going to do?” And, I  
 mean, I told the students “this is not going to happen.” …And they’re like 
 “Why?” And I was like “I am not going to let this happen.”  
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 From March 8 through September 9, 2011, Dr. Smith endured four distinct 
Mountain University budget reduction proposals, monitored the results of two crucial 
governing body meetings [see Appendix F], and ultimately won the fight to save his unit.  
Contemplating this triumph, Dr. Smith made this metaphoric comparison: “When it was 
all over, it was kind of like people often describe a car accident.  Like, you know, when 
you’re in it…your adrenaline…and then after…[expression indicative of exhaustion].” 
Though he suffered from ennui in the immediate aftermath, Dr. Smith began to reflect on 
this experience, and his feelings toward Mountain University, during the intervening 
year.  In a telling exchange, Dr. Smith revealed his stance on the subject of institutional 
loyalty: 
 I do think there is a kind of scarring that like, that’s not completely business as  
 usual.  Kind of like…for instance, I have a lot of um…shirts, various kinds of  
 shirts, that have [Mountain University] logos.  I won’t wear them.  You know?  
 I just like…you can’t give that kind of connection to that university, and sort of  
 pride in it…like, “No.  This is the university that said we’ll cut you if we have to.” 
 Like, yeah, I don’t want to wear them [the shirts].  You know, I don’t want to  
 wear anything with [Mountain University] on it, right?  (Dr. Smith, personal  
 communication, February 16, 2012) 
 
Dr. Xavier 
 Accustomed to the institutional culture at Mountain University, Dr. Xavier calmly 
reacted to the news of potential elimination: “There wasn’t anything I could do about it, 
so why should I get upset?” Employed as a “factory worker” at Mountain University for a 
considerable length of time, Dr. Xavier was a seasoned veteran of the institution’s 
“business model” of academic governance.  While traditional university tenets espouse 
shared governance between faculty and administrators, Dr. Xavier described his role in 
the budget reduction process in the following manner: 
 I had no say, nothing.  See, that’s the business model.  The business model is  
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 people on the seventh floor administration building run the university.  The rest of  
 us are employees.   
 
 Beyond the business model, Dr. Xavier had other reasons for maintaining 
emotional equilibrium. Familiar with the lengthy legislative and bureaucratic processes 
involved in implementing institutional layoffs, Dr. Xavier embraced the fluidity of the 
situation, stating:  
 …the legislature still had six months before it would recess, and then any decision 
 made would be another year before it’d be implemented, so there are like 18  
 months between the time we found out we were slated for elimination and the  
 time anything would actually be done.  In 18 months a lot can happen, so that’s 
 another reason why I wasn’t too upset about it.  
In the interim, Dr. Xavier contacted the unit’s professional association, provided pertinent 
information to an influential academic blog, and worked to convince internal and external 
colleagues that the fate of the unit was far from sealed.  Expanding on this last action, Dr. 
Xavier recounted the tone of his electronic exchanges:  
 Whenever somebody wrote to me and said, “Oh, gee, I’m so sad to see them  
 eliminate the [unit],” I’d write back and say, “It hasn’t been decided yet.   
 Please write a letter to our president, our dean and the [governing body].” 
 
 Determined not to be bothered by something “so far down the road,” Dr. Xavier 
took solace in the tenets of his discipline.  Engrossed in his spring [2011] semester 
teaching duties, Dr. Xavier began to re-read a foundational text he had assigned to his 
students.  Written almost two centuries prior, this scholarly monograph instantiated a 
continuous cultural commentary as it related to his academic specialization. Reflecting on 
this pivotal moment, Dr. Xavier believed “it really helped me to read this book.”  
Pondering this change in perspective, Dr. Xavier summarized his feelings on the potential 
elimination of his unit: 
 I wasn’t even disappointed.  There was a time when I first got here I used to be  
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 disappointed about all these things.  People didn’t consult me, decisions were 
 made and just handed down…Now I’m not even disappointed ‘cause I know  
 that’s the culture, that’s the American university culture, American state  
 university culture or American state regional university culture (Dr. Xavier,  
 personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
Dr. Parks  
 Otherwise occupied at an academic conference, Dr. Parks received an email from 
Dr. Smith confirming the news.  The President had just released his initial budget 
reduction proposal, and Unit 1 was on the list.  Though Dr. Parks had heard rumors to 
this effect nearly a month prior, the timing of the official release placed him in an 
awkward spotlight.  As word of the proposed elimination circulated throughout the 
blogosphere, Dr. Parks took center stage at the scholarly convention.  Commenting on his 
newfound notoriety, he recalled: 
 So how did I feel about it?  Well in very short order at the [convention],  
 everybody at the conference was, “Oh my God, what’s happening at [Mountain  
 University]?  Is this true?” At the conference there was a resolution at the  
 conference—this is within a couple days of the proposal—a resolution amongst 
 the membership of the society to denounce it or to deplore it.  And, you know, in  
 very short order I was one of the two [people] at the conference from [Mountain 
 University], “Oh those guys.”  And everybody—but people really wanted to know  
 what was going on… 
 Returning from his travels, Dr. Parks played an active role in the defense of his 
unit.  In addition to blogging, Dr. Parks contacted related disciplinary associations and 
high-ranking Unit 1 alumni, many of whom happened to hold senior-level administrative 
positions at other institutions.  Moreover, Dr. Parks also collected data on comparable 
units across the country, and co-authored a response to the Dean with respect to the 
proposed elimination of Unit 1.  Asked to summarize this rebuttal, Dr. Parks replied: 
 …First of all that the metrics being used were inappropriate for our [unit] that has  
 a much larger service obligation.  It teaches a lot of—a much greater proportion  
 of its classes to students outside of the [college]…you’re not taking cognizance of 
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 what we do, especially what we do with respect to other colleges.  And we’re not  
 a small [unit] by comparison to other universities.   
When I inquired as to the Dean’s reply, Dr. Parks remained silent; there was no response 
to his missive.  
 Forging ahead in the midst of his unit’s uncertain future, Dr. Parks conceded a 
noticeable change in his job performance.  Articulating his split focus during the spring 
2011 semester, Dr. Parks stated: 
 It was certainly a semester in which I was distracted.  It did take away a bit from 
 my teaching.  It also slowed down some of my writing as I was both, you know,  
 preparing defenses against the impending cuts and also obsessing over them a  
 little bit.  So it did slow down both teaching and research.   
Furthermore, though the unit was ultimately spared from elimination, Dr. Parks 
experienced an attitudinal shift toward Mountain University.  Echoing the sentiments of 
Dr. Smith, Dr. Parks articulated his position during the following exchange:  
 Dr. Parks: I know that I do have less institutional loyalty.   
 Interviewer: How does that manifest itself?  You know, how were you loyal  
 before and now you’re not?   
 Dr. Parks: Just by the way I represent the institution.  First and foremost to my  
 colleagues in the discipline.    
 Interviewer: How did you used to represent it and how is it now? 
 Dr. Parks: You know, it was great to me.  It was a great place to be.  The  
 institution is very supportive of my research.  It funds my travel, blah, blah, blah.  
 Now I’m a lot less of a booster.  (Dr. Parks, personal communication, March 19,  
 2012).   
Dr. Bradley 
 As the sole breadwinner for his family, Dr. Bradley experienced “a lot of worry” 
during the proposed elimination. Though tenure had been recommended by the unit and 
the dean, it had yet to be approved by the system-wide governing body.  Describing this 
all-important vote as “right in the middle” of the institutional tumult, Dr. Bradley 
recounted his observation of the assemblage: 
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 At the [governing body] meeting during this time, one of the [board members]  
 said, “Wait, maybe we should just table these tenure decisions until we have this  
 budget thing sorted out.”  And then some of the other [board members] said, “No, 
 forget it.  We can’t keep these people on the line like that.”  So that was—that  
 kinda got, basically, voted down or however you wanna put it.  And they voted  
 then to grant all the people who the various institutions had recommended to them  
 for tenure—they granted them all tenure.  So then I got tenure, not without a little 
 extra anxiety though.   
Though he was now a tenured faculty member, Dr. Bradley recalled his preoccupation 
during spring 2011:   
 So I would say yes, definitely that semester I didn’t really get anything done  
 besides worrying about this problem and trying to coordinate this or that.  Getting  
 people to write letters and stuff like that.  Trying to come up with arguments  
 about how the data didn’t support the idea that our [unit] was the best choice to be  
 eliminated and all this kind of thing.   
 While his research agenda was on “the back burner,” Dr. Bradley found that his 
teaching commitments provided him with an emotional outlet.  Indeed, focusing on class 
preparation and paper grading allowed Dr. Bradley to uncover a valuable learning 
opportunity for the students majoring in this particular area of scholarship.  Dr. Bradley 
described his unique assignment in the following manner: 
 To think about, as part of an academic exercise, to think about the nature and  
 value of the discipline that they are studying.  So in that sense it provided  
 something of an educational opportunity.  I think, you know, if you’re studying 
 a certain discipline the society’s showing that it doesn’t value it.  Well, what is the 
 value of it and I asked them to think about that and discuss that.   
 
Although this positive, classroom moment provided momentary catharsis, Dr. Bradley 
provided candid advice to students wishing to pursue graduate-level education: 
 I guess it’s not a change in kind; it’s more of a change in degree.  Like are you  
 sure that you’re willing to put up with this [the potential elimination of your unit]  
 ‘cause this kinda stuff’s gonna happen in the future in other places too.   
 
 In a further illustration of this tumultuous time, Dr. Bradley expressed his dismay 
over disparaging remarks in the local press: 
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 So obviously there’s supportive comments in the newspaper articles but I read a  
 lot of these articles and I read a lot of the comments.  And it’s kinda, you know,  
 disheartening to be made out to feel like you’re some kind of parasite on the  
 system.  I don’t—I didn’t feel like I was a parasite on the system but that was one  
 of the effects of floating these possibilities out there that ended up getting  
 retracted.  I felt like why do I wanna be—why do I wanna live in the place where  
 a large amount of people feel like I’m stealing their money?  That I’m like an  
 academic welfare recipient of some kind.  Why would I want—I don’t feel that  
 that’s what I am, but that’s—if that’s how people feel about me in the community 
 it doesn’t really make me wanna be a part of the community (Dr. Bradley,  
personal communication, March 22, 2012).     
Strategic Uncertainty 
 As outlined in the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the initial phase of 
individual uncertainty relates to organizational rationale.  Simply stated, why has the 
organization decided to head in this particular direction?  Guided by the theoretical 
components noted below, I aim to answer this very question.    
Reasons for Organizational Change 
 As explicated at the beginning of this chapter, Mountain University faced a 
significant financial shortfall as a result of the Governor’s proposed 2011-2013 biennial 
budget for higher education (Governor, 2011).  Recognizing the gravity of this reduction 
in state support, both the President and the Provost issued emails to the campus 
community detailing the seriousness of the situation.  In a memorandum to the Deans, the 
Provost summarized Mountain University’s dire fiscal predicament: 
 As you are aware, the budget proposal for higher education funding currently  
 before the state legislature reduces the [Mountain State] System of Higher  
 Education budget an additional 29.1 percent in the next biennium (2011-2013).  
 The [Mountain University] portion of this reduction is $47.5 million of our  
 current state appropriation.  This proposed cut comes on top of the $49.6 million 
 that [Mountain University] has already reduced in the past three fiscal years.  In  
 short, should this proposal be adopted by the state legislature [Mountain  
 University] will see a total reduction in its state support of almost $100 million 
 over the five years leading up to June 30, 2013.  Past cuts have generally spared  
 Academic Affairs.  Although academics make up approximately 75 percent of the 
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 budget, we have taken only about 25 percent of the cuts.  Unfortunately, we no  
 longer have that option available to us; Academic Affairs will be required to  
 absorb more of the cuts in the next biennium (Provost, February 15, 2011).   
 
In a further contextualization of these figures, the President provided his take on this 
scenario, stating: “In my opinion, such a budget cut delivered by July 1, 2012, cannot be 
administered without a declaration of financial exigency” (President, February 15, 2012).  
Though the Mountain State System of Higher Education governing body ultimately 
refused to make this declaration, the mere possibility of financial exigency, coupled with 
the directives outlined by the President and Provost, colored Unit 1’s perceptions of 
organizational change.   
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization  
 In addition to outlining the rationale for Mountain University’s budget crisis, the 
President and Provost provided financial targets and processual guidelines to the Deans in 
their mid-February emails.  As such, the Provost explicated the following budget 
reduction philosophy: 
 Under this process each dean will be given a budget reduction target and asked to  
 make recommendations regarding how this target will be met in each school and 
 college.  These recommendations are due no later than Friday, February 25.  You  
 should work closely with your executive committees to develop these  
 recommendations.  In making these proposals it is important to bear in mind that  
 the central teaching and research mission of [Mountain University] should be  
 protected as best as possible.  To that extent, horizontal cuts should generally be 
 avoided as they do nothing other than ensure the mediocrity of all programs. Now  
 is the time that we must consider additional vertical cuts and the elimination of  
 academic programs and departments that are not core to our mission (Provost,  
 February 15, 2011).   
 
Echoing the Provost’s sentiments, the President made the following declaration: 
 An administrative team will review the proposals and determine if there are  
 additional efficiencies we can gain through major organizational changes that  
 would reduce the cut impact on our teaching and research mission.  The cuts will 
 not be equally applied to all units, and the possibility of elimination or  
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 condensation of colleges and schools will be considered along with departmental 
 eliminations and reorganizations.  Our highest consideration will be preserving 
 our students’ education, the core strengths of our institution, and gaining every  
 measure of efficiency we can find (President, February 15, 2011). [See Appendix  
 F for the entirety of the institutional mission statement referenced by the Provost 
 and President]  
  
Though the organizational planning process advocated by the President and 
Provost referenced updated terminology, the strategy of institutional downsizing has 
remained rather consistent.  Largely a choice between across-the-board (i.e. “horizontal”) 
or targeted (i.e. “vertical”) cutbacks, university administrators must decide which strategy 
or combination of strategies will guide the future direction of the institution.  In 
describing the longstanding institutional preference for across-the-board reductions, 
Eckel (2003) provides the following explanation: 
This approach causes less stress than strategic, targeted cuts because it does not  
require evaluative decisions among units difficult to compare or anyone to make 
unpopular decisions; those responsible for managing the change are more  
experienced with the processes to make across-the-board cuts, and, finally, the 
shared nature of university decision-making makes targeted cuts difficult (p.5-6).   
 
While Mountain University had charted this course during previous budgetary crises, the 
executive administration believed that continued reliance on horizontal cuts would 
weaken the institution as a whole.  As prefaced by administrative leadership, Mountain 
University would become “a smaller more focused institution” (President, March 30, 
2011).    
 Heeding the charge of his superiors, the Dean of Unit 1 began to make the 
evaluative decisions necessary to meet the Provost’s February 25, 2011 timeframe.  With 
only ten calendar days separating the directive from the deadline, the Dean had little time 
to prepare his response.  To this end, the Dean and his staff assembled a report which 
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ranked each unit in the College; the report listed Unit 1 as “underperforming” (Dr. 
Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
 Meeting as a group to discuss this account, the members of Unit 1 reviewed the 
report for accuracy and appropriateness of inclusionary criteria, finding neither.  When I 
asked members of Unit 1 to elaborate on the Dean’s collegiate ranking system, I received 
the following responses: 
Dr. Xavier: “…we were penalized in part because of we don’t have any graduate 
students.  The reason we don’t have graduate students is we don’t have a graduate 
program…It was based primarily on the number of majors.  We didn’t have many majors 
(personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
 
Dr. Parks: “…the data they were using was a little dated, a little old.  It didn’t keep track 
of for instance the number of double majors that we had.  And it didn’t keep track of 
some relatively recent growth in the number of majors…What was not being recognized 
was the amount of off college teaching that we do. (personal communication, March 19, 
2012).   
 
Though Unit 1 rebutted the perceived flaws in the ranking system, the truncated 
timeframe did not permit adequate revisions or faculty consultation.  Questioned as to 
why the Dean submitted Unit 1 for inclusion on the initial March 8, 2011 cut list despite 
their data-driven protests, the faculty provided the following comments:  
Dr. Smith: Well…why it’s on the list is a big big mystery all around, because there’s—
there were several stages (personal communication, February 16, 2012).    
 
Dr. Bradley: So there are two answers, I guess, I have to that question.  One is—the 
general reason is because of the low number of graduating degrees.  That’s the general 
reason, but that’s not a complete explanation because there are other majors that weren’t 
on the list that had fewer majors, fewer graduates, a lower graduation rate.  So why were 
we on that list?  I don’t know.  I can’t really say.  (personal communication, March 22, 
2012).   
 
Dr. Xavier: Yeah, because of the small number of majors. Probably some of the feeling 
was it would cause the least pain ‘cause we were a small [unit] and small majors, so they 
just chopped it off.  Nobody knows (personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
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Dr. Parks: The dean was thrown into a lifeboat situation.  Ok, and who’s going to be 
piggy?  You know, who’s going to get tossed out of the lifeboat?...That’s the dollar 
figure.  Yeah.  I’m not saying that’s very creative but there you go and at least the dean is 
able to preserve all of his graduate programs (personal communication, March 19, 2012).   
 
 Elaborating on this strategic ambiguity, Dr. Smith revealed an interesting 
interchange with the Dean: 
 They [the Deans] were required to make vertical cuts.  Ok.  So what the Dean had  
 said is, “He was going to give them [the executive administration] the names of  
 three departments.” And what the Dean said to us is, “They’re never going to take 
 these, alright?  But I’ve got to give them three names” (personal communication,  
 February 16, 2012).   
 
Provided this context, the members of Unit 1 speculated as to the real role of institutional 
data in the Dean’s decision-making process.  Dr. Parks, in particular, had this to offer: 
“You can generate metrics that can do whatever you want, well pretty much” (personal 
communication, March 19, 2012).  Unconvinced that facts and figures had resulted in 
their potential elimination, a new theory gained credence amongst the faculty and the 
local press.  As articulated by a prominent newspaper columnist:   
 The plan to eliminate [Mountain University’s] [Unit 1] is so preposterous, so right  
 out of a “Simpsons” episode, that the cynic in me thinks it’s a devious – and  
 ethically suspect! – plan to draw attention to the Draconian budget cuts proposed  
 by [Mountain State Governor] (Coolican, 2011).   
 
  Augmenting this assertion, Drs. Smith, Xavier, and Bradley provided the following 
feedback: 
 I think uh…the upper administration was thinking both “Huh…this is gonna be  
 really really bad p.r. (public relations) if we lose [Unit 1].  Legislatures don’t want  
 that kind of bad p.r. for their state, so they won’t do that.  So we’ll put [Unit 1] up  
 there as a big target.” …So I think it was sort of a…part of a chicken game (Dr.  
 Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
 We knew it was a possibility that this was just a political ploy, but there seemed  
 to be some—there’s another fact—there seemed to be some reason to think the  
 administration was trying to create the most drastic scenario they could to scare  
 the legislature into not making cuts, so that was another consideration (Dr.  
84 
 
 Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
 
 Okay.  Right, so that was—that seemed to be a motivation that if we cut  
 everything horizontally it’s gonna weaken everything in the university and no  
 one’s gonna notice because the manner of the cuts is to just weaken everything.  
 Whereas if you cut vertically and eliminate [units] that that is something  
 noticeable that you can just say in one sentence that we have to eliminate X, Y, Z,  
 [units].  And that’s a sound byte you can use rather than saying we have to  
 eliminate, you know, 10 percent or 20 percent of the budget from this—from  
 everywhere.  That that’s gonna have all these little effects that aren’t as easy to  
 articulate (Dr. Bradley, personal communication, March 22, 2012).   
 
 Confused and angered by this perceived institutional strategy, concerned citizens 
and academicians pushed back on the proposed elimination.  Referencing Mountain 
University’s plan to cut Unit 1, local resident Rose Rhine made the following economic 
analogy: “I am astounded that our officials are so ignorant that one of the first things they 
would propose to cut is the exact thing that [Mountain State], indeed the entire nation, 
needs most to fend off this spiral” (Rhine, April 4, 2011).  In addition to macro-level 
arguments, outside scholars pinpointed underlying flaws in this peculiar proposal.  In an 
email to the President, Provost, and Dean, the executive director of Unit 1’s national 
professional association provided arguments based on principle and practicality, stating: 
“Eliminating [Unit 1] would be inconsistent with [Mountain University’s] Mission 
Statement.”  Furthermore, Unit 1 is a “low overhead discipline,” which instills “the kind 
of skills most desired by employers.”  Moreover, “one thing that is relatively unique 
about [Unit 1] is that total [Unit 1] enrollments are typically quite high.  This is in large 
measure because students recognize that certain courses in [Unit 1] strongly augment 
their other major courses” (Unit 1 National Association Executive Director, personal 
communication, March 10, 2011).   
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 Though Dr. Smith lamented that “some of the people who I think would have 
helped us and should have helped us didn’t give us much help, because they all said “this 
is just a bluff,” (personal communication, February 16, 2012), significant opposition did 
occur from within the institution.  In a strongly worded letter to the Mountain University 
Faculty Senate at-large, members of the General Education Committee (GEC) argued 
against the proposed reform of undergraduate general education requirements during this 
critical juncture.  As advanced by eight of the nine voting members of the GEC: 
 The recently proposed cuts, which are themselves subject to change, make the 
 timeline issues as discussed in our March 4
th
 report even more problematic.   
 Specifically, the university is proposing eliminating [Unit 1], among others, and  
 making significant reorganizations of major academic units.  Since no final  
 decision will be made on these issues until at least July 2011, it seems to us  
 impossible to determine which courses will be available for inclusion in the core, 
 which units will offer them, and who must approve new courses and curricula  
 within these new units…The GEC asserts that the only thing that separates a good 
 General Education core from a bad one is purposeful and attentive appraisal of 
 both the content of the requirements, and the means by which students  
 satisfy those requirements (Mountain University Faculty Senate GEC, personal 
 communication, March 21, 2011).   
 
Perhaps sensing the unease generated by the March 8, 2011 budget reduction list, 
the chair of the Faculty Senate soon called a special meeting to discuss anticipated cuts 
and proposed unitary closures (Mountain University Faculty Senate Chair, personal 
communication, March 24, 2011).  In addition to the executive administration, several 
deans, and the entirety of the Faculty Senate, one hundred plus people filed into the 
Student Union ballroom to hear the President speak on this important matter.  Stressing 
his commitment to campus bylaws and faculty consultation, the President emphasized 
that “everything was based on predictions” and that a firm budget was not yet available.  
Moreover, there were no satisfying set of quantitative metrics available to guide these 
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cuts.  However, the President did recognize the stress caused by this situation, and 
offered the following explanation: 
Budget cutting is a slow-moving form of post-traumatic stress disorder.  There is 
almost nothing I can do to alleviate your anxiety.  We need to eliminate some of  
the cafeteria selection on the menu (S. Donoff, personal observation of Faculty 
Senate meeting, March 29, 2011).   
 
Following the President’s exposition, several members of the Faculty Senate and 
faculty at-large stepped forward to provide commentary on the elimination process.  
Though many individuals plead the case for their particular unit, two consistent themes 
reverberated throughout this institutional discourse.  Challenging the President’s 
professed commitment to shared governance, faculty stressed the need for consultation 
and data-driven decision-making in the exercise of reshaping Mountain University.  
Reinforcing these claims, a member of Unit 1 (who declined to be interviewed for this 
study) protested the strategy of vertical cuts as damaging to the reputation and 
educational quality of the institution, and demanded that the President provide a solid 
rationale for the elimination process.  Moreover, several faculty members from other 
units urged organizational realignment, reassignment of tenured faculty, and the 
discontinuance of a hotly contested new Ph.D. program as proposed alternatives to the 
March 8
th
 plan (S. Donoff, personal observation of Faculty Senate meeting, March 29, 
2011).    
 In an email to the campus community the following morning, the President 
announced a revised proposal which contained approximately $3.3 million in additional 
cuts.  Prompted by the legislative finance committee to provide cuts equal to the 
Governor’s proposed budget, the President noted that he received this mandate on March 
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22 with a response deadline of March 28.  Elaborating on this proposal, the President 
stated: 
 Clearly the short timeframe for submission of the additional cuts precluded  
 meaningful consultation, although they have been discussed with Academic 
 Council and Cabinet and Faculty Senate leadership. The additional cuts included 
 some additional subprogram elimination and an estimate of cost savings from  
 potential college and university level reorganization…I have been asked  
 repeatedly what principles were used to guide these cuts.  I would like to remind  
 everyone that we aren’t aware of any other institution that has faced cuts of this  
 magnitude over such a short period of time.  We are in uncharted territory. We 
 can no longer sustain the diversity of programs we have with the resources we  
 receive; thus we need to reorganize in each college and across the university to  
 focus on our core academic and research mission…We also have to consider that 
 we cannot significantly decrease enrollment revenue flow without driving further 
 cuts (President, March 30, 2011).  
 
While the President’s reference to preserving Mountain University’s mission is consistent 
with his February 15 letter to the campus, his interjection of concerns over enrollment 
revenue presaged a new strategic component.  While not explicitly stated in his next 
email, this consideration was likely imparted privately to the Deans.  Addressing this next 
phase of academic attrition, the President opined:  
 Last month I released a list of possible program and department eliminations. The  
 list, put together very quickly to meet the [governing body’s] demand for detailed 
 cuts, has damaged morale and created an incredible amount of anxiety on our  
 campus. Please know that this proposal was preliminary and by no means final. 
 Now a more orderly analysis and process will take place, and you need to be  
 involved in it.  I have asked all the deans to consult with faculty and staff to get  
 your best ideas about how we can meet budget cut targets for your unit. Each  
 college needs to engage in a thoughtful and thorough discussion about how we  
 can sustain our core mission and serve our students in light of limited resources.  
 After consulting with you, the deans will submit revised plans to the provost, who 
 will then review them in collaboration with the Faculty Advisory Committee.  We 
 will fine tune the plans created in consultation with the faculty and have them  
 ready for full consideration in mid-May. I am deeply concerned about the 
 colleagues and programs we will lose because budget cuts are inevitable, and I  
 will do everything in my power to honor tenure whenever I can.  I will work 
 collaboratively with the Faculty Advisory Committee to preserve as many 
 positions as possible (President, April 8, 2011).   
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Including the aforementioned assertions, the institutional strategy now consisted of the 
following elements: preservation of Mountain University’s academic and research 
mission, maintaining enrollment revenue, honoring tenure, and protecting positions.   
 Though the President publicly issued his directive to the Deans on April 8, it is 
apparent that the Dean of Unit 1 had revised his proposal prior to this date.  At a college-
wide meeting on April 5, the Dean announced a new plan which preserved Unit 1, with 
the exception of its non-tenured faculty members. Moreover, those non-tenured 
individuals would have until July 1, 2011 to obtain tenure, or else they would be 
terminated on June 30, 2012.  In an email to college which was subsequently obtained by 
the press, the Dean iterated that “the central rationale is to have as slight an impact on 
student progress toward degrees as possible” (Corbin, 2011).   
However, members of the public and Unit 1 challenged the Dean’s claim, and the 
lack of consultation involved in achieving this revised proposal.  In an internet comment 
posted in response to the Corbin article, local resident Gina Sully offered the following 
perspective: 
The elimination of tenure-track faculty seems to me to be a move in the direction  
of eliminating full-time faculty altogether and having as many classes as possible 
taught by people who won’t receive any kind of benefits package.  That’s a good  
move (in case you can’t hear the dripping, that’s sarcasm). Part-time instructors 
have to teach 10 classes a year to make $25,000—without benefits. Yep. That’ll 
bring the best faculty in the country to teach here (Sully, 2011).   
Commenting on the Dean’s unilateral decision-making process, members of Unit 1 
provided the following criticisms: 
Dr. Xavier: “The whole budget thing was handled by the administration with no  
consultation of faculty, as far as I can tell” (personal communication, 
February 23, 2012).  
 
Dr. Bradley: “We got off the list not because they got more money, but for some other  
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  reason. So we were on the list and then off the list” (personal  
  communication, March 22, 2012).   
Dr. Smith: “The big sort of last plan was the junior faculty were going to get cut.  And  
          the Dean kind of making noises like that he didn’t think that was going to  
          happen, but I was like “I don’t care what you think.”  It’s got…I mean, “I 
          want in writing, I want to know…” (personal communication, February 16,  
                     2012).  
 Covering this change in strategic direction, student newspaper columnist Haley 
Etchison pointed out the disparity among the President’s March 30th elimination 
proposal, the Dean’s announcement of April 5th , and the President’s April 8th email to the 
campus community.  Commenting on this series of events, Etchison reported: 
 The [March 30] document, as presented to the [governing body], contains the  
 recommendation to eliminate [Unit 1], but since the [college] released a new plan 
 on Tuesday [April 5] detailing faculty reductions in place of that cut, [the  
 president’s] plan in likely to be amended.  [A governing body member] attested  
 that he has received more communications asking for the preservation of [Unit 1] 
 than making any other request. [The Mountain University president] pointed out  
 that for one area to be saved, another has to be put in danger. “Every time I take 
 one program off the table, I have to put a program on the table,” he said. But, he  
 said that any administrative proposal for cuts must have “grassroots” support from 
 the faculty of the university in order to be effective and fair (Etchison, 2011).  
A pivotal piece of journalism, Etchison’s account raises additional questions as to the 
timing of and motivation behind this weeklong series of executive communications.  At a 
special meeting on April 8
th
, the Mountain State System of Higher Education governing 
body questioned the President of Mountain University about his March 30
th
 budget 
reduction plan.  Admitting that the governing body “did not have the background 
information or depth of knowledge in cutting programs,” a member of this body “asked if 
there was a way to preserve the course offerings in [Unit 1].” In response, the President 
noted, “they are reviewing the process right now” (Governing body, 2011).   
90 
 
 Attributing this change in course to their letter-writing campaign, the members of 
Unit 1 discussed the mounting pressure on Mountain University administration: 
Dr. Smith: “Yeah, he [Mountain University President] keeps getting all these letters  
                    saying, you know, “What’s wrong out there? Are you gonna do that  
         [eliminate Unit 1]?  He mentioned in um some talks that, you know, uh… 
         some speeches he made about that he didn’t want to get another national  
                    black eye” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).   
 
Dr. Bradley: “And it wasn’t so much because of that letter [a letter from Unit 1 to the  
  Dean], I think, so much as external letters from the academic community 
  saying that it would be a big mistake to eliminate [Unit 1]” (personal  
  communication, March 22, 2012).   
 
Dr. Parks:       “Of course, from within our field, it turns out that a lot of our…a lot of  
  people in [Unit 1] are well connected with higher administrators at other  
  universities and so we tapped our contacts there. Basically telling—we  
  contacted those folks in particular to talk to the higher administration here 
  at [Mountain University] to basically make it clear that if—that the  
  provost and the president of [Mountain University] did not want to be  
  known as the provost and president that killed [Unit 1] at [Mountain  
  University].  That basically if they wanted to advance their career any  
  further that it would not be in their interests to be known as the president 
  or the provost that did anything to [Unit 1]” (personal communication,  
  March 19, 2012).   
Provided the inconsistency among the March 30
th
 elimination proposal, April 5
th
 
collegiate announcement, and the President’s April 8th governing body testimony, it is 
apparent that March 30
th
-April 8
th
 was a decisive week for Unit 1.  Saved from outright 
elimination, Unit 1’s non-tenured faculty lines were nonetheless featured in the May 3rd 
and June 8
th
 budget reduction proposals (Mountain University, 2011; President, 2011).  
Interpreting this change in direction, members of Unit 1 offered the following: 
Dr. Smith: “This went through several stages—right, as you know—lots and lots of  
         stages—and there were different proposals…and it never really completely 
         felt over until like, the next September [2011]. Right? I mean, even over the 
         summer it wasn’t completely clear, right, what was going to happen”  
         (personal communication, February 16, 2012).      
 
Dr. Bradley: “There were multiple like “Here’s the first list, but this is only—this is only 
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            the plan A. This is the first iteration of our attempt to come up with a  
            budget.” So it was never the case that the legislature gave us this amount of 
            money and here’s the [Mountain University] budget.  It was like “Here’s 
            our first pass and that included [Unit 1] on the list.” Then in the later pass it 
            didn’t include [Unit 1] on the list and that was—that came much later.  So  
            yeah, there was kind of a lack of transparency and clarity as far as what the 
            university’s position was about what cuts were gonna be made” (personal 
            communication, March 22, 2012).      
 
Dr. Xavier:  “I think that could summarize a lot of the controversy in academia—most  
           people are used to dealing with necessary truths.  A good administrative  
           position, they have to deal with contingent truths and they can’t handle it” 
                     (personal communication, February 23, 2012).    
In a further elaboration of these aforementioned constructs, the following section will 
detail significant occurrences which impacted the short-term viability of Mountain 
University and Unit 1.     
Organizational Sustainability  
Throughout the academic summer of 2011, a series of fortuitous events provided 
Mountain University with additional, unexpected sources of funding.  On May 2, 2011, 
the Mountain State Economic Forum revised its December 1, 2010 forecast on future 
state revenue, allocating an additional $274 million for public expenditures (Mountain 
State Economic Forum, 2011).  Charged with allocating these additional funds, the 
Governor pledged “that the $274 million increase will go directly to public education” 
(Spillman, 2011).  Taking “public education” to mean K-12 education, the Governor 
disproportionately allocated only $20 million to the Mountain State System of Higher 
Education, with the remainder slated for compulsory schooling (Rindels, 2011).          
Meanwhile, on May 9, 2011, the President announced the Tenured Faculty 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (TFVSIP), which offered a one-time, lump sum 
buyout of 150% of a tenured faculty member’s employment contract, contingent upon 
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leaving the institution by June 30, 2011.  As iterated by the President, “the goal of this 
program is to offer a voluntary incentive buy-out option to help limit the need for 
terminating tenured faculty.  In short, the more tenured faculty who take this buy-out 
option, the fewer other tenured faculty we will be forced to terminate” (President, 
personal communication, May 9, 2011).  Applications for the TFVSIP buy-out were due 
on May 23, 2011, providing a two-week decision window.   
However, just three days after the TFVSIP application due-date, the Mountain 
State Supreme Court issued a pivotal judicial opinion. Radically augmenting the 
additional $20 million allocation to the Mountain State System of Higher Education, this 
ruling invalidated the legislature’s appropriation of $62 million in local fees for state 
general fund usage (Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, 2011).  Compelled to amend 
his anti-tax stance, the Governor and the legislature came together “after five days of 
round-the-clock negotiations” to reach a budgetary compromise (Spillman & Vogel, 
2011).  Issued on June 1, the 2011-2013 budget included $620 million in taxes that were 
set to expire at the close of the 2009-2011 biennium, providing an infusion of funds for 
the Mountain State System of Higher Education.  Speaking to the local press about the 
finalized budget, the President of Mountain University offered the following insight into 
his new strategy: 
We exist in a global marketplace, and we compete for top faculty…If you don’t 
honor tenure, you get yourself in trouble…As far as program eliminations, a  
significant number will still occur, but they won’t occur by relieving tenured 
faculty of their positions (Lake, June 3, 2011).   
 
Pressed by the same reporter as to which units would be eliminated, the President 
provided the following response: “[Mountain University President] did not say which 
departments would be cut.  The deans of the various colleges are still finalizing details” 
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(Lake, June 9, 2011).  These “details,” outlined in a June 8th town hall meeting, provided 
budget reduction figures for each college, but did not specify which units would be 
eliminated (Mountain University, June 8, 2011).  Though the President promised faculty 
consultation on this matter (S. Donoff, personal observation of town hall meeting, June 8, 
2011), Mountain University transmitted this proposal to the governing body for approval 
at their June 16-17 meeting.  In this budget reduction proposal, Mountain University 
committed to adding back several “programs and services, significantly improving the 
support for access and student success, as well a number of programs that directly 
support economic development” (Governing body, 2011).  Though their non-tenured 
faculty lines remained a part of the budget reduction proposal, Unit 1 was listed among 
these “add backs.”  However, the following caveat underscored the entirety of the plan: 
Note: The reductions specified above represent current plans, but these could  
change based on many factors, including final cuts levels, action by the  
[governing body], faculty/staff departures, support required for students in  
impacted programs, the outcome of the curricular review process, the final 
outcome of academic reorganizations, etc. (Governing body, 2011).  
         
While tuition increases and across-the-board salary reductions closed a portion of 
Mountain University’s $20 million budget gap (Lake, June 18, 2011), the buy-out 
incentive noted above provided additional funds for the cash-strapped institution. As 
such, forty-eight tenured faculty members accepted the TFVSIP package, freeing an 
additional $6.34 million for the preservation of remaining faculty members (Formoso, 
2011; Mountain University, June 27, 2011).  Addressing this influx of funds, the 
President opined that “the sacrifice made by tenured faculty accepting the TVSIP buyouts 
allowed us to save tenured and non-tenured positions and they deserve our thanks” 
(President, July 6, 2011).  However, it was still unclear exactly who and what was 
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“saved” in this latest scenario.  In an August 18th email to the campus community, 
Mountain University’s President updated his constituents: 
As the summer winds down, I want to take a moment to welcome all of you back  
to campus and update you on what we have been working on over the summer.  
First, some of you have asked me when the budget cuts will be implemented.  For 
all intents and purposes the budget cuts are done and I am happy to report that no  
tenured or tenure track faculty were terminated as a result of program elimination. 
 
 Clearly, several developments had occurred during the summer of 2011.  With 
three months in between the June and September governing body meetings, it is evident 
that the administration worked to reconcile the elimination process, but with insufficient 
communication to the faculty-- the majority of which are not on-campus during the 
summer term. Though the plan referenced by the President would not be approved until 
the September 8
th
 meeting of the governing body’s Business & Finance Committee, the 
decisions outlined in this report were made well in advance of this gathering (Governing 
Body, September 8, 2011).  While Unit 1 ultimately retained its non-tenured lines, faculty 
members expressed concerns about institutional and organizational sustainability beyond 
the 2011-2013 biennium.  Commenting on the future of Mountain University and their 
individual unit, Drs. Smith and Parks outlined their perspectives: 
 I think the university is in a weaker position, because, I mean, once you sort of uh  
 cross the line and get people to consider, “Here’s one place to cut,” um…if you  
 end up not, they can say the next time, “Well, you know, we didn’t last time, and 
 you know, it was clear that was one of the things we could have done—let’s do  
 that.” So, no, I don’t think the university…you know, in somewhat of a…you  
 know, give the President’s really made a big big effort to make it not happen  
 again, uh, that helps. But I think the fact that it came close before makes it weak 
 (Dr. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2012).   
 
 Well, it’s very clear that in the exercise of ranking departments that the dean for  
 instance was willing to funnel resources into what were the perceived strengths of 
 the college. In particular the perceived graduate strengths of the college and that is 
 continuing.  So for instance there are a number of new hires—a number of new  
 senior hires that are being made. And they’re not being made in [Unit 1] it’s yet 
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 more in [other units in the college]. And so this exercise of prioritizing programs  
 turned out to pick winners and the process of ranking programs, I’m afraid, is a 
 self perpetuating activity (Dr. Parks, personal communication, March 19, 2012). 
Delving deeper into their stated concerns, the following section will detail the nature of 
the business environment and its perceived effects on continued organizational and 
unitary viability.  
Nature of the Business Environment  
 As no organization exists in isolation from its external environment, it is 
important to analyze the effects of these extrinsic variables.  As addressed in Chapter 2’s 
literature review, state institutions have suffered as a result of public disinvestment in 
higher education.  While departmental/programmatic eliminations, salary reductions, and 
tuition increases are familiar budget reduction tactics, public universities also expend 
considerable energies on external revenue generation.  Hoping to replace state funding 
with other stable funding streams, public institutions have increasingly turned to the 
business community--and Mountain University is no exception.    
 Underscoring the current public sentiment, Drs. Smith and Xavier provided the 
following synopses:  
 It’s long been recognized that some tasks are best coordinated by governments, 
 and that to succeed in these efforts, governments have to raise revenue from  
 citizens.  Since colonial times, Americans have recognized that education is one 
 of the things that taxpayers need to support (and those were some lean times!).  
 Sadly, over the last several decades, Americans seem to have grown accustomed 
 to thinking that they can have roads, schools, fire departments, and Medicare  
 without fully paying for them.  Now that such thinking has proven a fantasy,  
 taxpayers should have responded with a sensible, “We should have been paying  
 for these things, and perhaps we should start.” Instead they have clamored to cut 
 spending—usually on things that don’t directly concern them or whose immediate 
 benefits aren’t apparent (Dr. Smith, 2011).   
 
 That’s another problem that we have today in our society is that people are  
 reluctant to spend money on public institutions.  They don’t wanna spend money 
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 on parks.  You gotta pay.  Parks used to be free.  Now you gotta pay fees to get in.  
 They don’t wanna spend money on education.  The less money they spend the  
 better.  But, it’s very short sighted ‘cause public institutions benefit everyone  
 (Dr. Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
 
In a telling exchange, Dr. Parks and I spoke about the particular shift in the Mountain 
State political climate: 
 Dr. Parks: I’m afraid—maybe this won’t happen next biennium but I’m afraid  
 that the tactic of using the budget as a weapon, as it was the last biennium, that 
 might recur. And if and when that recurs, we might be dangled over the fire. 
 Interviewer: That’s an interesting choice of words to say, “Use the budget as a  
 weapon,” what do you mean by that? 
 Dr. Parks: That is precisely what one of the political parties has been doing in  
 order to gain concessions in say in Wisconsin and Ohio.  Gain concessions out of 
 public employee unions.  I know that we’re not— 
 Interviewer: You’re saying in general this is a tactic? Ok, it’s not just— 
 Dr. Parks: That is a tactic that’s being used over and over again.  And it’s a  
 relatively new tactic to [Mountain State] and it was very successful.  And I’m  
 afraid that might become the new normal.  That would make our lives—my life, 
 a lot less pleasant (personal communication, March 19, 2012).   
Succinctly reinforced by the leader of their professional association: “This makes the 
situation at [Mountain University] a particularly important threat to the discipline of [Unit 
1] in a time when large numbers of universities face budgetary pressures from state 
government” (Unit 1 National Association Executive Director, personal communication, 
March 11, 2011).   
 Keenly aware of this shift in public priorities, the President has made efforts to 
strengthen Mountain University’s “town and gown” relations.  A recent addition to the 
Mountain City chamber of commerce board of trustees (Velotta, 2011), the President has 
also courted the Mountain State Development Authority and other prominent local 
business leaders to assist with fundraising efforts. Speaking to the local press about the 
importance of these occupational ties, the President declared: 
 The folks in those groups are major decision makers in our state.  Working with 
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 them, bringing them to our campus, working collaboratively is really the key to  
 gaining the kind of support that we need so we can establish a reasonable revenue 
 flow that’s predictable and stable (Green, 2011).   
 
However, securing a “predictable and stable” funding stream from private entities 
is not without its own set of potential pitfalls.  Indeed, as the business model becomes 
instantiated in the academic psyche, it stands to diminish the role of the “public” in 
higher education.  Forced to compete with a growing for-profit sector, it is clear that 
public institutions must adapt to an increasingly business-oriented marketplace.  
Speaking to the [Mountain State] Business Journal about this phenomenon, University of 
Phoenix representative Kathy Gamboa afforded the following explanation: 
While the situation for public institutions is severe, Gamboa says University of 
Phoenix’s biggest challenge right now is keeping up with the needs of the  
 community.  “Being for-profit affords us the opportunity to move a little faster,” 
 she says.  “An organization may come to us with an idea for a program, and we’re 
 able to work a little faster to put a program together.” She refers to the recent  
 development of a green and sustainable energy program, as well as an autism  
 certification program for teachers. “We try to fit into niches and help where we 
 can when we see programs being cut from the non-profit areas” (Santina, 2011).  
In an attempt to provide the same level of service to the business community, the mayor 
of Mountain City outlined a similar plan for Mountain University.  In addition to his 
ardent advocacy for the retention of Unit 1, the mayor espoused the following strategy: 
 [Mountain City mayor] also said the more “strategic alliances” that the city builds 
 with the university, the better off the community will be in terms of bringing in  
 new businesses and new jobs.  [Mountain University President] is already  
 working to that end, he said. “If a business wants to come into our community,  
 and they happen to have a particular expertise as far as the work force is  
 concerned, they will actually design a course at the university, which will address 
 that,” [Mountain City mayor] said. “I think that’s pretty innovative…That’s a real 
 enticement for a business to have training at a university, which will be able to  
 have an educated work force provided to them” (Toplikar, 2011). 
 
Summarizing the encroachment of private sector businesses into public higher education, 
Dr. Xavier commented:  
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 Really somewhat very clever.  See, on the one hand, they all support public  
 education, but on the other hand, they expect public educational institutions to  
 train their employees for them.  Why shouldn’t they train their own employees if 
 that’s how they want?  They’re externalizing some of their costs by expecting the 
 public education to graduate students who are job ready 
            (personal communication, February 23, 2012).  
 
Having utilized a variety of sources to underscore Unit 1’s strategic uncertainty, I will 
now rely solely on interview data to elucidate structural uncertainty.   
Structural Uncertainty 
In the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the second, concomitant phase 
of individual uncertainty relates to organizational structure.  Simply stated, what has 
changed in terms of the inner workings of the unit?  Guided by the statements of Unit 1 
faculty, I relate their answers to this question below.    
Reporting Structures 
 Despite the specter of elimination, reporting structures in Unit 1 remained 
consistent during and after the budget reduction process. Refusing to condemn their chair 
for these unfortunate circumstances, Unit 1 retained its leadership and organizational 
structure in the wake of this potential elimination. Elaborating on this continuity, Dr. 
Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) remarked: 
 And there wasn’t blame, I don’t think. People weren’t saying—people didn’t  
 think, for example, “Oh our chair, you know, he didn’t—it was his fault that  
 we’re on the list ‘cause he didn’t do his job.” There wasn’t talk like that.   
 
While Dr. Bradley’s assertion spoke to Unit 1’s continued confidence in their chair, my 
exchange with Dr. Xavier (personal communication, February 23, 2012) revealed the 
informal coupling of the faculty: 
 Dr. Xavier: We don’t have much formal organization in this department.   
 Everything’s mucking along as far as I can see. 
 Interviewer: What do you mean?  What’s “formal organization?” 
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 Dr. Xavier: Well, you know, roles and procedures and things like that. We don’t  
 have those.  We just meet once in a while. 
 
With few formalities in place prior to the proposed elimination, Unit 1 chose to 
retain this structure at the unitary level.  However, members of Unit 1 recognized the 
crucial role of the Dean in the elimination process, and accordingly changed their tactics 
in this reporting realm. Emphasizing this newfound advocacy, Dr. Parks (personal 
communication, March 19, 2012) explained: 
Dr. Parks: We will be squeaking constantly and hopefully sometimes the  
squeaking wheel will get the oil, let’s hope. 
Interviewer: How do you squeak? 
Dr. Parks: Well, it’s the constant bid for positions or the reminder—it’s actually  
also the constantly reminding, especially the dean, what he does have in this  
[unit].   
 
Hoping to prevent future inclusion on elimination lists, Unit 1 vocalized their concerns in 
a more concerted fashion.  In a further elaboration of this recent awareness, Dr. Parks 
stated simply: “I think more of us now have a sense of the image we must portray to the 
rest of the college, to the dean, to the administration” (personal communication, March 
19, 2012).   
Functionality of the Unit 
 While the members of Unit 1 observed only minor changes in reporting 
structures, the potential elimination had more noticeable effects on their collective 
functionality.  Strikingly, the faculty members expressed a sincere sense of camaraderie 
as a result of the struggle to save their unit. Commenting on this unity, Drs. Smith, Parks, 
and Bradley noted the following: 
 Dr. Smith: The cohesion of the unit was sort of pretty good because it was…it 
 was all…um…this is a battle, like, and we’re going to sort of fight this, and we’re 
 sort of in this to win. It was not, there was never a kind of—when I’d talk to some 
 people in other units, of course, there was a kind of fatalism about it.  Um…that 
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 was never us (personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
 Dr. Parks: In that sense what we’ve been through has brought some of us—well,  
 it largely has brought the [unit] closer together (personal communication, March  
 19, 2012). 
 
 Dr. Bradley: If anything, it made us get along better. We saw more of each other  
 in all of these meetings and so forth.  And we didn’t really have big differences in  
 opinion on what to do (personal communication, March 22, 2012).  
 
     Piggybacking on the military imagery utilized by Dr. Smith, Dr. Parks referred to this 
solidarity as “a bunker mentality” (personal communication, March 19, 2012). 
Preoccupied with saving their unit, Dr. Smith indicated that his faculty’s research 
productivity declined precipitously during the spring of 2011.  In conducting the faculty’s 
annual evaluations, Dr. Smith (personal communication, February 16, 2012) noted the 
following: 
 I imagine it will bounce back. But, I mean, you know, you build your research—is 
 built on the research you did before.  And just the whole spring [2011] was kind  
 of lost doing this [dealing with the specter of budget cuts].   
 
Quite interestingly, productivity actually increased in other aspects of the traditional 
triad.  Commenting on this unusual pattern, Dr. Smith continued: 
 So productivity really fell off, um, in terms of research productivity.  Teaching,  
 people did as well…or better.  Teaching, teaching did not fall off.  I think people  
 really felt like, “Alright, we’re on the edge, we’re in the spotlight, you know,  
 we’re going to rise to the occasion.”  
 
Mentioning that he received “the highest teaching evaluations I had in ten years” during 
the spring of 2011, Dr. Smith speculated as to the motivations of his faculty: 
 Yeah, and I mean, you know, they, you know, people telling you, “You guys  
 aren’t worth anything.” We were like, “Yes we are.  You know, this is really  
 important.” And so, yes, everybody did really good teaching, I think.  So teaching,  
 you might have thought teaching got worse, you know, would get worse, people 
 saying, “I don’t care, they don’t care about us.”  But no. Teaching got as good or 
 better.  But research productivity just fell off, because people were doing these  
 other things.   
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 Furthermore, Unit 1 faculty focused on expanding the scope of their services to 
students and the community, in the hopes of staving off future elimination proceedings.  
Discussing their shift in recruitment strategy, Dr. Bradley (personal communication, 
March 22, 2012) explained: 
 More focus on—in the lower division courses; the one-on-ones and so forth to  
 make sure we have our best teachers there. And that they are telling them about  
 the majors—about the major; thinking about different kind of versions of a minor 
 or major that might be attractive to more students.   
 
In addition to conceptualizing these new academic tracks, public promotion became a 
central tenet of Unit 1.  Referring to the possibility of a new lecture series sponsored by a 
prominent local company, Dr. Parks stated: “I think there’s a greater sense of we need to 
be a little more involved in community outreach” (personal communication, March 19, 
2012).  Having discussed the effects of structural uncertainty on Unit 1, I will now turn to 
specific aspects of job-related uncertainty.     
Job-Related Uncertainty 
In the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the final phase of individual 
uncertainty relates to provisions of employment.  Simply stated, what has changed in 
terms of the job they were hired to do?  Guided by the statements of Unit 1 faculty, I 
relate their answers to this question below.    
Job Security 
 Perhaps the most prominent aspect of a potential elimination, members of Unit 1 
expressed significant concerns regarding their continued employment at Mountain 
University.  Voicing his concerns to the local press, a faculty member (who declined to 
be interviewed for this study) summarized his dire situation:  
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 [A faculty member in Unit 1] says he likes [Mountain City] and the life he’s made  
 for himself, but he will be forced to move away if he is fired.  “I will have to try 
 to find a job somewhere else,” he says.  “I will have to declare personal  
 bankruptcy, I will have to pack whatever I can fit into my car with my dog and go 
 someplace where I can teach [in Unit 1’s discipline], because [this discipline] is  
 my career. It’s what I do.  In fact, it’s more than what I do—it’s who I am”  
 (Totten, 2011).   
 
Admitting that his faculty “were worried about getting fired,” Dr. Smith (personal 
communication, February 16, 2012) foreshadowed the anxiety of his colleagues. 
Contemplating the potential of “forced retirement,” Dr. Xavier (personal communication, 
February 23, 2012) pondered alternative options: 
 One thing I did do the first day, I went home and I looked up the cost of living of 
 [disciplinary units] in other cities.  I was thinking maybe I’ll just visit…45  
 minutes on the internet just poking around to see if I could afford rents. I was  
 trying to decide where—since I didn’t have a job here [at Mountain University]— 
 where in the world, or mostly in the United States, where would I like to live, so I 
 just tried different places.  
 
Upon hearing of the proposed elimination while attending a disciplinary conference, Dr. 
Parks (personal communication, March 19, 2012) took this opportunity to announce his 
future candidacy: 
 Dr. Parks: I told them that so far the proposal was to eliminate [Unit 1] and they 
 should look for my application next year. 
 Interviewer: So that was your first thought, was try to get another job? 
 Dr. Parks: Well that of course was—you have to prepare yourself against the  
 worst case scenario.   
 
Reinforcing his co-worker’s claims, Dr. Bradley succinctly stated: “They were willing to 
have my termination be part of this public plan.  I didn’t feel valued; therefore it made me 
wanna go” (personal communication, March 22, 2012).   
 However, while the non-tenured individuals in Unit 1 certainly had cause for 
concern, one may wonder why Drs. Smith, Xavier, Parks, and Bradley—all tenured 
faculty members—were so distressed by the potential elimination. Commenting on the 
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employment protections at Mountain University, Dr. Xavier explained: “We don’t have 
tenure here, don’t you know that?” (personal communication, February 23, 2012).  
Checking into the legalities of this process, Dr. Smith (personal communication, February 
16, 2012) recounted his disturbing discovery: 
 ‘Cause one of the cases I wanted to make was, “you can’t do this.” Ok.  And what  
 it is we find out is “yeah you can.” I mean, there is not the legal protections  
 everybody thinks there is.  People really assume, “how can they fire tenured  
 faculty?” There’s lots and lots of arcane detail about this, that you can study, but  
 the long and short of it is…sure they can [fire tenured faculty]. There’s nothing of 
 that sort in the contracts. And I mean, it’s really sort of up to a judge to decide if  
 there are circumstances in which they can [fire tenured faculty].  There’s no clear 
 law that says you can’t fire tenured faculty members…Yeah, it’s really really a  
 custom that you don’t do this. But there’s nothing legally binding, anywhere, that  
 has that.   
 
Anticipating the potential legal challenges that might arise as a result of 
departmental/programmatic eliminations, the Mountain State system of higher education 
governing body proposed significant changes to their regulatory code.  In a telling email 
to his institutional colleagues, a prominent member of the Faculty Senate offered his 
assessment of these revisions: 
 I am alarmed by the Code changes submitted to the Code Review Task Force.   
 Among the more disturbing elements I note that 
 
1. Administrators may carve out parts of departments for elimination. 
2. No seniority protection is mandated in these Code changes.  
3. [System] administrators may lay off tenured faculty in the absence of a 
declared financial exigency. 
4. Curricular review may now include “adverse financial conditions” as 
sufficient cause to lay off a faculty member. 
 
All Faculty need to know that the [governing body] is contemplating aggressive 
action that undermines tenure…This is a potentially destructive policy change that 
seemingly breaks tenure around any ill-defined fiscal crisis. Without a strong 
tenure model, the classic three-legged stool of academia is shattered.  Academic 
freedom and shared governance will suffer (Mountain University Faculty Senator, 
personal communication, April 28, 2011).   
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Though the points referenced above were not incorporated into the system code as of the 
time of publication, their very mention underscores the prevailing job security issues at 
Mountain University, in aggregate, and in Unit 1, in particular.        
Promotion Opportunities 
 Concerned with his potential for academic advancement at Mountain University, 
Dr. Bradley contemplated his options at other institutions: 
 I’ve been thinking about alternatives.  And while I was—while the [unit] was in  
 that timeframe when we were—looked like we were gonna be cut I did apply to  
 get another job.  Now the way my discipline works, and maybe it’s the same  
 elsewhere, at that time of year there wasn’t really any permanent positions being 
 advertised or available.  That’s just not how the market works. But I did apply and 
 get offered a job; a three year temporary job… (personal communication, March  
 22, 2012).   
 
Explaining that “there are other sort of academic advantages too to be in a different place, 
at a good university,” Dr. Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) strongly 
considered leaving his tenured position for a non-tenured post at a more prestigious 
university.  Though the Dean had promised to re-hire him upon completion of the three 
year term, Dr. Bradley admitted that fiscal considerations ultimately held him back.  
Explaining his rationale for remaining at Mountain University, Dr. Bradley stated: 
 The final deciding factor was, I guess, the financial uncertainty of going.  How  
 much was it going to cost to move and the cost of living.  They were offering me 
 more money than [Mountain University] offers me, but in a city with a high cost 
 of living.  And so how does that—how can I—am I going to be able to afford  
 this?  Is this gonna be a big risk for me? (personal communication, March 22,  
 2012). 
 In addition to Dr. Bradley’s more individualized concerns, Drs. Parks and Smith 
worried about promoting the unit’s reputation amongst the academic community.  
Emphasizing Unit 1’s scholarly prominence, Dr. Parks stated: “One of the shocking 
things about the proposed elimination was that this was viewed as a desirable place to be 
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and as a place where very good [members of the discipline] had recently been attracted” 
(personal communication, March 19, 2012).  However, Dr. Smith believed that the 
proposed elimination had jeopardized his ability to retain his faculty.  Vocalizing his 
feelings of foreboding, Dr. Smith explained: 
 Um…everyone in the sort of trade publications comes out—they have lists of  
 jobs, right—uh, I imagine a lot of people will sort of fantasize, say, “Uh…you 
 know, that would be nice…maybe someday I’ll apply for something like that.”  
 Now they’re like, “I think I will [apply for another job].”  Right?  You will have 
 A much more likelihood of applying to other places, looking at other places,  
 thinking about other places” (personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
 Moreover, recruitment of new faculty would prove challenging in the wake of the 
proposed elimination.  As articulated by Dr. Parks: 
 Well, we have identified senior faculty that we might like to hire.  For instance, 
 when the president said, “Hey look, we want to make some high impact faculty  
 hires at the senior level” we thought it was important for us to be in that game.  
 And so we did identify one or two people. Just to make the case that, “Hey look, 
 even after what has happened, we can still attract high quality faculty.” That  
 we’re not crippled...But if we get into a so to speak bidding war with somebody, 
 I am afraid we would lose out (personal communication, March 19, 2012). 
 
Changes to the Job Role 
 While the proposed elimination diminished opportunities for self and unitary 
promotion, Unit 1 faculty perceived substantial changes to their Mountain University 
working conditions.  Specifically, Drs. Bradley and Xavier noted modifications to class 
sizes, and the attendant effects on instructional quality.  In the following exchange, Dr. 
Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) elaborated on his perceptions: 
 Interviewer: So you’ve noticed a workload increase? 
 Dr. Bradley: I think there’s a little bit more there, yeah. And then, also, just our  
 classes have upped the cap and so I have to grade more papers and stuff. 
 Interviewer: Who upped the cap? 
 Dr. Bradley: The administration made the class sizes bigger. 
 Interviewer: What were they? 
 Dr. Bradley: They were more like 30 I think. I think they were 30 and then they  
106 
 
 went up to like 36 maybe.  That’s for a certain [introductory class]. And then for 
 other classes that, for the majors, they also went up to 32.  They had been lower  
 maybe.  Maybe 28 or something like that, I don’t remember. 
 
Echoing Dr. Bradley’s sentiments, Dr. Xavier and I discussed the aforementioned 
phenomenon: 
 Dr. Xavier: Well, as a response—not to this thing, but as a response to the budget  
 crisis, the provost unilaterally increased the enrollments in our courses 20 percent 
 without even talking to us.  The university just said—they didn’t even tell us.   
 They just did it.  We noticed— 
 Interviewer: You just showed up, you’re like, “Oh, my roster is huge.” 
 Dr. Xavier: Yeah, I’d see my roster, it’s got 20 percent more students than before  
 this happened.  The chair doesn’t know. The dean knew. The provost did it  
 unilaterally. See, that’s what I’m talking about.  I’ve just been a factory worker. 
 Interviewer: Okay.  When you got this huge roster, what did you do?  How did  
 you react? 
 Dr. Xavier: Could do nothing. 
 Interviewer: How did you react though?  How did you feel when you saw this?   
 Tell me how.  You see this roster and— 
 Dr. Xavier: I felt disrespected.  I mean, I’m a Ph.D. and a professional and  
 somebody changes my working conditions unilaterally without even—did not talk  
 to me about it, didn’t even inform me about it, just did it (personal  
 communication, February 23, 2012).  
 
In addition to feeling disempowered by the increase in class size, Drs. Bradley and 
Xavier noted its negative impact on student learning.  Expanding on this point, Dr. 
Bradley noted:  
 I think there’s a point where the discussion becomes more difficult when you get  
 to like 28, 30, over 30.  More students are gonna sorta fall through the cracks as  
 far as that aspect of the classroom experience (personal communication, March 
 22, 2012).  
 
In a similar vein, Dr. Xavier made the following observation:  
 [Unit 1’s discipline] is just not something that people can learn, it’s something  
 people do, and they need practice.  The way to practice is through classroom  
 discussion.  If you have a bigger class, then people are more intimidated and you 
 don’t get to know each other as well and it’s hard to make your own  
 conversations (personal communication, February 23, 2012).   
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 Compounding the stress from increased class sizes, Drs. Parks, Bradley, and 
Xavier commented on the lack of new hires and diminished university benefits.  As 
articulated by the faculty: 
 There was one loss. Somebody—one of our visiting assistant professors did bail  
 out and took a position elsewhere. Did bail out because of the budget situation  
 and we didn’t get a replacement for that person (Dr. Parks, personal  
 communication, March 19, 2012). 
 
 I mean we haven’t hired any new people and people have left which means  
 there’s the same amount of work as far as the service side of things.  Same  
 amount of work distributed to fewer people (Dr. Bradley, personal  
 communication, March 22, 2012).   
 
 I’ve been furloughed six days a year. Plus my salary was docked 2.5% or  
 something. Then I got furloughed, which is another 2.5%. Six days a year I’m 
 not supposed to work without pay [Laughter]. That’s loosey goosey.  Of course I 
 had no say about that either…The healthcare benefits are terrible.  The out-of- 
 pocket expenses if you’re in a family, if you have a family, it’s $7800 a year out- 
 of-pocket expenses.  That’s almost $8000 for healthcare.  Most people find it’s  
 very difficult to pay that.  Benefits are going down (Dr. Xavier, personal  
 communication, February 23, 2012).   
 
 In addition to his faculty’s striking commentary, Dr. Smith confided the new 
reality of his chairmanship, stating: “You know, there’s a little bit more sense that part of 
your job is to make sure they don’t eliminate you” (personal communication, February 
16, 2012).  Elaborating on this assertion, Dr. Smith remarked: 
 Um, the one thing I guess I am different is I’ve looked more toward outside  
 funding than I ever would.  This is just not something you learn about in grad  
 school or think about when you’re thinking about doing [Unit 1’s discipline]— 
 “Oh, how are you going to find people in the community who would donate?” 
 Right? I do spend some time looking for them [donors] and trying to find them. 
 And that—that’s different.  And that’s probably the biggest change is seeing what 
 I can do (personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
As a companion to his fundraising efforts, Dr. Smith discussed new collaborations and 
pre-professional tracks as an integral part of his role as chair, explaining: “Now we’re 
really sort of pushing that, because it, you know, it will help us get more people 
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involved” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).  In the following section, I will 
delve deeper into the specific actions of Dr. Smith, and how they impacted the faculty’s 
perception of the proposed elimination process.       
Effect of the Department Chair 
 As the official, designated leader of an academic department (Leaming, 2007), the 
department chair is in a prime position to influence faculty perceptions of strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s (2007) 
concepts of manifest and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 1’s 
department chair, Dr. Smith, below.  
Acquiring and Communicating Information 
 Gathering and disseminating accurate information to affiliated faculty is a critical 
aspect of effective departmental leadership (Berdrow, 2010; Tucker, 1993). In this 
manner, Dr. Smith made a concerted effort to keep his faculty abreast of developments 
during the potential elimination. In addition to sending out “a state of the union message 
at the beginning of each semester” (Dr. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 
2012), Dr. Smith made frequent use of electronic correspondence. Corroborating this 
claim, two members of the faculty recalled their initial awareness of the March 8
th
 budget 
reduction proposal: 
 Dr. Xavier: “The chair sent out an email that said that we were gonna be  
 eliminated” (personal communication, February 23, 2012). 
 
 Dr. Parks: “I got an email from the department chair saying, “Yep, we’re on the  
 list” (personal communication, March 19, 2012).   
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 In addition to communication via email, Dr. Smith called bi-weekly meetings to 
update his faculty—a decisive break from the usual monthly gathering.  Describing this 
initial meeting, Dr. Bradley stated: 
 Well, I don’t remember the exact dates but it was in the spring of 2011.  And the  
 chair of [Unit 1] just called a meeting and said that there was some kind of budget 
 cuts on the horizon and he was—there were kinda rumors that our [unit] was  
 gonna be one of the [units cut]…after that first meeting there was no letter [to the 
 administration], there was just the chair wanted to talk to the—he was gonna sorta 
 verbally talk to the dean and people.  I don’t know exactly who—to try to get  
 more information and try to make some kind of a case [not to eliminate the unit] 
 (personal communication, March 22, 2012). 
 
Committed to clarity, transparency, and unity, Dr. Smith explained his rationale: 
 
 We were having more frequent [meetings]—because we, you know, there were  
 always questions about who we were going to send letters to and why.  And what 
 our response would be to the Dean and what our response would be to the  
 President.  A lot of what I had to do was have people do nothing, at times when  
 they wanted to do stuff, right? ‘Cause there were all kinds of counter-productive 
 things people could have done, right? Various kinds of stuff that I think would not 
 have helped (personal communication, February 16, 2012).   
 
Elaborating on his staunch avoidance of counter-productive activities, Dr. Smith  
succeeded in setting the departmental tone.    
Setting the Tone 
 As the face of Unit 1, Dr. Smith assumed responsibility for delineating the 
departmental demeanor.  Conscious of his faculty’s negative attitude toward the 
administration, Dr. Smith refocused their energies in a more positive manner.  Describing 
this turnaround, Dr. Smith stated: 
 I mean, there were a lot of, uh, you know, angry feelings toward the Dean and the  
 Provost and the President.  And I was like, “No. They’re our buddies now.  I  
 mean, even though they’re doing this [putting us on the cut list], they have to be 
 [our buddies].  They’re the only ones who can sort of save our bacon here”  
 (personal communication, February 16, 2012).   
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A self-described “general,” Dr. Smith explicated his disposition, and its attendant effects 
on his faculty, as follows: 
 This is everything I’m going to do, and I’m absolutely bound and determined not  
 to let this [the elimination of Unit 1] happen.  And um, I had that attitude, and the 
 faculty sort of picked up that attitude too.  They weren’t gonna, sort of, let this  
 happen. So it was a lot of an attitude of, “Ok, what can we do to stop this?” Um, 
 they might have been a little more frustrated than me, ‘cause I actually felt like I 
 was in a position of doing stuff all the time.  Right?  So all day long, every day, 
 I was sending emails, and fielding calls, and doing stuff like that (personal  
 communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
 Though Dr. Xavier described Dr. Smith as “totally panicked” and “just dithering 
away,” (personal communication, February 23, 2012) it was evident that he devoted 
considerable time and indefatigable effort into his departmental leadership. Encouraging 
his faculty to consider alternatives to Unit 1’s elimination, Dr. Smith included a critical 
caveat:     
 Like, I’d assign everybody, “How would we make up this dollar amount?”   
 Right? “If it didn’t come from [Unit 1], where could it come from?”  Without 
 trashing other colleagues. “You can’t do that,” I said (personal communication, 
 February 16, 2012).   
Furthermore, Dr. Smith took pains to prevent his faculty colleagues from further 
jeopardizing their precarious position.  Describing a particular incident, Dr. Smith 
recalled: 
 Some students came to us with a bunch of signatures for the President that we, 
 you know, we need to cease and desist this nonsense now.  You know?  Kind of 
 like…and I was like, “No. Students should not be doing that.  That will have no  
 effect, one, and it’ll have a negative effect, two” (personal communication,  
 February 16, 2012).   
In an attempt to shield Unit 1’s students from the potential elimination, Dr. Smith crafted 
an inclusive, multi-point plan to save his unit.   
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Strategy Formulation 
 During the course of our conversation, Dr. Smith described the three-pronged 
strategy he developed to combat the elimination of Unit 1.  As summarized by Dr. Smith 
(personal communication, February 16, 2012), this approach entailed: 
1. Reasons why the university couldn’t legally eliminate Unit 1 
2. Reasons why the university shouldn’t eliminate Unit 1 
3. Alternative funding sources/cost saving measures that would generate revenue 
equal or greater to the amount that would be saved by eliminating Unit 1 
 
While discussions with outside legal counsel undercut his first point (see pages 102-103 
for more detailed information on the tenuous legal protections afforded by tenure), points 
two and three remained viable options.  Choosing to focus on his second aim, Dr. Smith 
explained his rationale: 
 The main thing was kind of the p.r. (public relations)—don’t make it [the cut].  
 Whatever you do, don’t do this.  Um…you will look like a silly university if this 
 is the cut you take.  And that was sort of the message that I wanted them to hear  
 over and over again.  And, I mean, I talked to people in the President’s Council.   
 They said, “Yeah, he [the Mountain University president] keeps getting all these 
 letters saying, “You know, what’s wrong out there?  Are you gonna do that?” 
 He [the Mountain University president] mentioned in um some talks that, you  
 know, uh…some speeches that he made about that he didn’t want to get another  
 national black eye, like we did, you know, threatening to cut [Unit 1].  Right?  
 So, I mean, he’s hearing it from everybody.  And I was making sure he heard  
 from everyone (personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, Dr. Smith recruited his faculty colleagues in the execution of this second 
point.  Elaborating on this camaraderie, Dr. Smith stated: 
 So it was all going to be about, sort of, public pressure. And the public pressure  
 was going to come from every quarter, sort of every conceivable quarter that it  
 could.  I mean, I uh…in department meetings, right?  Um, I would say, “Like, ok, 
 who do you know?” Right?  And you know, one of my members would say,  
 “Well, I once played golf with Alice Cooper.” And I’d say, “You have to call  
 him” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).  
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Though the fulfillment of point number two soon overshadowed the third point, Dr. 
Smith did make an effort to explore this option.  Describing cost-saving and revenue-
generating possibilities, Dr. Smith remarked: 
 Don’t say, “Cut it from this, you know.” But uh, say it like, “Here are the things  
 that, um…this certain…find out how much this electricity takes…and how much 
 we’d save by not having this building on for this many hours.” So I’d assign  
 people like, “Find out that.” And then um…we can put this in a kind of letter at  
 some point, right? Or um, “Here’s who you could talk to about fundraising,”  
 right?  Or um, “I know that you know this person.  Can you contact—like I know 
 you were friends with this university president.”  Like uh…or, you know, I would 
 get people to give me lists of people they know.  And then I would give them  
 assignments of who to call and what to say, and stuff (personal communication,  
 February 16, 2012).   
 
As alluded to in the aforementioned statement, Dr. Smith recognized the importance of 
enlisting outside assistance in the fight to save Unit 1.      
Recruiting Outside Assistance 
 Underscoring his personal philosophy of strength in numbers, Dr. Smith implored 
his faculty to alert anyone “in some kind of position of power” and get them to write in 
favor of saving Unit 1 (personal communication, February 16, 2012).  In this vein, Dr. 
Smith answered over 400 emails, many of which were similar in tone, saying: “You 
know, we heard about you, is there anything we can do?” Replying to each one in turn, 
Dr. Smith said: “Yes, here’s something you can do.  You know, here’s a list of these 
people to write” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).   
In his attempts “to convince legislators, administrators, and community members 
that eliminating [Unit 1] is a poor way to help solve the state budget crisis,” Dr. Smith 
alerted Unit 1’s national professional association to the unfortunate situation at Mountain 
University (Dr. Smith, 2011).  Believing that all members of Unit 1’s discipline had a 
“vested interest” in preventing the elimination, Dr. Smith’s appeal unleashed a torrent of 
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correspondence from his colleagues across the country (Unit 1 National Association 
Executive Director, personal communication, March 10, 2011; Unit 1 Pacific Division 
Membership, personal communication, March 14, 2011).  Looking closer to home, Dr. 
Smith also “tried to make sure that we had support from other units; that they would be 
able to speak up for us” (Dr. Bradley, personal communication, March 22, 2012).  While 
the rationale for removing Unit 1 from the cut list was never fully explained, it is likely 
that Dr. Smith’s rallying cry for assistance contributed to the eventual salvation of Unit 1.           
Summary 
 Bonded together by the shared phenomenon of potential elimination, the members 
of Unit 1 nonetheless acknowledged their unique experiences in dealing with this 
unforeseen situation.  While the unit in its entirety only remained on the chopping block 
from March 8-May 3, 2011—a mere two months—the ramifications from this event 
reverberated well beyond this stated timeframe.  Indeed, consequences of the proposed 
elimination included the development of a “general” in Dr. Smith and a “bunker 
mentality” in the rest of the unit.  As such, the frequent use of military imagery in 
describing this traumatic process underscores an underlying war between Unit 1 and the 
Mountain University administration—a battle that could re-emerge during future 
budgetary crises.  Provided the diminished institutional loyalty and research productivity 
that arose as a result of these proceedings, it appears that Unit 1 lost more than it gained, 
despite its obvious success in self-preservation.  Turning to other faculty in a similar 
predicament, I will now explicate their attempts to save their unit.         
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Unit 2 
 Like their counterparts in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 struggled with the 
accompanying uncertainty of a potential elimination.  Though they too were ultimately 
successful in self-preservation, members of Unit 2 experienced the budget reduction 
measures in a much different manner.  Indeed, in the individual vignettes and 
departmental explications to follow, I discovered a unit torn apart, rather than brought 
together, by the process of advocating for their unit’s salvation.  In keeping with the 
aforementioned case structure, I present profiles of the chair and each faculty member, 
followed by an analysis of strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty.  Finally, I 
conclude this section by examining the chair’s role in affecting faculty perceptions of 
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties. 
Dr. Hayes: Chair of Unit 2 
 The Dean spoke of “making sacrifices” as he informed Dr. Hayes of the potential 
elimination. Called to his office on March 7, 2011—a day prior to the release of the 
initial budget reduction proposal—Dr. Hayes was blindsided by this devastating 
announcement.  Returning to his office, Dr. Hayes absorbed more bad news; his 
counterpart at a neighboring state institution had received a similar directive.  Within the 
span of a few hours, Dr. Hayes’ entire world had changed; how could Mountain State 
contemplate the wholesale elimination of this discipline?   
 Placed in this unenviable position, Dr. Hayes immediately informed his faculty of 
this new reality, urging them to mobilize all of their available resources in support of Unit 
2.  Meanwhile, Dr. Hayes alerted Unit 2’s national association, hoping to spread the word 
throughout the disciplinary community. With the support of colleagues across the 
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country, Dr. Hayes and his faculty spearheaded a “huge grassroots undertaking” within 
Mountain University and the surrounding populace.  Highlighting the scope of services 
provided by Unit 2, Dr. Hayes spoke with local media outlets and researched creative 
means of generating new sources of revenue.   
Believing that you “don’t have to cause terror” in order to save money, Dr. Hayes 
worked tirelessly to develop a counter-proposal to the elimination of Unit 2.  Examining 
tuition rates at nearby private institutions, Dr. Hayes recognized an untapped source of 
revenue.  Rather than rely on the whims of the Mountain State legislature, why not create 
a self-sustaining unit?  Utilizing his accounting and managerial skill sets, Dr. Hayes 
developed a differential tuition strategy with rates significantly below those of nearby 
private universities. Though he never received any formal, written notification of Unit 2’s 
salvation (only an informal conversation with the Dean), Dr. Hayes knew that this 
alternative tuition plan had made a significant impact. While he believes that there is less 
negativity now that the 2011-2013 budget process has concluded, Dr. Hayes still works to 
solidify Unit 2’s political connections in case of future fiscal crises (personal 
communication, March 1, 2012).   
Dr. Miles 
 “He got you.  He got you!” Walking around campus the day after the March 8th 
proposal, Dr. Miles could not escape the friendly taunts of his institutional colleagues. An 
outspoken critic of Mountain University, Dr. Miles believed that his most recent 
publication had thoroughly incensed the executive administration, resulting in Unit 2’s 
placement on “the official hit list.” Undeterred by this unfortunate development, Dr. 
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Miles recognized if “you’re gonna be a pain in the ass, you’re gonna pay the price.” But 
he was certainly not willing to concede defeat. 
 “Accustomed to conflict,” Dr. Miles “put together a whole bunch of students” as a 
means of organizing against the potential elimination. With a turnout of “something like 
50, 60 students” at the initial meeting, Dr. Miles envisioned a letter-writing campaign 
which would generate “thousands of letters, literally thousands.” However, this bold 
vision never materialized, as “some of the students allowed their competitiveness to take 
over their good sense.” Lamenting this missed opportunity to “work it politically,” Dr. 
Miles commented: 
 You know, I couldn’t do it.  It’s gotta all be worked through the students, so you  
 have to teach students to perform appropriately in organization.  That took weeks, 
 but eventually she [the head of the student steering committee] handled it well.   
 By that time, there were ten students who were working on the thing, and even  
 they weren’t doing what they should’ve been doing. 
 
 Though disappointed by this setback, Dr. Miles knew the difficulty in rallying a 
community that is “actively hostile to education.”  Perceiving Mountain University as “an 
expression of cultural values,” Dr. Miles offered the following explanation: 
 The community has a vocational sense of higher education, not an educational  
 sense of higher education.  That’s what starts to explain [Mountain University].   
 It’s almost designed to be weak.  It doesn’t aspire to be strong.  It’s never gonna 
 get the money from the state.   
 
A seasoned social advocate, Dr. Miles linked the decline of the labor movement to 
waning support for community institutions.  Absent collective organization by and for 
“working folk,” societal systems will reflect other, more powerful inclinations.  
Summarizing this “anti-intellectual” ethos, Dr. Miles reflected: 
 It’s almost antagonistic to the university when you listen to comments. The 
 community votes down almost every single bond issue.  They voted down for the  
 police.  They voted down for the libraries.  You know all this.  Right?  What do 
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 you expect from the university? (personal communication, February 24, 2012) 
             
Dr. Frye 
 “It was a very weird time,” Dr. Frye recalled.  And he could certainly judge, 
having worked at Mountain University for more than a decade.  News of the proposed 
elimination had ushered in a new phase in his long academic career; the entire university 
was up in arms. Fortunately, Dr. Frye’s scholarly specialization had prepared him for this 
fight.   
 Recognizing a teachable moment in this intellectual milieu, Dr. Frye gave his 
students a civic-minded assignment—engage the community in support of Unit 2.  
Aiding this cause in an ancillary capacity, Dr. Frye personally wrote letters in support of 
his unit’s activities, and also served as an informational resource for the faculty.  A 
regular at on-campus budget meetings, Dr. Frye frequently debriefed colleagues who 
were unable to attend.  Steadfast in his belief that you “can’t cut what’s important to the 
community,” Dr. Frye often alluded to the practical, workforce-related need to retain Unit 
2.  Ultimately successful in achieving this aim, Dr. Frye appeared hopeful that “we are 
going into recovery now” and that the next budget will not be as devastating (personal 
communication, March 13, 2012).               
Dr. Grant       
 “What could I do next that might help somewhat here?” Pondering his prospects, 
Dr. Grant described Unit 2 as “quite on our toes all during that period of several weeks or 
a couple of months.” While others wrote letters and organized student opposition, Dr. 
Grant took a different tack: “I just take my own initiatives and one of them was to start a 
discussion with the president.” Energized by conflict, Dr. Grant complemented this 
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executive dialogue with local media exposure, offering a compelling, statistically-based 
rationale for the retention of Unit 2.   
 Though he felt secure in his standing, Dr. Grant “was sad and more concerned for 
the younger faculty.” Without tenure, these junior colleagues would surely bear the brunt 
of the elimination, should it come to pass.  A visible presence in the local community, Dr. 
Grant tapped into Unit 2’s extensive alumni network in a further contributory effort.  
Describing his activities, Dr. Grant stated: 
 You know, when I go around the city, and if I step into the [related agency]  
 department office or if I go around the [more economically depressed] area where  
 those agencies are, I always run into graduates of [Unit 2].  So we wanted all of  
 them to know what’s going on, you know, and gain their support here.   
 
While he was “proud of [Unit 2], all of us for doing what we needed to do,” Dr. Grant 
was troubled by the administrative reaction to the fiscal shortfall.  Summarizing his 
thinking, Dr. Grant opined: 
 I believe there’s always a moment of truth that comes along that you could say,  
 “Oh, it’s too bad the budget crisis came along.”  Well, but the question is, “How  
 are you going to deal with it?”  Let’s watch how you deal with this.  And I think  
 that it was dealt with rather incompetently here (personal communication, March  
 26, 2012). 
 
Strategic Uncertainty 
Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 dealt with mounting uncertainty 
as it pertained to Mountain University’s strategic direction.  Though a reduction in state 
support undoubtedly precipitated this chain of events, the members of Unit 2 wondered 
why their department appeared on the March 8
th
 budget reduction proposal. In the 
sections below, I discuss their impressions of strategic uncertainty, and why they believe 
their unit was ultimately saved from elimination.    
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Reasons for Organizational Change 
 Shocked and dismayed by their proposed elimination, Dr. Hayes immediately 
requested an emergency meeting with the Provost to discuss this decision.  Unable to 
attend, the Provost offered the following response: 
 [Dr. Hayes], unfortunately I am leaving first thing tomorrow for the [governing  
 body] meeting in [Mountain State capital] and will be unavailable for the rest of  
 the week.  At the same time I have to tell you that a meeting is not going to be a  
 particularly good use of my time or that of your faculty.  I know the value of  
 [Unit 2] just as I know the value of all of our programs. If the Governor’s  
 recommended cuts come and the money is not there, then it’s not there.  I would 
 suggest instead that your faculty and students contact the Governor and 
 Legislature since our fate is in their hands (Provost, personal communication to  
 Dr. Hayes, March 8, 2011).   
 
Unsatisfied with the Provost’s explanation, Dr. Grant directed his inquiry to the Dean of 
Unit 2: “The president has said that his proposed cuts were based on the 
recommendations of the deans.  Did you in fact recommend that [Unit 2] be eliminated?” 
(personal communication, March 21, 2011).  In response, the Dean provided the 
following reply: 
 Please remember the President and the Provost both indicated that Deans would  
 make recommendations and that they would modify those recommendations.  No, 
 I did not recommend the elimination of [Unit 2]. I recommended the elimination  
 of some faculty positions in [Unit 2] based on a recommendation to do away with 
 [a certain degree program in Unit 2].  I have indicated in a College meeting and at 
 an Executive Committee meeting that I, as a Dean, must and will support those  
 decisions. Any disagreements with the recommendations will be between myself 
 and the Provost & President and you will not hear about it…I would suggest that 
 you and your colleagues work at getting the legislature to understand how  
 valuable [Unit 2] and the University are for the state.  They need to restore funds. 
 (Unit 2 Dean, personal communication, March 21, 2011) 
 
Discontented with the Dean’s reply, Dr. Grant turned to the Mountain University 
President.  In this regard, the President responded: 
 For starters I suggest you talk to [the Provost] and [the Dean], but in a nutshell, 
 we are facing an unprecedented set of cuts, and we cannot afford to lose student 
 enrollment or the cuts will be deeper.  [Unit 2] is an expensive program and the 
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 student production rate is low. Further, [Unit 2] has little impact on the rest of the  
 educational activities of our students.  That’s it in a nutshell. (President, personal 
 communication, March 28, 2011).   
 
Though Unit 2’s communications with the Provost, Dean, and President did not 
yield a straightforward response, all three individuals cited the legislative appropriations 
process as the key factor in the unit’s fate.  However, while the legislature did “hold the 
purse strings,” it was the responsibility of the Mountain University administration to 
present a budget reduction proposal which met these legislative targets. Pushing back 
against their inclusion, faculty in Unit 2 questioned their elimination as it pertained to the 
planning and future direction of Mountain University.           
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization 
 Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 attempted to uncover the 
rationale for their proposed elimination. Corresponding with the Dean, Dr. Hayes 
challenged the appropriateness and accuracy of the metrics used to evaluate the 
productivity of each collegiate unit. In this manner, Dr. Hayes stated that “there is some 
speculation there is some inflation as to what counts as a true scholarly publication.”  
Furthermore, Dr. Hayes believed that the Dean’s “presentation was not helpful by way of 
presenting why programs were targeted for elimination, did not present essential 
information re: graduate FTE’s, external funding as particularly reflected by [Unit 2] (Dr. 
Hayes, personal communication, March 10, 2011).  Indeed, of the $7.8 million in external 
funding received by the College, $5 million had been awarded to Unit 2 (Totten, 2011).       
External funding aside, members of Unit 2 mentioned other points of 
departmental pride.  A large unit with substantial undergraduate and graduate enrollment, 
Unit 2 seemed like an unlikely target for potential elimination.  Furthermore, the diversity 
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of students and faculty in Unit 2 enhanced the institutional mission of Mountain 
University [see Appendix F].  Dismayed at these contradictory aims, Dr. Hayes brought 
these discrepancies to the attention of the Dean, stating: “I do believe information will be 
made public in the near future regarding the incredible disparities regarding the number 
of women/minority faculty who will be eliminated by such a move in the College” (Dr. 
Hayes, personal communication, March 10, 2011).  As reinforced by Dr. Miles: “There’s 
no inherent weakness given [Mountain University] in this program. To the contrary, we 
get all sorts of points for diversity and all the rest” (personal communication, February 
24, 2012).   
  Confounded by the lack of concrete data, Dr. Grant summarized the feelings of 
his faculty colleagues: 
What criteria were you using?  It should be transparent what your cutting is,  
how it proceeds.  And yet, if you don’t have any criteria, it’s not transparent.   
You’re just saying that such and such a program, such and such a department will 
be eliminated, but we don’t know how you got there.  Because according to us,  
when we looked at any measure that was commonly tossed around at the  
university, scholarly productivity or enrollment in the program, whether it be our 
[undergraduate] program or the [graduate] program, we compared well.  We  
compared very well with the rest of the university.  So therefore, it became—it  
was a mystery. How do you choose such departments? (personal communication, 
March 26, 2012).   
 
Furthermore, the absence of explicit metrics invited “all kinds of speculation” as to why 
Unit 2 appeared on the chopping block (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 
2012).  Like the members of Unit 1, several faculty in Unit 2 believed that the March 8
th
 
budget reduction proposal was perhaps a means by which to gain public support.  As 
articulated by the faculty: 
 Dr. Hayes: Did the [Mountain University] administration decide on a “sky is  
 falling” strategy in order to garner legislature support for funding the university? 
 (personal communication, March 1, 2012) 
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 Dr. Frye: The proposed eliminations threw the entire campus into a panic.  I’m  
 not sure if it was a purposeful panic, designed to get the community stirred up to 
 support the university. (personal communication, March 13, 2012) 
 
 Dr. Miles: “What are the alternatives?  Well, maybe you say what the President is  
 trying to do is pick programs to eliminate that are gonna bring the community  
 together in support of the university. Well, if that was true—he’d go after [some 
 high profile professional programs], but he didn’t do that.  They were held  
 harmless.” (personal communication, February 24, 2012).   
 
 In addition to these persistent rumors, interviewed faculty also perceived a 
devaluation of their discipline and its attendant contributions to Mountain University.  
Concluding that Unit 2 was “on the periphery,” Dr. Frye acknowledged that scientific 
disciplines are deemed more rigorous and thus have greater prestige on campus (personal 
communication, March 13, 2012). Seconding this claim, Dr. Miles stated: “You know, 
they keep talking about stoking up the sciences here and the rest” (personal 
communication, February 24, 2012). Referring to his department as one of “the most 
devalued units” at Mountain University, Dr. Grant found it “difficult not to despair, not to 
give up on [Mountain State], and not to give in to overgeneralizations” (personal 
communication, March 9, 2011).   
 Moreover, Dr. Hayes found himself “frustrated and dismayed by the overall 
strategy of cutting and gutting this University” (personal communication, March 9, 
2011).  Believing that revenue diversification and creative thinking were the keys to 
financial solvency, Dr. Hayes declared that you “don’t have to cause terror” in order to 
save money (personal communication, March 1, 2012). Indeed, Dr. Hayes was not the 
only member of Unit 2 to consider alternative solutions. In an email to faculty colleagues, 
a member of Unit 2 (who declined to be interviewed for this study), offered the following 
fix: 
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 As I said in the meeting with [the Dean], why aren’t we considering the  
 elimination of the [entire College] as a viable resolution.  Programs aren’t the  
 only things that should be considered for elimination. We would pick up an  
 immediate half-million dollar cost savings with the elimination of the Dean’s 
 office. (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 8, 2011) 
 
Furthermore, it appeared as though Mountain University was expending its 
limited funds on athletic facilities and technological enhancements, as opposed to 
restoring faculty salaries.  Commenting on these “mixed messages,” Dr. Hayes 
wondered: Why is our priority building a stadium over rewarding faculty?  Are we a 
research institution or a teaching institution? (personal communication, March 1, 2012). 
As reinforced by Dr. Miles:  
To build a great university is an extraordinarily expensive thing, and almost  
invariably, it arises in a very traditional way out of the sophistication of a  
community.  The great universities in the world grew out of great urban centers 
of intellectual ferment, even when they weren’t in the cities like Oxford, which is 
a little bit north of London.  Great universities are not pastoral pursuits (personal 
communication, February 24, 2012).   
 
Summarizing the uncertainty surrounding Mountain University’s future direction, Dr. 
Grant captured the moment as such: 
 This president put out, I mean I don’t know it was two, three or four proposals,  
 get on my, you know, this long list. One differing from the previous one and the 
 next one differing from the previous one. And so you put the university in a state 
 of panic… (personal communication, March 26, 2012).   
 
However, the Dean offered the following consolation: “Remember, the budget cuts listed 
are part of a process and as they say in hockey the game is not over until the fat lady 
sings” (Unit 2 Dean, personal communication, March 21, 2011). Indeed, the members of 
Unit 2 would take this suggestion to heart, taking pains to preserve their organizational 
sustainability.    
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Organizational Sustainability 
 Hamstrung by the political process, Mountain University administration cycled 
through a series of budgetary proposals designed to meet ever-changing funding targets.  
While the entirety of the institutional budget lay in legislative hands, Unit 2 found a 
powerful political ally waiting in their corner.  Raised in the Mountain City community, 
this influential state senator recognized the invaluable contributions of Unit 2, and 
subsequently became their legislative “champion” (Dr. Hayes, personal communication, 
March 1, 2012).  At a critical budget subcommittee hearing attending by the President, 
the Senator publically questioned Mountain University’s plan to eliminate Unit 2 (Ryan, 
2011).  In response, “the president reportedly said it would be re-reviewed” (Mountain 
University Faculty Senator, personal communication, March 22, 2011).  Three days later, 
Dr. Hayes reported that the graduate program, and consequently, the entirety of Unit 2, 
had been spared elimination. The undergraduate program, however, was still in jeopardy 
(Dr. Hayes, personal communication, March 25, 2011).   
 While Dr. Hayes’ announcement was certainly a positive revelation, Dr. Grant 
remained skeptical of the executive administration.  In an email to Dr. Hayes, Dr. Grant 
expressed his concerns: 
 In regard to the [graduate] program, we have received nothing in writing, there  
 have been no explanations offered, the president has made no public  
 announcement, and he has not officially retracted what is in writing in his  
 proposed budget cuts statement, which is the most recent official word on the 
 matter.  I do not trust these statements and I do not like the hidden nature of the 
 process (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 28, 2011).   
 
Responding to a similar set of sentiments by another member of Unit 2 (who declined to 
be interviewed for this study), the President replied: 
 Putting the [graduate program] back cost another 12-15 of our faculty their  
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 positions.  All these choices are bitter, but if we are to survive, we can no longer  
 be all things to all people, and we must keep as much tuition as we can to avoid  
 even deeper cuts.  My job is horrid, in that I have to try to find a way to lose 350 
 faculty and staff and still keep us functioning.  There are no good alternatives  
 left…It is a sad time, and we can only hope that our appeals will be heard and the 
 cuts will not be as deep as the proposed executive budget.  While I recognize the  
 anger people feel to me, your efforts are better spent contacting your  
 legislators.  (President, personal communication, March 28, 2011).    
 
 Though the President’s March 30th budget reduction proposal did in fact spare 
Unit 2’s graduate program from possible elimination (President Email, March 30, 2011), 
significant damage had already occurred to the department.  Indeed, the mere mention of 
Unit 2’s potential demise set a chain of inopportune events in motion which adversely 
affected student enrollment.  As articulated by Dr. Grant: 
 And so, he (the President) shouldn’t have made such a big deal out of the first  
 proposal knowing it’s going to be changed down the line.  But yet, on the basis of 
 that first proposal, he said, “Well, I would advise students who are applying for  
 the programs that are proposed to be cut, that they don’t apply for those 
 programs.” So here is a classic blunder. I mean, it’s a sign of real incompetence  
 on the part of a top administrator because you never go—knowing how many of  
 these things work out in the end; you never kill the program before it’s actually  
 officially killed.  And this was what his comment was leading to, was going to do. 
 If you say, “I’d advise our students not even to apply to this program,” well, then 
 you’re going to kill the program, shut it down, even though it’s only in a proposal 
 stage (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012).   
 
Speaking along these same lines, Dr. Hayes conceded that College advising center staff 
were encouraging students to choose another major. Extremely displeased with this 
counsel, Dr. Hayes found this to be counter-productive to efforts to save Unit 2 (Dr. 
Hayes, personal communication, March 1, 2012).  Moreover, dwindling student 
enrollment would negatively impact local employers who depended on Unit 2’s programs 
to prepare their workforce (Dr. Frye, personal communication, March 13, 2012).  
Recognizing the unintended consequences of preemptive proclamations, the members of 
Unit 2 also discussed the attendant effects of Mountain State’s anti-educational ideology.        
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Nature of the Business Environment 
 Echoing the sentiments of Unit 1 faculty, members of Unit 2 alluded to the 
sweeping changes effecting public higher education.  Increasingly sensitive to industry 
demands in the wake of declining state support, Dr. Grant longed for the academia of 
yesteryear “when there were a lot of tenure-track positions and so forth in the states.”  
Expounding on these sentiments, he asserted: 
 You know, the university has been turned into a marketplace.  So this is why they  
 talk in terms of student productivity rates that we read before.  You know,  
 production, it’s like a—what is this a factory or a market?  Students are  
 considered consumers…This is all a private enterprise model for the university.  
 And we have higher administrators who have gone along with all this leading, to  
 me, to the destruction of a great university system in the United States.  There’s  
 been the withdrawal of public money, of state money.  So I’ve taken to calling the 
 public university as we used to call a place like [Mountain University], a public 
 university, a charity university.  We depend upon people, billionaires or multi- 
 millionaires giving us charity, and they could give the charity for what they  
 choose.  They want to build up the business school, or they want to put another 
 building on campus.  You know, it’s no longer a public university.  I tell my  
 students how I went to a college that was one of the best in the country, and it was 
 free.  Free!  It was truly a public college, [a college in the Northeast].  And  
 nowadays, we don’t see the importance of having truly public universities 
 (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012).   
 
Building on this concept, Dr. Miles offered a comparative assessment of the Mountain 
City populace: 
 As a large metropolitan area, we’re the most underserved in higher education by  
 an enormous amount.  Buffalo, which is so much poorer than this community, has 
 almost twice as many per capita higher education slots than this place.  This is it  
 in university education here, and yet it is such a deficient, underfunded thing.  It’s 
 underfunded by the public, and it’s enormously underfunded by the private sector 
 (Dr. Miles, personal communication, February 24, 2012).   
 
 Moreover, the potential elimination of Unit 2 would make Mountain City the only 
major metropolitan area in the United States without this particular disciplinary 
specialization.  Indeed, as intimated by Dr. Frye, the closure of Unit 2 would force 
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interested students to seek schooling in a nearby state, for this would be the closest 
commuter option available to them (personal communication, March 13, 2012).  
Speaking to a local media outlet, Dr. Grant repeated Dr. Frye’s assertion.  When 
questioned as to what constitutes a “major city,” Dr. Grant retorted that “every city with 
over 500,000 population has at least one or more [options to study the discipline of Unit 
2]…You know, how was this ever figured into the process here?” (personal 
communication, March 26, 2012). In the midst of this strategic uncertainty, the faculty of 
Unit 2 struggled to maintain their departmental cohesion, discussed in-depth in the 
following section.   
Structural Uncertainty 
  Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 dealt with changes in reporting 
structures and departmental functionality.  However, the declarations of faculty members 
in this particular unit differed significantly from the statements of Unit 1.  In the sections 
that follow, I contextualize Unit 2’s perceptions of structural uncertainty, providing a 
stark contrast to Unit 1.   
Reporting Structures 
 While Unit 2 was similar to Unit 1 in that the faculty did not blame their chair, 
nor seek a new one, following the elimination experience, there is little congruence 
beyond these points.  Compounding the specter of potential departmental elimination, 
Unit 2 also coped with the possibility of college-wide restructuring.  As outlined by Dr. 
Hayes in an email to the faculty: 
 The president has also begun to make plans for possible re-organization of  
 Colleges and programs.  It seems that he plans to eliminate one college, and  
 consolidating others.  He did mention that [Unit 2] may be placed in [another 
 unit]…[The College] may [be renamed] with a different configuration of  
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 programs.  None of this is set in stone but the beginning talking points of what 
 may happen.  Then again, nothing may happen (personal communication,  
 March 25, 2011).   
Though these structural changes had not come to pass by the time of publication, it 
should be noted that institutional reorganization is generally a gradual process—
consistent with the overall pace of academic permutation (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007).  As 
such, it is quite possible that the aforementioned plans (or a version of them) could still 
come to fruition.        
Functionality of the Unit 
In clear contrast to Unit 1, members of Unit 2 did not discuss downturns in their 
teaching, research, and service obligations.  Indeed, despite persistently low morale, 
faculty “didn’t use this [situation] as an excuse” to shirk their scholarship (Dr. Hayes, 
personal communication, March 1, 2012).  Reinforcing this claim, Dr. Miles spoke of 
finishing a book during this tumultuous time, and furthermore maintained his 
commitment to original lectures, stating: “I have the time to do it and I put a lot of effort 
into it” (personal communication, February 24, 2012).  While this is not to imply that 
faculty in Unit 1 shirked their obligations, it is noteworthy that the proposed elimination 
did not affect Unit 2 faculty in a similar manner. 
Moreover, faculty in Unit 2 did not exhibit the camaraderie characteristic of Unit 
1.  As summarized by Dr. Hayes: 
This elimination process has pitted junior faculty against senior faculty.  In some  
 respects, junior faculty resent the more expensive senior faculty. The perspective  
 of the junior faculty is that senior faculty placed our unit in the “expensive”  
 category which then singled out our unit for elimination. Junior faculty resent  
 making less, taking a pay cut, and possibly being the first to be fired while senior 
 faculty are more cushioned from these financial blows (personal communication, 
 March 1, 2012).   
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Correspondence obtained from a faculty member in Unit 2 indicated a high degree of 
animosity amongst faculty members.  Responding to colleagues, a member of Unit 2 
(who declined to be interviewed for this study), made the following statement: 
 This is not the time to turn the guns inward and send hurtful one-liner emails out  
 to each other.  We are [disciplinary affiliates of Unit 2].  This is a problem.  We  
 solve problems (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 8, 2011).   
 
Several days later, another member of Unit 2 (who declined to be interviewed for this 
study) shared similar sentiments: 
 Again I ask that we please don’t make negative assumptions and public attacks on  
 one another in that we are presently all in this boat together; although it seems  
 that some of us have more to lose as folks start throwing people overboard from 
 what they perceive as a sinking ship.  But hopefully, the [disciplinary] principles, 
 values, and skills that we teach students will be utilized with each other in the  
 coming weeks, months, and hopefully years ahead. I also hope and ask everyone 
 to keep up the good fight and uplift each other’s spirits because if we don’t we 
 can’t expect others to join and stay in this battle with us (Member of Unit 2,  
 personal communication, March 17, 2011).     
 
While members of Unit 2 did praise Dr. Grant for his local media efforts, it was evident 
that these accolades were the exception, rather than the rule.  
 Perhaps a contributing factor in this intra-unit animosity, several faculty members 
mentioned the negative toll of hiring freezes on their collective functionality.  Admitting 
that “we’re a skeleton of a faculty,” Dr. Frye noted that retirements and departures had 
forced them to replace full-timers with part-time instructors (PTIs). Furthermore, all of 
the PTIs had Master’s degrees, while Dr. Frye believed “that to have a good department, 
you need to have full-time Ph.D.s working” (personal communication, March 13, 2012).  
In addition, Dr. Grant expressed concerns over being “shorthanded” and “not permitted to 
hire” (personal communication, March 26, 2012).  As explicated by Dr. Miles: 
 They owe us three faculty lines they’ve taken away from us over the years. Our  
 undergraduate program is largely taught by part-timers here, you know that teach 
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 a course here from the community, which is not a good thing, because it’s a very 
 new community.  There’s no depth of [Unit 2] scholars here.  Many of our  
 graduate courses are taught that way.  We’ve got full-time junior faculty here,  
 who will never be on a tenure-track.  They don’t have doctorates.  They don’t  
 publish.  No, the university owes us three full-time lines.  If you wanna be fair  
 about the thing, when you consider student-faculty ratios across the college, they  
 owe us five lines, if not six (personal communication, February 24, 2012).   
 
Likewise, Dr. Hayes discussed the increase from twelve to sixteen PTIs as a double-
edged sword.  In summation: 
 In one sense, PTIs can be hired quickly (no search required), and they have real- 
 world experience (currently practicing in the field).  However, students may feel 
 “short-changed” when they have so many PTI instructors in the program (as PTIs 
 are not as accessible/available as full-time faculty).  I believe there is a trend  
 “toward hiring more transient-type faculty” at this institution, whether it is PTIs 
 or visiting professors.  PTIs and visiting professors cost less than full-time faculty, 
 and they are more flexible in their assignments (personal communication, March 
 1, 2012).   
 
Piggybacking on Dr. Hayes’ assertion, Dr. Frye also expressed anxiety over the effects of 
PTIs on student learning.  Noting the importance of receiving theoretical knowledge, Dr. 
Frye believed that Unit 2 was doing a disservice to its students by employing so many 
part-timers.  Moreover, students in Unit 2 had approached Dr. Frye with concerns about 
the considerable part-time composition of the department (personal communication, 
March 13, 2012).   
 In a related vein, Dr. Hayes perceived significant changes to the departmental 
support structure.  Commenting that “this university is being run by students,” Dr. Hayes 
offered the following synopsis: 
 Before the budget crisis, I had two administrative assistants.  As part of shared  
 sacrifice in the college, I allowed one administrative assistant to take what I  
 thought was a short-term assignment in another office which had no  
 administrative support.  It has since become apparent that this administrative  
 assistant will not be returning to our unit.  I have hired student workers to  
 supplement our one remaining administrative assistant, but student workers have 
 a limited skill set.  As such, travel documentation, PTI hire paperwork, and other 
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 basic administrative duties have not been completed in a timely fashion (personal 
 communication, March 1, 2012). 
 
As underscored by the aforementioned summary, unitary functionality extends beyond 
the faculty core, encompassing support staff and student workers.  Though this situation 
may be more obvious to Dr. Hayes given his position as chair, the substitution of 
professional assistants for student workers is indeed a troubling trend—one worthy of 
further investigation.   
Job-Related Uncertainty 
Much like the faculty in Unit 1, members of Unit 2 experienced considerable 
employment-related changes both during and after the proposed elimination process.  
However, while Unit 1 faculty were skeptical about the university’s tenure protections, 
Unit 2 faculty were split as to their faith in this longstanding institutional tenet.  
Interestingly, both faculties expressed similar concerns regarding increased class sizes, as 
one of many unwelcome changes in working conditions.  Detailed explications of these 
facets of job-related uncertainty appear below.         
Job Security 
 Perhaps unable to sleep due to the shocking news of the potential elimination, Dr. 
Hayes spent the evening of March 7, 2011 emailing his faculty.  Perturbed by their lack 
of response to his earlier communiqué, Dr. Hayes wondered whether “everyone is just 
updating their CVs & logging on to higheredjobs.com” (Dr. Hayes, personal 
communication, March 7, 2011). Borne out of frustration, Dr. Hayes’ comments 
underscored an interesting departmental dynamic. While the untenured faculty in Unit 2 
certainly had cause for concern, and directly cited their lack of tenure as the main reason 
for not speaking to the press (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 11, 
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2011), there was a decisive split among the four tenured members of Unit 2 interviewed 
for this study.     
 Clearly confident in the protections of tenure, Dr. Miles (personal 
communication, February 24, 2012) made the following comments throughout the course 
of our interview: 
 I’m a very senior professor.  I even think if they closed [Unit 2], they wouldn’t 
 have been able to get rid of me.  They would have put me in another department 
 someplace…I’m protected…I’m very senior…Tenure’s a big deal.  Being a full 
 professor is, too…I can retire, or they’ll kill me.   
 
Moreover, Dr. Grant offered the following assessment of his job-security: 
 
 Because, you know, at this point in my career, I’m pretty secure in terms of being 
 a tenured full professor and having enough financial resources that I could resign  
 or retire, as they say, anytime I want (personal communication, March 26, 2012). 
 
Conversely, Dr. Frye began searching for alternative employment almost immediately  
 
following the release of the March 8, 2011 cut list. Believing there is “no support for us 
in administration,” Dr. Frye admitted that “I don’t feel that secure staying here” (personal 
communication, March 13, 2012).  Furthermore, Dr. Hayes conceded that “my phone was 
not filled with conciliatory messages from the power tower” following a press appearance 
by one of his faculty.  After listening to these voicemails, Dr. Hayes informed the Dean 
that “I would be in my office today dusting off my cv,” but “never heard from him” 
(personal communication, March 15, 2011).  Provided these conflicting perceptions of 
tenure, it is apparent that full-time faculty no longer feel confident in this once 
impervious protection.     
Promotion Opportunities 
 Referring to merit pay distributions as “an issue of loyalty,” Dr. Miles lamented 
the institution’s promotional pay scale. Forthright in his criticism of Mountain 
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University, Dr. Miles interpreted his financial snubs as punishment for these critiques, 
stating:  
 It’s cost me over the years in merit pay. You know, I’ve written a lot…At the  
 beginning, I got the full merit pay for the book, but not the last four books.  I 
 wrote a book with Rowan and Littlefield, who’s a hell of a publisher.  They gave  
 me $1500 for it, not $4500, which is the maximum in merit pay.  $1500 is what  
 you get for delivering a paper at a conference, but this was a sole-authored,  
 scholarly monograph from a very good publisher, and they gave me $1500.   
 Every year my merit was cut afterwards, so when I take a look at professors, 
 who I know—who have done comparable, actually less than I’ve done, they’re  
 making about $30,000 a year more than I, but it’s alright  
 (personal communication, February 24, 2012).   
 
A seasoned scholar, Dr. Miles could remember the university’s “golden age,” when merit 
pay was a given; up-and-coming professors were not so lucky.  Indeed, in a powerful 
statement to the Mountain University president, an untenured individual pondered his 
academic future:   
 I honestly felt this was “my dream job” here at [Mountain University], now when 
 I still reiterate this people literally laugh when I say this…I still am trying to have 
 blind faith that things will work out.  But when I read your statement, “[Unit 2]  
 has little impact on the rest of the educational activities of our students.” what I  
 felt this communicated was a de-valuing of my profession. Unless I interpreted  
 this statement incorrectly this saddens me and makes me really question whether 
 the reputation of our department will be so tarnished and disrespected in our own 
 [Mountain University] community that my hopes of building a career here are not 
 realistic (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 28, 2011).   
 
While the aforementioned account is but one individual’s perspective, the profound 
sincerity of this message underscores the need to investigate the elimination phenomenon 
from both tenured and non-tenured standpoints.       
Changes to the Job Role 
 Consistent with faculty in Unit 1, members of Unit 2 decried the one-sided 
implementation of increased class sizes.  Affirming the new instructor/student ratio in 
undergraduate classes as 1:35 (was 1:25) and graduate classes as 1:15 (was 1:12), Dr. 
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Hayes acknowledged that Unit 2 has cut back on the number of admitted students in 
order to reduce these ratios (personal communication, March 1, 2012). Shocked at this 
turn of events, Dr. Grant offered the following situational assessment: 
 I’ve had the highest numbers in my classes that I’ve ever had in my whole career.  
 So, you know, what brought that on?  How did that come about, the highest  
 numbers?  Maybe, I don’t know, maybe some people wanted to show efficiency, 
 so instead of—for example, one of my courses should have been two sections and 
 yet it was just one section so I had a much larger class than usual (personal  
 communication, March 26, 2012). 
 
 Yet, like all academic changes, the increased class sizes did not occur in a 
vacuum.  Indeed, Dr. Frye likened this growth to decreased productivity in other areas of 
the traditional triad.  While Mountain University “claims to be a research university,” Dr. 
Frye believed that the 3/3 teaching load was far too heavy to produce substantial amounts 
of research (personal communication, March 13, 2012).  Moreover, the teaching load was 
inconsistent amongst the various colleges, leading to an imbalance in research 
productivity across campus (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012).  As 
reinforced by Dr. Grant: “Well, for one thing, it’s a lot more work for me in grading 
assignments.  I couldn’t get to any of my research last semester” (personal 
communication, March 26, 2012).   
    In addition to increased class sizes, new administrative assignments presented 
further challenges to the maintenance of a robust research agenda.  As previously noted, 
Unit 2 had experienced a decrease in full-time faculty, an increase in part-time faculty, 
and a loss of administrative support staff.  This confluence of events, coupled with the 
potential elimination, created a very unusual working environment for the department 
chair and faculty alike.  As summarized by Dr. Hayes: 
 If my administrative assistant is out of the office and our student workers are not  
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 available, I have to spend time intercepting visitors at the reception desk.  This is  
 burdensome and takes time away from other duties I must perform as leader of  
 this unit (personal communication, March 1, 2012).   
 
Furthermore, the overreliance on PTIs prompted Dr. Hayes to institute a separate training 
manual/orientation process for transient faculty, due to their ever-increasing numbers 
(personal communication, March 1, 2012).    
 On top of these considerable changes, Dr. Hayes shouldered the responsibility for 
“unlearning the negative publicity” that had resulted from the potential elimination 
process.  While the institution and the press advertised the dissolution of Unit 2, there 
was no reciprocal response to the department’s salvation. As such, Dr. Hayes and his 
faculty had to re-stimulate interest in the unit’s programs (personal communication, 
March 1, 2012).  As buttressed by Dr. Grant: 
 Some of my colleagues tell me that there seems to be a perception out in the  
 community amongst some people that, indeed, our [undergraduate] program has 
 been shutdown, that there is no [undergraduate] program. So now, we have an 
 [undergraduate] committee that’s trying to overcome this: sending out letters to 
 [influential leaders] in [Mountain City], you know, so as to notify them, “Hey,  
 our program is still here.  It’s up and running” (personal communication, March 
 26, 2012).    
 
As previously discussed, Unit 2’s graduate program received a reprieve merely three 
weeks after its inclusion on the March 8
th
 cut list.  Meanwhile, the status of its 
undergraduate program remained uncertain well into the summer and early fall of 2011.  
Appearing as part of the institutional budget reduction proposal at the June 16-17
 
governing body meeting, the undergraduate program faced an uncertain fate (Governing 
body, 2011).  However, at the next governing body meeting, held from September 8 -9, 
there was no mention of the undergraduate program elimination on the agenda 
(Governing body, 2011). Furthermore, Dr. Hayes acknowledged that he never received 
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any formal, written notification that the undergraduate program had been saved; an 
informal conversation with the Dean was deemed sufficient (personal communication, 
March 1, 2012).     
Effect of the Department Chair 
Much like Unit 1’s Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes influenced his faculty’s perceptions of 
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s 
(2007) concepts of manifest and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 2’s 
department chair below.   
Acquiring and Communicating Information 
 Similar to Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes expended considerable energies in the acquisition 
and communication of pertinent information.  Upon speaking with the Dean and his 
counterpart at another state institution, Dr. Hayes immediately relayed this news to the 
Unit 2 faculty, offering his availability for individual consultation (personal 
communication, March 7, 2011).  In addition, Dr. Hayes also attempted to convene a 
meeting with the Provost to discuss the potential elimination, though this gathering did 
not come to pass (personal communication, March 8, 2011).  Furthermore, Dr. Hayes 
forwarded all supportive communications he received to his faculty colleagues, keeping 
them abreast of current developments (personal communications, March 15 & 17, 2011). 
Moreover, Dr. Hayes also embraced faculty consultation prior to communicating 
with the Dean, offering them the ability to “review and make suggestions” on a 
department-wide productivity report (personal communication, March 21, 2011).  
Finally, upon hearing of their victory in preserving Unit 2’s graduate program, Dr. Hayes 
offered the following assessment: “I think we need to continue our efforts to save the 
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[undergraduate program], but be relieved that our graduate program will continue” 
(personal communication, March 25, 2011).  A powerful and exemplary communication, 
Dr. Hayes took pains to set the tone in the department’s efforts to preserve its programs. 
Setting the Tone 
 In his initial email to faculty colleagues, Dr. Hayes emphasized the importance of 
determination during these tough times: 
 In the coming months we need to go about our business that we will still be here  
 for the years to come—however, we will need to take this threat seriously and  
 draw attention with the legislature, governor, and [governing body], as to the need 
 and importance of our program. All of us will need to work hard mobilizing such 
 support (personal communication, March 7, 2011). 
 
Resolute in his commitment to these principles, Dr. Hayes involved and encouraged his 
faculty to fulfill appropriate roles.  Believing Dr. Grant to be “a great representative” for 
Unit 2, Dr. Hayes presented him with the opportunity to partake in a high-profile media 
event (personal communication, March 10, 2011).  In addition to praising Dr. Grant for 
his work on behalf of Unit 2, Dr. Hayes also extended accolades to other faculty for their 
specific contributions, stating: “I want to personally thank those of you who have helped 
focus the students and community” (personal communication, March 17, 2011).  
However, while Dr. Hayes was quick to give credit where due, he also refused to tolerate 
intra-unit criticism. When scuttlebutt emerged regarding Dr. Grant’s selection as a media 
representative, Dr. Hayes stepped in to halt these “attacks,” refocusing the faculty as to 
their collective purpose in preventing the elimination (personal communication, March 
11, 2011).    
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Strategy Formulation 
 Like Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes spent considerable amounts of time formulating a 
strategy to save Unit 2.  Similar to his institutional colleague, Dr. Hayes recognized the 
utility of political connections, and worked to realize their full benefit.  In addition to 
becoming point-person for press contacts, Dr. Hayes endeavored to gain “support within 
the business community” as well within the university (personal communication, March 
11, 2011).  In this manner, Dr. Hayes convened a new Unit 2 advisory board.  Designed 
as a networking system, this fifteen-member panel included prominent alumni, local 
agency directors, and government relations personnel.  Commenting on this approach, 
Dr. Hayes declared: “Having those political connections is not going to hurt us at all” 
(personal communication, March 1, 2012).   
 However, while the establishment of strong political ties remained a viable policy, 
Dr. Hayes’ principal tactic was to “make money for the University” (personal 
communication, March 9, 2011). As such, Dr. Hayes mapped “the internal logic of 
closing [Unit 2] and came up with all sorts of ways to save it” (Dr. Miles, personal 
communication, February 24, 2012).  In contrast to Dr. Smith’s efforts to devise 
institutional cost savings in lieu of departmental elimination, Dr. Hayes reformulated 
Unit 2 as a revenue-generating dynamo.  In an email to the Provost, Dr. Hayes 
proclaimed: 
 As a [unit], we have the lowest graduate tuition of the western states, and are even 
 lower than [our in-state competitor].  If we are afforded the opportunity of  
 establishing our own differential tuition, and also plan to offer online degree  
 opportunities we would not need to rely on the legislature, its whims, and formula  
 funding to have a robust, viable program with over 400 students  
 (personal communication, March 9, 2011).   
 
In a subsequent email to the Dean, Dr. Hayes made the following observation: 
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 The reality is that many of our programs will have to follow such a course of  
 action, given these times.  I think we can serve as a successful model  
 (personal communication, March 10, 2011). 
 
As a result of diligently researched budgetary projections, Dr. Hayes was able to 
convince the Dean that this differential graduate tuition strategy “would allow us to 
continue the [undergraduate program] and bring in an additional $500,000-600,000 in 
revenue for the University” (personal communication, March 11, 2011).  An example of 
the creative thinking espoused by Dr. Hayes, this successful strategy made a significant 
impact on the salvation of Unit 2.      
Recruiting Outside Assistance 
 As mentioned in the previous section, Dr. Hayes recognized the value of having 
well-established political connections.  In one of his first attempts to save Unit 2, Dr. 
Hayes “made the situation known to all the [Unit 2’s] in the country” (Dr. Grant, personal 
communication, March 26, 2012).  Utilizing Unit 2’s national professional association 
listserv as a means of disseminating information, Dr. Hayes urged disciplinary affiliates 
to write to the President, Provost, and governing body members as to the importance of 
preserving Unit 2.  Moreover, Dr. Hayes encouraged his faculty to “give me names of 
folks you think would be helpful.  I need people who can “reach out” to others who can 
make things happen” (personal communication, March 11, 2011). Perceiving political 
pressure as paramount, Dr. Hayes’ expended considerable efforts to shield his unit 
through political activism—a trend that is likely to continue.   
Summary 
Though far from bound together by the shared phenomenon of potential 
elimination, the members of Unit 2 were nonetheless forthcoming in their perceptions of 
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the potential elimination. While the unit’s graduate program remained on the chopping 
block from March 8-May 30, 2011—a mere twenty-two days—the fight to preserve their 
undergraduate program continued well into the summer months.  Listed as a proposed cut 
at the June 16-17
th
 governing body meeting, the differential tuition policy proposal was 
not accepted until a later date, and was only conveyed to Dr. Hayes via an informal 
conversation.  While the use of military imagery was not as pronounced in Unit 2 as it 
was in Unit 1, Dr. Hayes did reference his faculty’s fight against “this siege” (personal 
communication, March 11, 2011).  Though members of Unit 2 made no mention of 
diminished institutional loyalty, it appeared as though intra-unit loyalties were strained as 
a result of the proposed elimination. Turning to other faculty in a very different 
predicament, I will now explicate their experiences in dealing with the outright 
elimination of their unit.           
Units 3 & 4  
In this section, I present five vignettes, each outlining the participant’s personal 
experiences with the 2011-2013 budget reduction process at Mountain University.  
Located in the same college, it would be redundant to expand upon strategic, structural, 
and job-related uncertainties in separate sections.  Therefore, I will begin with individual 
vignettes, followed by a combined discussion of strategic, structural, and job-related 
uncertainties.  Upon completion of this objective, I will return to separately analyze the 
department chair effect in Units 3 and 4.     
  Though their units were ultimately eliminated, a strategic planning process 
foreshadowed this outcome.  Implemented July 1, 2011, the Dean endorsed this no-
department, single program structure as a way to eliminate scholarly “silos.”  Shielded 
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from eliminating tenured faculty as a result of high numbers of collegiate TFVSIP 
participants, the Dean’s changes reflected a corporate vision of university governance. 
However, the elimination of a traditional academic configuration in favor of a business-
like governance model engendered considerable structural uncertainty.  Interviewed in 
the midst of this transition, I relate the faculty’s experiences with this change process 
below.   
Dr. Roberts-Chair of Unit 3 
 But, you know, I make it work, because I believe in this college and I believe in  
 this university.  So I have to make it work.  I make it work with enthusiasm.  
 (personal communication, March 7, 2012) 
 
With his exuberant personality and forward-thinking philosophy, Dr. Roberts embraced 
the sweeping changes to college and unit.  Prompted by the appointment of a new, non-
academic dean, these adjustments reflected the business model of private industry (Lake, 
2011).  Though the new dean did not hold a terminal degree, the President removed his 
interim status after a one-year probationary period.  Announcing this appointment, the 
President declared: 
 The upward trajectory of the [college] has been so potent.  The [college] has  
 given their interim dean one of the most resounding endorsements of leadership 
 that I have ever witnessed (Lister, 2011).   
 
Clearly, Dr. Roberts numbered amongst the adherents. Viewing the college as “a 
partnership,” Dr. Roberts offered the following analogy: 
 It’s a partnership, the same as you’d have a legal practice, a medical practice, a  
 bunch of physicians together, a bunch of lawyers, an engineering practice—it’s a 
 partnership.  You’ve got people—professionals, who are partners; so when you’re 
 admitted to tenure, you become a partner.  You don’t buy your way in the way  
 you do in an accounting firm, but you buy it in with six years of blood, sweat, and 
 tears to become a partner—so it’s sweat equity that makes you a partner—and  
 you have responsibility when you become a partner (personal communication,  
 March 7, 2012).   
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To Dr. Roberts, part of this responsibility included buying in to the new collegiate 
leadership model, despite differences in opinion between himself and the dean.  Believing 
that the wellbeing of students transcended college and departmental politics, Dr. Roberts 
outlined his perception of the academician’s purpose: 
 The university to me, is the crucible of thought, of care, and of preparing future  
 generations.  The work we do—I really believe this—is some of the most  
 important work on the planet; because if the human race is going to advance, and 
 if we’re going to move to the omega point, whatever we think that is—it’s up to 
 us to see to it that what happened in the past is linked to what happens in the 
 future (personal communication, March 7, 2012).   
 
Committed to this philosophy, Dr. Roberts encouraged his former faculty members to 
press “full speed ahead” in pursuit of this new agenda—a bold move in the face of such 
transformational change (personal communication, March 7, 2012).    
Dr. James 
 At odds with the new Dean over changes to the college and the erosion of 
academic governance, Dr. James summarized his position: “I was for the old structure. I 
was for the department chairs” (personal communication, February 27, 2012). Employed 
at Mountain University for a considerable period of time, Dr. James had seen the college 
grow and flourish throughout the preceding decades.  However, with this latest change in 
leadership, Dr. James perceived the new “corporate mentality” as an unwelcome 
academic encroachment.  Indeed, Dr. James was not the only faculty member to express 
these concerns.  Alluding to conversations with his colleagues, he offered the following 
assessment: 
 I really think now there’s a very strong, simmering discontent because of the  
 associate and assistant administrators who are unilaterally making decisions  
 without consulting with the faculty.  That’s really gotten people—it’s this water 
 cooler mentality.  Around the water cooler they’re all fired up.  It takes a lot to get 
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 them to move on something but we’re getting close to the boiling point  
 (personal communication, February 27, 2012).    
 
 A precursor to this “boiling point,” Dr. James discussed his attempts to address 
the “whispers” of departmental elimination with the Dean: 
 I can’t remember exactly but he made it sound like, “Well, we’re considering it.  
 There’ll be some changes.  I’m not quite sure yet what it’ll be but the strategic  
 plan calls for us to change things.”  Then, just before the meeting—like a couple 
 weeks before—we heard of the new structure he was going to propose at the  
 meeting (personal communication, February 27, 2012). 
 
Announced at a May 2011 faculty meeting, the Dean’s new department-less structure 
would go into effect on July 1, 2011.  Calling this pronouncement a “fait accompli,” Dr. 
James lamented the appointments, proclamations, and re-votes that had replaced 
traditional faculty elections, bylaws, and autonomous decision-making.  Close to 
retirement, Dr. James admitted that “if it got too bad I could just throw in the towel.” Too 
tired to continue fighting against “those things I don’t agree with,” Dr. James decided “to 
go along with it” in the interim (personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
Dr. Adams 
 Employed at Mountain University for nearly two decades, Dr. Adams had 
experienced his fair share of institutional change.  But this time was different.  With a 
new Dean, a new reporting structure, and the loss of significant numbers of colleagues, 
Dr. Adams felt a heavy weight resting on his shoulders: 
 So the combined stress of all that has, you know, set morale and everything back  
 to where, you know, it’s been one of the most stressful times, you know, since  
 I’ve been here at the college and I’ve been here goin’ on [several] years now.  It’s 
 starting, you know, just like the university saying, “Oh, the budget’s gonna get 
 better,” things like that; starting to see some light (personal communication, April  
 10, 2012).   
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Optimistic about the future but realistic about the present, Dr. Adams perceived a 
decisive shift in administrative discretion as it pertained to this collegiate overhaul: 
 I’m finally getting to the job I should have had years ago [Laughter], but wasn’t 
 eligible because of the university rules for administrators having had Ph.D.’s and 
 having gotten tenure, which does make it personally very interesting then that  
 those rules apply to everybody, except for our dean [Laughter].  But, it is what it  
 is (personal communication, April 10, 2012).   
 
 Using humor to cope with an otherwise difficult situation, Dr. Adams discussed 
the short-term effects of this new reporting structure during the following exchange: 
 Interviewer: Have the silos gone away?  Is there more camaraderie in the college  
 with this new structure? 
 Dr. Adams: No. 
 Interviewer: Is there less or has it stayed the same? 
 Dr. Adams: It’s about the same, yeah, there’s pockets of the people that talk to  
 each other and hang out.  There’s still lots of gossiping, lots of back fighting, lots 
 of who said what about what and that has not quite—it has not gone away. You  
 know, it’s starting to get a little better (personal communication, April 10, 2012).  
 
 Despite entrenched loyalties and enmities, Dr. Adams did notice the Dean’s efforts to 
engender greater collegiate community. Recounting a recent visit to a newly opened 
performing arts complex, Dr. Adams noted: 
 We had a faculty meeting down at the [performing arts complex] and we got to  
 take a tour and everybody got—you know, and that was just something nice to do 
 together and to talk about things.  At the time, there was a few controversial  
 things [Laughter] he wanted to, you know, meet about, but you know, things like 
 that really help (personal communication, April 10, 2012).     
 
Eager to experience the progression of this new leadership model, Dr. Adams appeared 
amenable to change—an important characteristic for an aspiring academic administrator.   
Dr. Covey-Chair of Unit 4 
 Commenting on his brief tenure as leader of Unit 4, Dr. Covey made the 
following declaration: “I was brought in to chair that department and to build a master’s 
and a doctorate program as well as a graduate program.  We barely got started when we 
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were eliminated.” Though he lamented the plans that never came to fruition, Dr. Covey 
was a “survivor” and not a defeatist.  Outlining his position, he offered an evolutionary 
analogy: “I can mutate, migrate, or die.  I’ll be honest with you I made a decision to 
embrace it.” Open to the new governance model, Dr. Covey believed “we’re stronger 
because we’re not fractured by departments.  I think that moving to a single degree for 
this college was absolutely the right thing to do” (personal communication, February 22, 
2012). 
 Though many of his tenured colleagues disagreed with this assessment, Dr. Covey 
was more concerned with the fate of his students and non-tenured individuals. Describing 
the classroom demeanor during the institutional turmoil, Dr. Covey noted “the haters and 
attitudes from stress; giving up; their helplessness and anger…They felt like they were 
abandoned by the university.”  Moreover, “it was our junior faculty I felt worst about 
because they really felt like they had just been thrown out.  One day they’ve got a job, the 
next day they know they’ve got a year.” While he “felt a tremendous amount of pressure 
and frustration” during this time, these feelings paled in comparison to those facing 
imminent unemployment (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
 Characterizing the aftermath of institutional and collegiate upheaval as “a 
grieving process,” Dr. Covey acknowledged his ambivalence toward the minutia of 
academe:  
 Matter of fact, one of my buddies last night sent me an email…He says, “What 
 department are you in?”  I said, “I’m not.  I just put down [the full name of the  
 college].” That’s what my business card says.  That’s what I’m doing  
 (personal communication, February 22, 2012). 
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Identifying himself as “a round peg that’s been squared off,” Dr. Covey nonetheless 
discarded the “woe is me” attitude: “Too many people retire a place in anger.  I won’t see 
that happen” (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
Dr. Kingman 
 Discussing the issue of institutional loyalty, Dr. Kingman decried the lack of 
“humanism” as it pertained to the budgetary changes sweeping Mountain University. For 
nearly twenty years, Dr. Kingman “gave this university everything I had…1000 percent 
to my classes, you know, served on committees on the college level.” Hedging against 
potential termination, Dr. Kingman signed up to claim the TFVSIP package, pulling back 
at the last possible moment.  Though he ultimately remained at Mountain University, Dr. 
Kingman described this process as follows: 
 I went over there [to Human Resources], and I expected some—it was an  
 emotional process to be looking at signing your papers to leave, especially  
 since it hadn’t been a choice to leave.  And the absence of any sensitivity to 
 what the VSIP people might be going through, you know, nothing about “I’m 
 really sorry you’re in this position where you had your unit eliminated or 
 whatever.”  It was so kind of mechanical and so non kind of humanistic and 
 relational, I was very disappointed (personal communication, February 28, 2012). 
 
While dismayed at his treatment by Human Resources, Dr. Kingman was even more 
disheartened by a lack of professional collegiality: “There were very few people from the 
administration, many of whom I’d known for a long time, or even from across campus 
that would just, you know, send an e-mail and say…“How are you holding up?” 
(personal communication, February 28, 2012).   
 Despite these emotional setbacks, Dr. Kingman expressed “gratitude for what I do 
have in life.” Knowing “how lucky I am to have a job in this economic environment,” Dr. 
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Kingman believed “that every experience in life makes you wiser.” Expounding on this 
philosophical outlook, Dr. Kingman explained: 
 And every test, I just—it comes back to every test that I’m given, I just want to  
 become a better person, having gone through it.  And I think that I have been.   
 You know, a certain level of acceptance—you know, you can’t determine what 
 life gives you.  All you can do is decide how you’re gonna respond to it  
 (personal communication, February 28, 2012).   
 
Though he “would not wish what I went through on anybody,” Dr. Kingman found solace 
in this particular life experience: 
I think that the best judgment of a situation is to use it to grow was a human 
being. Who are you on the other side of it?  And, you know, I learned a lot of 
things I think were good for me to learn as a human being going through this 
process (personal communication, February 28, 2012).   
 
Strategic Uncertainty 
 
 Engaged in faculty-driven strategic planning sessions in 2006 and 2009, these 
discussions had stalled due to a lack of scholarly consensus.  Upon arrival at the college 
in the Fall of 2010, the new dean decided to restart the strategic planning process once 
more, in order to make “explicit the Vision, Values, Mission, Goals and Strategies of the 
College. ” A framework for 2011-2015, this plan would “serve as a “road map” to guide 
and direct the major efforts of the College for the next three to five years” (Mountain 
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011). In the sections below, the faculty of Units 3 and 
4 discuss the arrival of the new dean and the effects 2010-2011 strategic planning 
process.      
Reasons for Organizational Change 
 From October 2010 through June 2011, the new Dean directed the efforts of the 
collegiate strategic planning process. As a means of gathering “broad and comprehensive 
feedback from all major stakeholders,” an outside facilitator gathered information from 
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“students, faculty, professional and clerical staff, advisory board members, alumni, 
industry leaders and other individuals and groups involved in the College.” Using 
“surveys, interviews, questionnaires, and focus group discussions,” the facilitator 
developed “an environmental scan examining political, economic, social and technology 
factors (PEST) and strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)” (Mountain 
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011).  The full text of the PEST and SWOT analyses 
appear as appendices H and I.     
 In addition to the aforementioned analytic tools, the strategic plan included goals 
and achievement strategies, each outlined in succession.  The seven goals of the strategic 
plan were as follows: 
1. Help students learn and grow through rigorous academics, relevant 
professional experiences and engaging social opportunities. 
2. Support and enhance faculty/staff professional development, collaboration and 
performance. 
3. Significantly increase resources to support and reward research, teaching and 
service. 
4. Develop strong relationships and improve communications with the alumni, 
industry and community. 
5. Enhance and expand facilities, resources and amenities to create a highly 
professional learning environment. 
6. Establish a strong and sustainable financial structure to ensure stability and 
long term success.   
7. Improve the organizational and operational effectiveness of the College.  
(Mountain University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011)   
 
Two to four strategies followed each goal, with simple, bulleted points serving to guide 
faculty and administrative actions.  Including appendices, the strategic plan totaled thirty-
four pages, reading as more of a PowerPoint presentation than an academic narrative.  
 Commenting on the rationale for this undertaking, the faculty were fairly 
consistent in their understanding.  Prompted by the Provost’s budget reduction directive, 
the Dean adhered to the collegiate mission: 
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 Develop students into leaders of the [disciplinary] industry, contribute to the  
 advancement of the profession and provide service to the community by having  
 an outstanding faculty, challenging curriculum, innovative research, supportive  
 culture and wide range of professional experiences; all in the context of one of the 
            most exciting cities in the world  (Mountain University [Units 3 & 4] College,   
 2011).  
 
As substantiated by Dr. Kingman (personal communication, February 28, 2012): 
 
 The Dean was told he had to cut, I don’t know, $1 million, $1.5 million from the 
 budget and that it was equivalent to about ten lines.  At that point, he just looked  
 for the faculty or the degree programs that weren’t central to the mission of the  
 college, in his mind.  That’s how the faculty were let go.  
 
Focused on preserving the college’s essential functions, the Dean implemented business 
practices to achieve this end.  As outlined in the following interchange, the Dean drew on 
his private sector training to lead the college: 
 Interviewer: Why do you think that all the departments were eliminated? 
 Dr. Covey: We got a new dean and he comes out of the corporate sector and he  
 looked at this and he says, “This doesn’t make any sense.” What he was looking  
 at it was from a corporate perspective and also from a [Mountain City] industry 
 perspective.  He said, “If I’m going to go out and I’m going to sell the college,  
 I can’t sell it as four dispersed and disparate departments.”  We had 10 or 11  
 degrees at that point; I lost count (personal communication, February 22, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, “He’s trying to make sure that we’re turning out a product—which is our 
students—that best serves the needs of the [disciplinary] industry and specifically looks 
at the [Mountain City] marketplace” (Dr. Covey, personal communication, February 22, 
2012).   
 Acting on institutional data, Dr. Adams presented demonstrable evidence in favor 
of collegiate consolidation: 
 Over 80 percent of our students were still getting our—even though we offered all 
 these other majors and things, 80 percent of our students were still getting their  
 degree in [a specific major].  So we decided to go back and just offer that one  
 degree.  That it was too confusing and that our industry and employment partners  
 really didn’t care whether students had all these other separate names on their  
 diplomas (personal communication, April 10, 2012).    
150 
 
 
As explained by Dr. Roberts, this academic integration had been long in the making.  In 
summation of this decision, he stated: “Concurrently, with the budget whittling, we 
decided—and this had pre-dated any problems we had—to redo our curriculum; so we 
had one streamlined curriculum we were getting to, to replace several minors, majors not 
listed” (personal communication, March 7, 2012).  Though the reasons for collegiate 
change were relatively clear, perceptions of the strategic planning process and its 
implementation varied by narrator.   
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization  
 A private sector businessman, the Dean approached the aforementioned planning 
process in the manner most familiar to him—a course of action which promoted fact-
based decision-making over personal sentiment.  Solidifying his status as an academic 
outsider, the Dean operated on personality as opposed to politics, providing a concise, 
logical rationale for the college’s strategic direction.  Commenting on this candor, Dr. 
Kingman offered the following assessment of the Dean: 
 I guess the thing—you know, even though—and this is a really strange thing, is  
 that even though [the Dean] eliminated our degree program, he did it in such a  
 way –first, like I said, he fought for us. You know, he fought really hard for us  
 when he first became Dean.  He was always respectful, and he was always kind.   
 And even when he sat us down and said, “I’m cutting your degree program and 
 your lines,” there was a sense that he did it—and I told him this to his face—he 
 did it honestly, and he did it respectfully and he did it ethically.  He didn’t wanna 
 be in that position, but that was the position he was in (personal communication, 
February 28, 2012). 
 
Reinforcing Dr. Kingman’s assertions, Dr. Covey provided a similar description of this 
pivotal event: 
 He brought us all in together and sat us down as a faculty, and he explained his  
 rationale and why it had to be done and he said, “I’ll do whatever I have to do to 
 help any of you be successful.” He was real compassionate about it and I think  
151 
 
 that was really important.  It didn’t take the frustration away.  It didn’t take the  
 anger—the anger’s just a kneejerk reaction (personal communication, February 
 22, 2012).   
 
 Though few doubted the Dean’s sincerity, several faculty members expressed 
concerns regarding the erosion of shared collegiate governance.  A decisive leader, the 
Dean tended to trust his instincts, often taking bold action with limited faculty input.  In a 
telling exchange, Dr. Roberts discussed his impressions of the college’s new 
organizational structure: 
 Interviewer: And this is all based off of a strategic plan, correct? 
 Dr. Roberts: Yeah.  I mean, it was one of the things discussed in the strategic 
 plan.  And it was based on a study that a faculty committee—former faculty  
 committee did two or three years ago.  They came up with several options of how 
 we could reorganize the college. We’re always looking for constant quality  
 improvement, but, you know, this is—I’m not sure this is the right path for us to 
 be taking (personal communication, March 7, 2012).   
 
Seconding Dr. Roberts’ claims, Dr. Adams elaborated on the limitations of faculty 
influence during the strategic planning process: 
 There was a consultant that—we had two different consultants.  One was the  
 original strategic planning process and then a different one in this second strategic 
 planning process and they did present a, you know, concluding report of, you  
 know, what was found during the process and it was after that concluding report  
 that the new structure was shown to the faculty saying, “This is what we’re  
 doing” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).   
 
Despite these hesitations, Dr. Adams did acknowledge that this heavy-handed decision-
making was a consequence of longstanding leadership deficiencies.  Expounding on this 
caveat, he explained: “Part of the problem is there was never a clear consensus on what 
the faculty wanted to do” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).    
 As the strategic planning process came to a close and implementation 
commenced, Dr. James took issue with the college’s new bonus program. Designed to 
incentivize high-quality research, this program provided monetary rewards to faculty 
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members who published in top-tier academic journals. However, only seven academic 
journals qualified as top-tier.  Questioning this outcome, Dr. James stated: 
 This is part of the new structure. The publishing people had their advisory  
 committee of five people and the associate dean of research said that it came from 
 that committee.  “That committee advised me this is the seven publications.” One 
 person who sat on that committee had never heard of it (personal communication, 
 February 27, 2012).   
 
Expounding on his displeasure, Dr. James offered a supplemental explanation: 
 It really wasn’t so much the money but again, they do dumb things because now  
 even the publishers are slick. “Well, if you publish there [in one of these seven  
 journals] you’re going to get money.” Then, those who feel that they excel more  
 at teaching than other areas or service, there’s no incentive there.  So you’re going  
 to teach a larger class and there’s no incentive there (personal communication,  
 February 27, 2012). 
 
Perceiving this inequitable bonus program as a source of faculty tension, Dr. James 
alluded to the pitfalls of a two-tiered academic system: “It doesn’t become an incentive; it 
becomes a disincentive because your colleague could write and put out the same effort 
you do and make money and you don’t” (personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
Organizational Sustainability 
 While personal financial incentives became a hot-button issue, the fiscal health of 
the college and institution loomed large in the faculty’s collective psyche. Recalling his 
perceptions of Mountain University’s early retirement program, Dr. Kingman 
remembered when the President “started talking about—brought out the VSIP program, 
and he said that if enough people elected to leave, where they could make the budget cut 
they needed, that his hope was he wouldn’t have to let tenured faculty go” (personal 
communication, February 28, 2012).   
 Provided this uncertain campus climate, Dr. Adams admitted “that it’s been very 
hard to find someone [a Dean] to come here” (personal communication, April 10, 2012). 
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Unable to lure top academic talent as a result of this negative publicity, faculty members 
acknowledged the core strength of their new leader.  As succinctly stated by Dr. Roberts: 
“He’s a business leader, a very successful one, and a huge fundraiser, he does a good job 
with that.  And he’ll be the first one to say he doesn’t understand academics” (personal 
communication, March 7, 2012).  Referencing a failed capital campaign, Dr. Adams 
endorsed his wealth of experience in that particular arena, stating: “That was one of the 
main reasons why our dean was hired from [the private sector], was to—once the, you 
know, budget got straightened out a little bit, to get that project back off the ground” 
(personal communication, April 10, 2012).  
 In addition to concerns about Mountain University’s financial stability, faculty 
members expressed qualms regarding the demographic and academic orientation of their 
college. Relating his perspectives on these matters, Dr. Covey made the following 
observations: 
 I think overall the college is stronger. I think from a research perspective that  
 remains to be seen until we see what we—we have two people right now left on  
 tenure track. That means everybody else is an associate professor or—if you look 
 at the average age of this college, this university, it scares me.  I look around the 
 college and I’d say it’s probably in the 50s—the average age of the college. I  
 mean, we’ve got faculty in their 70s, you know (personal communication,  
 February 22, 2012). 
 
Referring to Mountain University as an “immature” research institution, Dr. Covey 
further contextualized his position: 
 Our research resources here are just pitiful.  Our dean is committed to making  
 those changes.  That’s one of the reasons he reorganized—but the college, as a 
 whole here, doesn’t yet have a—there’s folks who do really good research in the 
 college, don’t get me wrong.  But as a whole, in many ways, we’re still a teaching 
 college (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
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Believing that “if we’re not going to bring folks in that can do solid research, we’re just 
shooting ourselves in the head,” Dr. Covey underscored the college’s conundrum. In 
summation, he offered the following prediction: 
 I think over the next five to ten years that’s going to change in this college as  
 we’re bringing better and better people into the college.  If they don’t come in  
 with a research orientation—if we don’t change the way we do graduate studies 
 in this university—we’re never going to be a research-intensive university.  They 
 can say that to the world.  A bunch of crap (personal communication, February  
 22, 2012).       
In addition to these esoteric concerns, faculty members touched on more eclectic, 
practical matters. A visionary thinker in this vein, Dr. Covey questioned why 
administrative consolidation was not pursued as an alternative to faculty termination. 
Commenting on this curiosity, Dr. Covey recalled: 
I did note that no college was eliminated through this whole process and they 
easily could’ve gotten rid of two or three colleges. I would’ve gotten rid of— 
I would have combined [two specified colleges].  I would’ve combined [two 
additional colleges] but I think there’s enough clout in the community—[the 
first two colleges]—they have a lot of power.  We’ve got a lot of power.   
[Another college] has got some power; not as much (personal communication, 
February 22, 2012).   
 
Alluding to the intangibles of university politics, Dr. Covey recognized that it was much 
simpler to eliminate individual faculty members than to consolidate “turf.”  However, the 
overall loss of college colleagues due to retirements, departures, and dismissals had taken 
its toll on the student body.  As summarized by Dr. Kingman: “There’s no way that the 
quality of the education they got was the same” (personal communication, February 28, 
2012).  
Nature of the Business Environment 
 Offering his perspectives on Mountain State and the fate of his unit, Dr. Covey 
made the following observation: 
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 Do I wish it had gone a different way?  I sure do.  I think we could’ve built a  
 really, really strong program here.  What’s my take on [Mountain State]?  
 [Mountain State] as a state does not value higher education.  Had I known that 
 [when I came to work here], I might’ve rethought it but I was ready to move 
 (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
 
Though disillusioned with Mountain State’s educational philosophy, Dr. Covey found 
Mountain University’s academic direction to be equally disconcerting. Panning the 
institution’s treatment of its graduate students, Dr. Covey opined: 
 Most doctoral students on state funds have to teach three courses—two courses a 
 semester I think it is.  You cannot build a graduate program and graduate students 
 that are going to be competitive in the marketplace by having them teach that kind 
 of a load (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
 
As evidenced by faculty commentary, it is clear that the strategic planning process had 
engendered significant controversy—debates which soon escalated into extreme 
structural uncertainty.     
Structural Uncertainty 
 A product of a department-less governance model, structural uncertainty pervaded 
the college of Units 3 and 4. Without a department chair to turn to, faculty members 
struggled to determine the appropriate chain of command.  Absent clear hierarchical 
lines, academics expressed consternation at the wide span of control and limited points of 
confluence.  Commentary on specific aspects of structural uncertainty appears below.      
Reporting Structures 
 Perceiving academic departments as “competitive units” or “silos,” the Dean 
conceived a new collegiate reporting structure in Spring 2011 (Dr. James, personal 
communication, February 27, 2012).  Substituting a corporate model for the college’s 
thirty-year-old reporting structure (see Figure 2 below), this new hierarchy (see Figure 3 
below) engendered widespread uncertainty amongst affiliated faculty.  Against the advice 
156 
 
of Dr. James, Dr. Roberts, and the units’ Organizational Structure Report (2009), the 
Dean eliminated all departments—replacing traditional department chairs with associate 
and assistant deans.     
 
  Figure 2. College Reporting Structure, 1980s-June 30, 2011 
 
 
Figure 3. College Reporting Structure, July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012 
 
             While the 2011-2015 strategic plan did call for “improve[ing] the structure of the 
College to function in a more efficient and professional manner,” the move to eliminate 
all departments did not flow from nor sit well with members of the faculty (Mountain 
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011, p.27).  Indeed, Dr. James offered the following 
assessment of the new model: 
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 Now that we have the single structure, he [the Dean] has eliminated the silos  
 but has created an “Us against Them” mentality.  “Us” being the people in the 
 administration—him, the three associate deans and assistant dean—against  
 “Them” the faculty.  Since then they have roughshodded rules like, “Okay, this 
 is the new rules.” “Well, who made these rules?” “The executive committee  
 and there’s no rebuttal” (personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
 
Alluding to the faculty’s sentiments, Dr. Adams revealed: “There’s definitely discussion 
that, well, you know, four or five years down the line if we, you know, have a new dean, 
then we’d go back to having departments” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).    
 Tangential to these assertions, Dr. Roberts alluded to the central issue of 
communication in a department-less college. Contending that “there was no home for 
people” in this new structure, Dr. Roberts railed against the “hearsay and bullshit” of 
hallway chatter (personal communication, March 7, 2012). In further explication, Dr. 
James declared: 
 When you have a span of control that wide you need to break it down.  The  
 original dean—when we had 12, 14, 16 faculty—treated it more like a large  
 department.  He could interface with 16 people.  When you get to be 61  
 [college faculty members] you need to break them into units so that—several 
 reasons I thought it was effective.  Number one, you chose your department  
 chair so the department chair had a stake in listening to you.  It also worked  
 against you, too.  I mean, if you didn’t want to be popular you might lose your 
 job so there’s an understanding of that.  But also, they got to know the faculty  
 better and could place them, I think, in positions that were more effective for 
 teaching.  I think they also understood where the faculty strengths were.  Some 
 were in publishing, some were in service, some were in teaching.  And reward  
 them accordingly.  Now, we have 41 faculty and literally one person.  I just  
 think the span of control is not effective (personal communication, February 
 27, 2012).   
 
Clarifying his original position, Dr. Roberts stated: 
 But what I mean, what I’m saying is that, instead of having faculty meetings 
 by department where you could talk about issues, there’s no place to do that  
 now.  Sure, there’s faculty meetings.  How are you going to talk about issues 
 in a faculty meeting with 41 people in it, how are you going to have a 
 meaningful discussion? (personal communication, March 7, 2012) 
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 Exemplifying Dr. Roberts’ foreboding, collegiate faculty expressed 
consternation in regard to the annual evaluation process.  Formerly the purview of 
department chairs, this new procedure called for a three-way evaluation among the 
Associate Deans.  Intended to enhance the robustness of annual evaluations, this method 
instead resulted in the opposite outcome.  Commenting on this academic anomaly, Dr. 
Covey asserted: “I’ve been in higher education for 40 years and I’ve never seen this 
model” (personal communication, February 22, 2012).  Confusing and chaotic, Dr. 
Adams described the process as follows: 
 And, you know, I haven’t heard any real complaints—hadn’t heard any  
 complaints that people were upset about the fairness of their evaluation or 
 anything bad.  It was just really un-wieldy and a little bit more time consuming 
 process for the Associate Deans since they were all evaluating.  [Laughter]  
 I know the Associate Deans didn’t care for the process too much, you know, 
 because they had 38 different applications they had to evaluate  
 (personal communication, April 10, 2012).                
 
In the following exchange, Dr. Roberts (personal communication, March 7, 2012) 
provides additional insight into procedural shortcomings: 
 Dr. Roberts: And there illustrates the problem, because when I was chair of 
 [Unit 3], and let’s say you were in my department.  Donoff, is your name? 
 Interviewer: Susan Donoff, yes.   
 Dr. Roberts: You forget to tell me that you worked on Three Square meal  
 thing, community service, and you forget to put it down [on your annual  
 evaluation]; because I talk to you every day, I know that maybe you’re an  
 airhead sometimes and you didn’t put it down there, but I know what you did. 
 So I’ll go ahead and add it in for you, and then I know what you did and I can 
 rate it properly.  See what I’m saying? 
 Interviewer: But now you’re kind of removed? 
 Dr. Roberts: Correct.  I’d also know if you’re B.S.ing me, too. 
 Interviewer: And now you don’t really—well… 
 Dr. Roberts: No idea.    
 
 While faculty evaluations certainly left much to be desired, Dr. Adams 
(personal communication, April 10, 2012) discerned further structural deficiencies: 
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 You know, what it messes up is those lines of reporting and that clarity of 
 who you go to, both the faculty and the student lines that people were used  
 to for that.  You know, for the students, you know, it’s now that the associate 
 dean and the assistant dean, you know, are handling most of the student issues 
 there.  You know, the students don’t notice a difference as much, because they 
 probably never really understood the departments either.  The other interesting  
 part of it is that we still—all our classes are still listed under the prefixes of  
 these different departments.  [Names relevant prefixes], because in the process 
 of all the common course numbering and things for the entire system, like [the 
 local community college] uses those same course numbers and things like that.   
 So, you know, there was a question about [going to one uniform prefix].  Now 
 we can’t—we wouldn’t even be able to do that, because then that would mess 
 up [the local community college] after they made a bunch of changes six, eight 
 years ago, so their stuff would comply with ours, because we had departments.   
 
Aware of the numerous issues that arose during the first year of implementation, the 
Dean announced a modified structure at the February 2012 faculty meeting.  Taking 
effect July 1, 2012, the new reporting hierarchy (see Figure 4 below) sought to remedy 
the aforementioned structural weaknesses. In a stroke of academic irony, Dr. Adams 
described the new “assistant dean for operations as basically everything a department 
chair would have been doing anyway” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).  Eager 
to return to their longstanding departmental structure, faculty members moved to recreate 
this same position under a different title.  
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Figure 4. College Reporting Structure, July 1, 2012-present 
  
Functionality of the Unit 
 Adjusting to the new department-less structure proved challenging for college 
faculty members, resulting in many of the same outcomes as individuals in “saved” units.  
Though departmental advocacy did not take the same forms as in Units 1 and 2, 
academics in Units 3 and 4 did express concerns about scholarly productivity.  While Dr. 
Covey “found that I had—I got the lowest teaching scores I’ve ever gotten in my life last 
semester,” (personal communication, February 22, 2012) Dr. Kingman admitted “that if I 
hadn’t had some things kind of in the hopper that my research productivity would’ve just 
almost dropped off completely” (personal communication, February 28, 2012).  A 
function of stress, Drs. Covey and Kingman allude to one of the unintended 
consequences of departmental restructuring.   
    Continuing in this vein, Dr. Kingman explained: “this whole process brings out 
the worst in people, you know, very much—at least that was our experience in the [name 
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removed] College, very much people trying to protect themselves” (personal 
communication, February 28, 2012).  Acknowledging the importance of jockeying, Dr. 
Roberts  admitted that “the view as the lead horse is a lot better than the view from 
behind that lead horse” (personal communication, March 7, 2012).  Unwilling to fight the 
rising tide of corporatism, faculty members looked for new opportunities in this 
contemporary reporting structure.  Admitting his fascination with this atypical hierarchy, 
Dr. Covey declared: “I think we’re stronger because we’ve come together and we’re 
better able to focus our resources and our energies.  Do I think it will last? Who knows?” 
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
 Job-Related Uncertainty 
 Like faculty in “saved” units, academics in eliminated units discussed key 
components of job-related uncertainty. While these departmental eliminations were for 
ideological rather than financial reasons, faculty members expressed similar sentiments 
as it pertained to this realm of inquiry.  Faculty commentary on aspects of job-related 
uncertainty appears below.     
Job Security 
 Though TVSIP program participation spared tenured faculty, non-tenured 
individuals in the college were not as fortunate.  Speaking about this very subject, Dr. 
Kingman offered a troubling caveat, stating: “Unfortunately, our junior faculty, they were 
told straight up, look ‘em in the eye, “Don’t worry.  You know, I’m telling you, you don’t 
have to worry about it” (personal communication, February 28, 2012).  Piggybacking on 
this assertion, Dr. Covey noted the following: 
 We had made a couple of really good hires.  Three of us came in—two of us at the  
 same time and the next year we got another person it—and they were good leaders. 
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 They were going to be solid researchers; they were going to move us in the  
 direction we needed to go and do the kinds of things that needed to be done 
 (personal communication, February 22, 2012). 
In addition to the loss of promising tenure-track faculty, Dr. Kingman recounted the 
collegiate climate during this tumultuous time: 
 The junior faculty were saying, “Well, if we bring in tenured faculty and our  
 college takes another cut, the first people to go are the untenured faculty, so we 
 don’t want more tenured faculty here.” So they were looking at colleagues from 
 across campus that were potentially losing their jobs and saying, “I’m putting my 
 needs first.” I had faculty members that said, “You know, I’ve got three kids to  
 feed, and I will do anything it takes not to lose my job, including sacrificing a  
 colleague” (personal communication, February 28, 2012).   
 
Unwilling to accommodate their institutional colleagues, Dr. Kingman offered a macabre 
metaphor: “I mean, so,  you know, there’s kind of dead bodies scattered all over the 
place, as far as, you know, what happened to people” (personal communication, February 
28, 2012).   
 Though non-tenured faculty members clung tightly to their positions, long-time 
Mountain University academics conveyed no such fears.  Underscoring these sentiments, 
Dr. James acknowledged: “Me, personally, it doesn’t make a difference.  I’m close to 
retirement” (personal communication, February 27, 2012).  In a similar vein, Dr. Covey 
stated: 
 I’m a tenured, full professor and there’s nothing they can do to me without  
 removing tenure from the university. It would take them six years to fire me and 
 I’m going to do my job and I’m going to do it well. But I’m going to research what 
 I want to research (personal communication, February 22, 2012).  
Despite hard-hitting financial challenges to the college and university, tenured faculty 
members in Units 3 and 4 expressed no doubts about their continued employment.   
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Promotion Opportunities 
 Perhaps the most hot-button issue amongst faculty members, a new “pay for 
publishing” program had touched off intra-collegiate rivalries.  As framed by Dr. Covey: 
 He [the Dean] announced at our last faculty meeting that if you publish in a  
 top-tier journal we’ll pay you for it.  $3,000…There was a group out there that 
 was absolutely opposed to it because they don’t publish in those particular  
 journals (personal communication, February 22, 2012). 
 
Among the opponents of this enticement, Dr. James offered a compelling counter-
assertion: 
 Well, the journals they listed seemed to favor a certain part of the people because 
 they tried to publish in there and the others are going, “Look, I’m publishing in  
 what I feel to be top journals in my area but there’s no financial incentive here.” 
 That really pissed people off.  Then the people who teach and do service say,  
 “Why is it so important? These people are getting course releases to publish— 
 that’s their job—so why are you rewarding them with more money?” I mean, we 
 have things like teacher—from within the college—teacher of the year, publisher 
 of the year, service person of the year.  You get extra money for that; one in each 
 category.  But this is like if you publish you’re going to get money  
 (personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
 In addition to this burgeoning controversy, faculty members expressed concerns 
regarding advancement opportunities both within and outside the college.  Discussing the 
former, Dr. Adams questioned his ability to move up in the current institutional 
environment: 
 So we’ll see what happens with that over the next couple years and there will  
 be room, because some of the people that are in the associate dean positions and 
 things, you know, are probably only gonna be here another couple years before 
 they retire.  So hopefully there will be room to move up from there 
  (personal communication, April 10, 2012). 
In a related vein, Dr. Covey explicated his scholarly stagnation: 
 I’m not going to retire and I’m not at a point in my career where people are going 
 to want to hire me.  I always thought that age discrimination was a bunch of  
 nonsense; maybe it’s a personal thing (personal communication, February 22,  
 2012).   
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Despite limited promotional opportunities at Mountain University, faculty members 
accepted the security of their current employment rather than take their chances at 
another institution.    
Changes to the Job Role 
As a result of budgetary-induced retirements and departures, collegiate faculty 
members dwindled from a high of sixty to an all-time low of forty.  A reduction of this 
magnitude, occurring over a mere three-year time period, caused considerable changes to 
the job roles of remaining faculty members. Discussing this phenomenon, Dr. James 
made the following observation: 
Well, as we lost faculty they arbitrarily increased the size of the classes  
immensely. Normally, we taught like a 60-size classroom because that’s  
where our structure is.  Our original dean set up for about 60 to a class, which, 
having taught at 60, was maybe I just got used to it.  It was a pretty ideal situation. 
Now, you can walk in with 150 in your class. 200 sometimes. And while it might 
lend itself to certain classes—maybe you could with 200—teachers were put in 
classes they were ill prepared for. They said, “Well, if you can teach 40 why can’t 
you teach 150?” Well, unless you’ve taught you don’t know the dynamics of a  
150 class versus a 40 class (personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
In addition to Dr. James’ assertions, Dr. Kingman conveyed the burden of increased 
service obligations:  
 Yeah, graduate committees.  Yeah, and it, you know—I chaired a lot of graduate 
 committees, and I don’t know if I chaired more, but it meant that since there were 
 only [a few] of us left, that we had to serve on all of the committees. You know, it 
 was kind of a member of a committee if not the chair of the committee.  And so, I 
 mean, we just became the group that was responsible for just making it go 
 (personal communication, February 28, 2012). 
 
Faced with a loss of a third of their faculty colleagues, members of Units 3 and 4 
struggled to balance teaching, research, and service.  As expressed by Dr. Adams:  
 And everybody’s gone from teaching two to three classes or three classes to four, 
 teaching large size classes and then you have, you know, that many fewer people  
 to spread around all these committees.  You know, so now, you know, where you  
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 used to just go to a department meeting, now you’re on one of these advisory  
 committees and, you know, everybody’s still on their other curriculum  
 committees, college-university committees and things (personal communication, 
 April 10, 2012).   
 While amplified teaching and service responsibilities represented the lion’s share 
of faculty commentary, members of Units 3 and 4 also discussed a decrease in shared 
governance.  In the following monologue, Dr. James outlines one aspect of this trend: 
He [the Dean] uses them [the college bylaws] when they’re at his convenience  
and when they’re not at his convenience he says they’re not in sync with the  
university’s bylaws; therefore, at this time we can’t use them. Other times he uses 
them.  When he first got here they wanted to…I forget what it was but we had a  
vote.  According to our bylaws the vote did not pass but he wanted it so he said, 
“Listen, I really want this so I’m going to move that way.” Everybody was hunky- 
dory at that time, saying, “Well, okay.  You’re new.  Fine.” We should have  
never—we should’ve held our ground right from the beginning, which we didn’t 
(personal communication, February 27, 2012).   
Furthermore, Dr. Roberts offered another example of circumscribed faculty input: 
Well, the one issue that came up is the [name removed] course, there was a 
discussion on one of these.  Somebody in the college, a senior person, wanted 
it gone.  So they did convene an ad hoc committee of people they thought would 
be interested in [this particular aspect of the college], and they discussed whether 
we should do away with [this particular] course, and they decided to.  But the 
conversation was not a focused conversation by all the people who should have  
been there having this conversation.  It should have started with the people who 
are, in one way or another, involved in either teaching that course or using the  
students’ skills who have taken that course in the other courses.  And then it can  
go to the college level; because normally, you’d have the discussion like this in 
the department, the department makes a course proposal or a change proposal.  
That’s standard throughout any university (personal communication, March 7, 
2012).  
 
 Moreover, “the faculty never voted on the decision to totally eliminate the 
departments,” in spite of contrary assertions advanced to the governing body (Dr. Adams, 
personal communication, April 10, 2012).  As reinforced by Dr. James: 
 I think one thing that was discouraging is when the president presented it to the 
 [governing body] that there’s a new structure in the [name removed] college and 
 we were told by someone in attendance—because none of the faculty were at the 
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 [governing body] meetings—that this was passed with a vote of the faculty of the 
 college.  No vote was ever taken (personal communication, February 27, 2012).    
 
In a tangential vein, Dr. Covey cited the erosion of core principles of faculty governance: 
 We’re bringing in five faculty—one senior—and we’re bringing in four people for 
 interviews.  We’ve got five positions.  One’s a senior faculty—who would come in 
 as a senior faculty member and we’re bringing in three other folks—all who got 
 their Ph.Ds. here.  To me, that doesn’t speak well.  You don’t do that  
 (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
Relieved to no longer be a chair, Dr. Covey underscored a positive aspect of the zero-
department structure: 
 I used to get here at 6:30, 7:00 in the morning.  I come in at 8:30 now.  I get up in 
 the morning and sort of dink around.  If I want to stay home like I did yesterday, I 
 stayed home and wrote all day long.  I couldn’t do that as an administrator.  I had  
 to be here.  It’s been liberating for me in a way because I rediscovered how much  
 fun it is to be a faculty member (personal communication, February 22, 2012).    
 
Effect of the Department Chair: Unit 3 
 
Though acting in a different capacity than a “saved” department chair, the 
academic leader of Unit 3 nonetheless affected perceptions of strategic, structural, and 
job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s (2007) concepts of manifest 
and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 3’s department chair below.   
Positive Personality 
 
 Unable to change the Dean’s mind as it pertained to departmental elimination, Dr. 
Roberts elected to “put a positive spin” on the college’s new direction.  Recognizing the 
utility of being “a cheerleader,” he outlined his leadership philosophy as follows: 
 It is what it is. You have to—students are why we’re here. We’re here for the  
 students, that’s the number one reason. We’re not here to design organizations, 
 we’re not here to write memos, we’re here for the students.   
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Refusing to “be a sourpuss,” Dr. Roberts underscored his “collaborative style” and 
“willing[ness] to make tough decisions” as hallmarks of an effective chair.  Elaborating 
on this leadership methodology, he explained: 
 You gain a lot more with a teaspoon of honey than you do with a gallon of  
 vinegar, and that’s just the way it is. And I think people want to know the 
 truth, people want to know—for you to be firm with them; but you have to 
 be firm, you have to be fair, you have to be consistent. That’s true in the 
 classroom and it’s true in management. I think that, for me, the style then 
 is to look at this as a partnership of professionals. 
 
Resolved to move with rather than against the tide of collegiate leadership, Dr. Roberts 
embraced these administrative challenges, and encouraged his former departmental 
colleagues to do the same (personal communication, March 7, 2012).    
Effect of the Department Chair: Unit 4 
Similar to Dr. Roberts, Dr. Covey affected faculty perceptions of strategic, 
structural, and job-related uncertainty through his unique leadership style.  While not as 
exuberant as Dr. Roberts in his endorsement of the college’s direction, he nonetheless 
moved with, rather than against, the new Dean.    
Realistic Outlook 
 
 A sensible and pragmatic leader, Dr. Covey summarized his position: “First goal 
was to save the department.  Second goal was to save the program. Third goal was to 
survive.” Concerned with preserving the employment of his departmental colleagues, Dr. 
Covey conveyed his stance: “Look, we’re going to die anyway. Let’s see if we can save 
the program.” Straightforward in his delivery, Dr. Covey’s words struck a chord with his 
faculty.  Recapping his message, Dr. Covey recalled: 
 It doesn’t do any good to whine.  That’s what I used to tell my kids.  “We  
 don’t whine in this house.” We fought a good battle and I came here to a  
 very bright future.  It didn’t work out that way.  It’s okay.  I go home at  
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 night, sleep good.  I go home, some nights I go home and whine, but [my 
 spouse] tells me to shut up. 
 
Though he and his colleagues “felt like we weren’t appreciated,” he reserved his ire for 
the Mountain University Faculty Senate:  
 I felt like they rolled over and played dead. Now, we had to make cuts at the 
 university; that’s a given. Somebody’s gonna go. We’re a small program,  
 we’re a new program.  We had time over the twenty years the program was  
 in existence before I got here to do those kinds of things.  They didn’t do it.  
 
Frustrated with a lack of faculty advocacy, Dr. Covey nonetheless acknowledged the role 
of recession in this latest outcome, stating: “had the economy not gone sour we’d still be 
a department and we wouldn’t be going” (personal communication, February 22, 2012).   
Summary 
 
Bound together by the shared phenomenon of departmental elimination, the 
members of Units 3 and 4 revealed numerous unintended consequences of structural 
change.  Struggling with the loss of a third of their colleagues, remaining collegiate 
faculty absorbed this workload via increased teaching and service obligations. Though 
Units 1 and 2 made frequent use of military imagery, Units 3 and 4 underscored the 
“death” of their respective departments.  In this vein, Dr. Kingman (Unit 4) recalled 
“dead bodies scattered all over the place,” while Dr. James lamented the “fait accompli” 
of departmental elimination. Although somewhat accepting of this change in direction, 
faculty members and former department chairs continued to voice their concerns 
regarding the perceived erosion of shared governance.  Chapter 5 concludes this study, 
and includes a discussion of findings, theoretical and practical implications, and 
recommendations for future research.      
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction and Overview of Study 
 An emergent and expanding phenomenon, departmental/programmatic 
eliminations represent a new paradigm in the history of American higher education.  
Following decades of unprecedented growth in student enrollments, disciplinary 
offerings, and campus acreage, sharp decreases in state subsidies have forced public 
institutions into a precarious position. Leery of sharp tuition increases due to their 
detrimental effects on student access, administrators have elected to balance budgets on 
the backs of state employees. Though faculty members represent but one constituency 
affected by this strategic direction, their historical status as university guardians heightens 
the stakes of this perilous pursuit.   
 In the current study, I interviewed thirteen tenured faculty members regarding 
their experiences with departmental/programmatic elimination at Mountain University.  
Though grateful for gainful employment in a turbulent job market, these individuals 
expressed serious concerns about the direction of their institution. While numerous 
comments pertained exclusively to Mountain University, several remarks heralded 
disquieting trends in American higher education.  Expanding on these points, I discuss 
findings, theoretical and practical implications, and recommendations for future research 
in the following sections.   
Research Questions 
Research Question 1 
How do individuals experience a potential departmental/programmatic elimination? 
170 
 
 Framed to provide the greatest leeway in individual responses, faculty members 
expressed emotions ranging from anger to bewilderment to reluctant acceptance.  Though 
each scholar shared his/her own unique experiences with departmental/programmatic 
elimination, certain commonalities emerged throughout the interview process.  In this 
manner, faculty lamented their general disempowerment as it pertained to the university’s 
strategic direction. Caught between a highly competitive job market and an uncertain 
future at Mountain University, many faculty members chose to stay at their current 
institution.  Moreover, several individuals cited family (i.e. spouse, children, etc.) 
concerns as paramount in their decision-making process. Hesitant to disrupt the lives of 
their family members and fearful of moving to another undesirable situation, many 
faculty members elected to ride out the current financial storm in the hopes of a brighter, 
post-recession future at Mountain University. Based upon the thirteen interviews 
conducted for this study, gender and rank were non-factors in a faculty member’s 
decision to seek new employment or remain at Mountain University. Table 6 provides 
general demographic characteristics of interview participants.         
Table 6 
Demographic Characteristics of Interview Participants 
Gender 9 men (69%); 4 women (31%) 
Race 13 Caucasians (100%) 
Unit Classification 4 non-STEM units (100%) 
Rank 5 Associate Professors (38%); 8 Full Professors (62%) 
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Research Question 2 
To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest themselves 
during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations? 
 Absent clear, data-driven performance indicators, faculty members were free to 
speculate as to their newfound status.  In this manner, Mountain University faculty 
members questioned the metrics which had placed them in academic jeopardy.  Citing 
outdated records and dubious definitions of “productivity,” faculty in Units 1 and 2 
pushed back against these categorizations through varied efforts at departmental 
advocacy.  Alerting their respective professional associations was a tactic shared by Units 
1 and 2, in addition to formulating alternative revenue generating/cost savings proposals.  
Though grounded in a college-wide strategic planning process, scholars in Units 3 and 4 
disputed the Dean’s vision of corporate governance.  Working to recreate their familiar 
departmental configuration, faculty members in Units 3 and 4 refashioned job titles and 
reporting structures to mimic traditional academic organizations.   
Perceiving profound organizational differences between private industry and 
public education, faculty members provided several concrete examples to substantiate 
these claims. Hired for his expertise in fundraising and his ties to business and industry, 
the Dean of Units 3 and 4 readily admitted his inexperience with shared governance.  
Conversely, faculty members in Units 1 and 2 conveyed no such issues with academic 
leadership, having retained the chairs of their respective departments.  Interestingly, the 
possibility of elimination had opposing effects on the collective functionality of Units 1 
and 2.  Stronger for having shared in the fight to save their department, Unit 1 faculty 
exhibited newfound solidarity, while faculty in Unit 2 fractured during their own call to 
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arms.  Believing that frequent meetings/faculty interaction brought their unit closer 
together, members of Unit 1 witnessed a collective surge in teaching evaluations.  
Alternatively, Unit 2 split according to rank, with junior faculty resentful of senior 
faculty for their tenured employment and secure salary.          
 Running the gamut from pressing concern to trivial afterthought, job-related 
uncertainty produced extreme anxiety for some and presented little worry for others.  
Perhaps dependent upon personality and other unaccountable psychological factors, job-
related uncertainty varied by individual narrator. However, of explicated concerns, 
uninterrupted academic employment was the most common faculty apprehension. 
Concerns regarding individual promotion/advancement were more pronounced in Units 3 
and 4, while faculty members in Units 1 and 2 expressed anxieties as to departmental 
prestige and the future of their respective disciplines. Table 7 provides an overview of 
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty across Units 1-4. 
Table 7 
Manifestations of Uncertainty 
Type of 
Uncertainty 
Unit 1 
Saved 
Unit 2 
Saved 
Unit 3 
Eliminated 
Unit 4 
Eliminated 
Strategic 
Confusion 
regarding 
strategy 
Confusion 
regarding 
strategy 
Disagreement 
regarding 
strategy 
Disagreement 
regarding 
strategy 
Structural 
Cohesion; Low 
research 
productivity; 
Reporting 
structure 
unchanged 
Disunion; 
Stable research 
productivity; 
Reporting 
structure 
unchanged  
 
Chaotic; 
Absence of 
traditional 
reporting 
structures  
 
Chaotic; 
Absence of 
traditional 
reporting 
structures  
 
Job-Related Increased class 
size; Perceived 
erosion of 
tenure  
Increased class 
size; Devalued/ 
demoralized 
Increased class 
size; Fairly 
secure due to 
retirements 
Increased class 
size; Fairly 
secure due to 
retirements  
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Research Question 3 
How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic, structural, and 
job-related uncertainties? 
 Acting as the departmental bellwether, chairs in Units 1-4 exhibited leadership by 
advocating on behalf of their faculty colleagues. While management styles varied by 
individual, messages of solidarity were a common theme across all department chair 
interviews.  In Unit 1, Dr. Smith turned negative attitudes into constructive action, 
assigning faculty to fact-finding missions to focus their attention.  Meanwhile, in Unit 2, 
Dr. Hayes embraced faculty consultation, inviting them to comment on a department-
wide productivity report.  In Units 3 and 4, Drs. Roberts and Covey encouraged their 
faculty colleagues to think positively about the college’s latest direction, refusing to 
publicly undermine the new Dean.  
While there are no real winners in a budget battle of this magnitude, chairs in 
Units 1 and 2 were instrumental in saving their units from potential elimination. Able to 
contribute to unitary advocacy in ways circumscribed to regular faculty members, Drs. 
Smith and Hayes accessed and deciphered departmental data, contacted national 
professional associations, and used the power of the press to increase their institutional 
leverage. Conversely, Drs. Covey and Roberts knew when to lay down their arms, 
encouraging their faculty colleagues to support the Dean’s vision.  Refusing to be a 
source of dissention and divisiveness within the college, the chairs of Units 3 and 4 
attempted to illustrate the positives while remaining cognizant of perceived 
organizational flaws.  Still in its initial stages, it is difficult to speculate as to the long-
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range outcomes of faculty advocacy in Units 3 and 4.  Table 8 outlines the pertinent 
activities/personality traits of the department chairs in Units 1-4.   
Table 8 
Activities and Personality Traits of the Department Chair        
Department 
Chair 
Dr. Smith 
Unit 1 
Saved 
Dr. Hayes 
Unit 2 
Saved 
Dr. Roberts 
Unit 3 
Eliminated 
Dr. Covey 
Unit 4 
Eliminated 
Activities/ 
Personality 
Traits 
Acquire & 
Communicate; 
Tone Setting; 
Strategizing; 
Recruiting 
Outside Help  
 
Acquire & 
Communicate; 
Tone Setting; 
Strategizing; 
Recruiting 
Outside Help  
 
Positive 
Personality 
Realistic 
Outlook 
 
Research Question 4 
How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between saved and 
eliminated units?  
 A feature of qualitative methodology, Yin (2009) advocates cross-case synthesis 
as a means to “address the most significant aspect of your case study” (p.161).  In Tables 
9-11, I employed a scale of mild, moderate, or severe to characterize each unit’s 
response, based upon the portion of the interview devoted towards each type of 
uncertainty.  As illustrated below, perceptual differences existed between “saved” and 
“eliminated” units.  While saved units experienced considerable strategic uncertainty, the 
prevalence of a strategic plan in eliminated units circumscribed this outcome.  
Conversely, faculty members in eliminated units reported severe structural uncertainty, 
while individuals in saved units encountered few disturbances in this arena. Though 
experimentation with alternative hierarchies is indeed an admirable innovation, the swift 
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erosion of a long-standing bureaucratic model engendered considerable confusion for 
faculty, staff, and students.  Perhaps the most opaque of the three types of uncertainty, 
job-related uncertainty did not differ by unitary status.  Indeed, perceptions of job-related 
uncertainty tended to vary by faculty rank and unit dynamic, though all four units 
reported a sharp increase in class sizes. 
Table 9 
 A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Strategic Uncertainty 
 Unit 1 
Saved 
Unit 2 
Saved 
Unit 3 
Eliminated 
Unit 4 
Eliminated 
Strategic Uncertainty Severe Severe Mild Mild 
Reasons for 
Organizational Change 
$ Driven $ Driven Strategic plan Strategic plan 
Planning & Future 
Direction  
Mission-
driven 
Productivity-
driven 
Corporate 
model 
Corporate 
model 
Organizational 
Sustainability 
TFVSIP; 
Court 
ruling; 
Bunker 
mentality 
Legislative 
support; 
Enrollment 
decline 
Fundraising; 
Faculty 
demographics; 
Research 
infrastructure 
Fundraising; 
Faculty 
demographics; 
Research 
infrastructure 
Nature of the Business 
Environment 
Lack of 
public 
support for 
education 
Market-
model; 
Differential 
tuition 
Mountain 
State does not 
value higher 
education 
Mountain 
State does not 
value higher 
education 
 
Table 10 
 
A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Structural Uncertainty 
 
 Unit 1 
Saved 
Unit 2 
Saved 
Unit 3 
Eliminated 
Unit 4 
Eliminated 
Structural Uncertainty Mild Mild Severe Severe 
Reporting Structures 
N/A N/A 
Hierarchical 
confusion 
Hierarchical 
confusion 
Functionality of Unit Positive; 
Low 
productivity 
Negative; 
Stable 
productivity 
Stress; 
Productivity 
declines 
Stress; 
Productivity 
declines 
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Table 11 
 
A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Job-Related Uncertainty 
 
 Unit 1 
Saved 
Unit 2 
Saved 
Unit 3 
Eliminated 
Unit 4 
Eliminated 
Job-Related Uncertainty Severe Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Job Security 
Perceived 
erosion of 
tenure 
protections 
Untenured 
faculty feel 
nervous; 
Tenured 
faculty feel 
secure 
TFVSIP 
participation 
saved jobs; 
Tenured full 
professors 
feel secure 
TFVSIP 
participation 
saved jobs; 
Tenured full 
professors 
feel secure 
Promotion Opportunities Damaged 
reputation 
Devalued 
profession 
Pay for 
publishing 
Pay for 
publishing 
Changes to the Job Role Increased 
class size; 
Increased 
service 
obligations 
Increased 
class size; 
Decreased 
research 
opportunities 
 
Increased 
class size; 
Increased 
service 
obligations; 
Decrease in 
shared 
governance 
Increased 
class size; 
Increased 
service 
obligations; 
Decrease in 
shared 
governance 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 Though participant perceptions varied widely, it is important to call attention to 
topics which resonated across departments, programs, and individuals.  In this regard, 
narrators universally noted increased class sizes—a decision made unilaterally and 
without faculty input.  In The fall of the faculty: The rise of the all-administrative 
university and why it matters, long-time academician Benjamin Ginsberg (2011) offered 
the following assessment of teaching in an administrative environment: 
 The first dimension along which the all-administrative university differs from its  
 faculty-directed counterpart is pedagogy.  From the professorial perspective, the 
 university exists to promote teaching by providing faculty members with  
 classrooms, laboratories, libraries, computers, and other instructional resources.  
 From the administrative perspective, however, the purpose of teaching is to bring 
 fee-paying customers (sometimes known as students) into its dormitories and  
177 
 
 classrooms.  Administrators think teaching serves the university, not the converse 
 (p.170).  
 
While this new paradigm serves to erode one of the core functions of the traditional 
academic triad, it is the students who suffer the severest consequences.  As reinforced by 
Keeling and Hersh (2012): 
 Why has higher education abandoned higher learning? Because learning itself is  
 no longer the first priority in most colleges and universities, despite the fact that  
 the core mission of every institution of higher education is exactly that—learning. 
 The many recent critiques that assail colleges and universities for rising costs,  
 rampant inefficiencies, and insufficient accountability hit other targets but miss  
 this key point. Without higher learning, higher education is just a series of steps 
 that lead to a degree—the receipt of which is evidence of nothing except the  
 completion of those steps (pp. 1-2).   
As faculty-student ratios inch higher, and part-timers replace tenured faculty, 
opportunities for individualized attention decline accordingly (June, 2012a). Seasoned 
scholar and AAUP advocate Ronald Ehrenberg (2011) underscores this phenomenon: 
 As economists are fond of pointing out, there is no such thing as a free lunch.  
 A growing body of research suggests that reliance on lower-cost, full-time,  
 nontenure-track faculty and/or part-time faculty may adversely affect student 
 outcomes. For example, my own research with Liang Zhang, which used  
 institutional-level panel data, found that, holding other factors constant, when a 
 four-year academic institution increases its use of either full-time nontenure-track 
 faculty or part-time faculty, its undergraduate students’ first-year persistence rates 
 and graduation rates go down (p.107).   
Provided faculty members’ assertions correlating increased class sizes to diminished 
instructional quality, (see pp. 105-106, 133-134, 164) Mountain University may well 
witness a decrease in graduation and persistence rates as current and future cohorts 
progress through this modified system.   
 As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, changes to faculty working conditions 
(e.g. increased class sizes) were made without due regard to established principles of 
shared governance.  Though Mortimer and Sathre (2007) acknowledge “that there are 
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fundamental disagreements within the academy about what shared governance actually 
means and how it should be implemented,” (p.21) the AAUP provides a succinct 
statement on the matter: 
 Areas that require joint efforts among the board, administration, and faculty  
 include long-range planning, decisions on buildings and facilities, resource 
 allocation, and short-and long-range priorities.  The faculty have primary  
 responsibility for the curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction,  
 research, faculty status, and areas of student life that relate to the educational 
 process (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007, p.23).   
 
Provided these assertions, new forms of academic collectivization may gain momentum.  
 
As elucidated by Fethke and Policano (2012) in Public no more: A new path to 
 
excellence in America’s public universities: 
 
 Interest in faculty unionization may grow as public support for education declines 
 and universities make increasing use of part-time instructors as a way to combat 
 shrinking funding and to convert fixed costs to variable costs.  Any erosion of  
 tenure might accelerate this move.  The countervailing force in the current  
 environment is the resistance to public unions by governors and legislators in 
 budget-strapped states; this is happening in Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, New York, 
 Florida, and elsewhere (p.175).   
 
In pages 102-103, members of Unit 1 and a Mountain University Faculty Senator 
expressed deep reservations regarding the erosion of tenure. Given the current financial 
recession and low status afforded public higher education in Mountain State, faculty may 
continue to witness increased administrative oversight coupled with diminished 
opportunities for shared governance.   
 Though the aforementioned trends are at the forefront of academic governance 
debates, perhaps the most intriguing finding of this study pertains to the differences in 
experience between those individuals in “saved” and “eliminated” units.  As visually 
displayed in Tables 6-8, the formal strategic planning process in Units 3 and 4 enhanced 
inter-unit communication, while the absence of such a process severely inhibited the 
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faculty’s directional conception in Units 1 and 2.  Firmly ensconced in a familiar 
departmental configuration, faculty in Units 1 and 2 experienced minimal levels of 
structural uncertainty, however, faculty in the department-less structure of Units 3 and 4 
(see pp. 155-160) reported dire dilemmas regarding hierarchical structures, administrative 
assignments, and bureaucratic functionality.  As reinforced by Mel Schiavelli, former 
provost and interim president at the College of William & Mary and provost at the 
University of Delaware:  
 The departmental structure, the college-within-the-university structure—these are  
 silos within which people in traditional disciplines live. I used to think you could 
 knock those silos down.  Well, believe me, that is the most difficult thing in a  
 university to have happen, partly because of the reward system for faculty.   
 You’re rewarded for contributions to your discipline, as opposed to contributions 
 to your institution (Marcus, 2011, p.42).   
A feature of the “functionalist paradigm,” business approaches to organizational change 
have engendered considerable controversy at Mountain University, with faculty in Units 
3 and 4 expressing clear frustration with the imposition of a non-academic governance 
model (Kezar, 2012, p.183).  Provided the stress-related losses in productivity and 
professional discontent with “corporate” governance, it is likely that the departure of the 
current dean will herald a return to a department-driven structure.   
 A pioneer of the program elimination literature, Sheila Slaughter’s (1993) seminal 
study on the corporatization of academe continues to stand the test of time. Connecting 
the pro-business discourse of the Reagan administration to the restructuring of academic 
labor, Slaughter’s analysis underscored recession as the crux of this phenomenon. 
Charged with managing the fiscal affairs of an institution, administrators must craft a 
university budget which meets the funding allocation specified by the state.  In times of 
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fiscal crisis, intra-collegiate contests become more pronounced, opening the door to 
political decision-making.  
Ten years later, Peter Eckel (2003) drew similar conclusions regarding the 
influence of internal politics in program closure proceedings.  In this regard, Eckel’s 
(2003) narrators conveyed numerous instances of institutional politics, leading the author 
to the following realization: 
The political frame is based upon the premise that different interest groups are  
constantly in conflict as they compete for power and scarce organizational  
resources.  To obtain these resources interest groups are continually forming 
coalitions, which dissolve and reform into new configurations as the issues at 
hand shift…The political frame helped to capture and organize elements such 
as coalition alignment, re-alignment, affiliations; power brokering; and  
influencing negotiation and conflict (p.18).   
 
Charting the path of least resistance, university administrators navigated these 
institutional waters, choosing targets with perceived organizational inadequacies.  
Discernible deficiencies included ineffectual departmental leadership, limited numbers of 
low-profile alumni, and politically inexperienced faculty members.    
Vestiges of Taylorism, these institutional changes signal a move to increase 
existing faculty productivity through the reallocation of teaching loads.  Often targeted 
for low enrollment, eliminated departments must nonetheless redistribute their students to 
existing units (Brint et al., 2005; June, 2012b).  As substantiated by noted organizational 
scholar Gareth Morgan (2006):  
 Interestingly, [Frederick] Taylor’s principles have crossed many ideological 
 barriers, being extensively used in the former USSR and Eastern Europe as  
 well as in capitalist countries. This fact signifies that Taylorism is as much a 
 tool for securing general control over the workplace as it is a means of  
 generating profit (p.25).   
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Realities of the 21
st
 century academic marketplace, the aforementioned themes are not 
exclusive to Mountain University, but are rather a function of a business-model approach 
to resource allocation in publically funded institutions.    
Implications for Theory 
 As predicted, the Bordia et al. (2004) theoretical framework transferred creditably 
to a similar public setting.  Though quantitative in its orientation, Bordia et al.’s concepts 
of strategic and structural uncertainty resonated with faculty narrators. Reinforced by 
scholars’ strategic speculation in Units 1 and 2, the strategic planning process stifled this 
type of uncertainty in Units 3 and 4.  Forced to abandon their familiar departmental 
organization, faculty members in Units 3 and 4 struggled to adapt to the college’s new 
structure.  Able to retain their departmental chairpersons, faculty members in Units 1 and 
2 made less frequent mention of structural disruption.      
While the Bordia et al. (2004) theoretical framework exhibited strong explanatory 
powers with respect to strategic and structural uncertainty, job-related uncertainty proved 
the weakest analytical component.  As illustrated in Table 8, a unit’s status as “saved” or 
“eliminated” had little perceptual bearing on faculty members’ job security, promotion 
opportunities, or changes to the job role.  The lone caveat in this regard concerned 
increased class sizes—a charge voiced across all four academic units.  However, these 
attempts at scholastic efficiency come at a steep price.  As advanced by Fethke and 
Policano (2012): 
Picture the faculty as allocating 60 percent of its time to teaching and 40 percent 
to research, with this proportion remaining fixed regardless of faculty size. In this 
case, the compound product of the university is a “tightly bundled” combination 
of instruction and research. Changes in faculty size affect the level of output, but 
the proportion of time allocated to research and teaching is fixed (p.74).  
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A non-academic model, the Bordia et al. (2004) framework must be adapted and 
refined in order to increase its applicability to university settings. As suggested by the 
findings of the present study, faculty rank may hold greater explanatory powers than 
faculty tenure status alone.  While non-tenured faculty undoubtedly experienced greater 
levels of job-related uncertainty when compared to tenured faculty, an analysis of 
individual commentary supports additional conclusions.  In this regard, full professorship 
appears to be a mitigating factor with respect to job-related uncertainty—a component 
worthy of further theoretical exploration.        
Implications for Practice 
 Pertinent points explicated in the preceding section call attention to the need for 
heightened faculty participation in institutional governance.  Though many scholars 
“succumb to the temptation to shirk administrative service,” Ginsberg (2011) makes a 
compelling argument for faculty advocacy:  
 While we worked on our books and taught our classes, our universities hired 
 dozens of new vice provosts and associate provosts and hundreds of new deanlets. 
 Administrators used our absence and the absence of some of our colleagues to  
 strengthen their own managerial capabilities and their continuing capacity to  
 circumvent and marginalize the faculty (p.210).   
 
As acknowledged by Dr. James (pp.165-166): “None of the faculty were at the 
[governing body] meeting” when Mountain University administration presented the new 
collegiate reporting structure.  It stands to reason that had a contingent of collegiate 
faculty attended this meeting, and voiced their concerns during the public comment 
period, the governing body would have had an obligation to take this additional 
perspective into consideration. Indeed, abstention from university and department-level 
service opens the floodgates to political chicanery. As stated in Chapter 5 of the 
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Mountain State System of Higher Education Governing Body Bylaws (revised June 
2012): 
 There shall be no reconsideration of the policy decisions to declare a  
 financial exigency, to discontinue or reduce in size an administrative  
 unit, project, program or curriculum because of financial exigency or 
 to discontinue, reduce in size or reorganize an administrative unit,  
 project, program or curriculum because of curricular reasons (p.10).  
 
A troubling pronouncement, this instantiation vests final oversight of curricular matters in 
college/university administration, effectively circumscribing faculty input. Formerly the 
exclusive purview of faculty (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007), administrators have virtually 
foreclosed all rebuttals to institutional decision-making in the Mountain System of 
Higher Education.  
Confronted with carte blanche decision-making authority, faculty members may 
only challenge their individual employment status, as opposed to challenging the 
legitimacy of financial exigency or the departmental/programmatic discontinuance 
process (Governing Body Bylaws, 2012).  As substantiated in Chapter 5: “The faculty 
member requesting reconsideration (of their employment status during a financial 
exigency or curricular review) has the burden of showing that the decision to furlough, 
reduce pay or to lay off cannot be sustained” (p.10). Though the system does provide for 
faculty input via “one or more employment review committees,” the “president shall 
determine the number of persons to serve on each committee, shall determine their terms 
of service, shall choose the chair of the committee, and, in addition, shall choose one half 
of the remaining membership of each committee” (p.10).  Given these guidelines, it is 
unlikely that institutional faculty could overcome administrative momentum.   
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 Despite the severity of these challenges, faculty members in Mountain State and 
across the country have battled back against the erosion of tenure protections and 
arbitrary institutional decision-making (Berrett, 2011; Etchison, 2012; Glenn, 2011; 
Schmidt, 2012; Wilson, 2011).  Harnessing the power of the press, professors at 
Mountain University have advanced their cause via the student newspaper (Etchison, 
2012) and widely circulated trade publications (Berrett, 2011; Dr. Smith, 2011; Glenn, 
2011).  Two thousand miles east at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro, the 
Department of Theater mounted a spirited defense of their discipline when faced with 
curricular review.  In defense of her unit and traditional academic governance, longtime 
professor Deborah Bell boldly declared: “A university is not a corporation” (Wilson, 
2011, A14). Railing against “inaccurate data and poor communication,” UNC Theater 
faculty countered by making their case in a front page article in The Chronicle of Higher 
Education—the nation’s premiere source on the status of the profession (Wilson, 2011). 
 Though much remains to be accomplished in terms of restoring and enhancing 
shared governance, pockets of resistance have appeared on the academic horizon. Most 
notably, the AAUP has promised “big changes in its leadership and overall direction” 
with new president Rudy H. Fichtenbaum. A professor of economics at Wright State 
University (Ohio), Dr. Fichtenbaum “played a central role in last year’s successful 
campaign for an Ohio ballot measure that repealed a state law preventing many faculty 
members at public colleges from being involved in collective bargaining.” Furthermore, 
the new AAUP president is committed to “expanding its membership among not just 
professors but also adjunct instructors and graduate students, and trying to strengthen the 
organization’s ties to other labor unions and to education-advocacy groups” (Schmidt, 
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2012, A18). Referring to the welcome emergence of “critical university studies,” 
chronicle.com commentator “Cewatt” offered the following endorsement: 
 I do not consider this criticism of higher education a negative evolution. We  
 need scholars across all levels and disciplines speaking out about the changes 
 occurring in academe.  We must guard our right to speak out and keep our jobs, 
 something in increasing jeopardy.  We must speak out—against abuses by the 
 National Collegiate Athletic Association, U.S. News & World Report, corporate 
 donors.  This is how we continue to grow (2012, B18).   
 
A sobering reminder of a tenuous academic freedom, scholars must exercise their rights 
to free speech before they are circumscribed in writing.                       
Recommendations for Future Research 
 A counter to the “functionalist paradigm,” Kezar (2012) distinguishes interpretive 
studies as: 
 foreground[ing] language, discourse, and communication patterns: the  
 interpersonal meaning of change, the symbolic significance; the implications of 
 change for affected cultures and individuals, social background of actors and the 
 role of history and culture; and performance of organizational actors (pp.183,  
 188). 
Grounded in the qualitative traditions of phenomenology and ethnography, these 
methodological approaches: 
 focus on those experiencing the change, trying to understand their perspectives 
 and how they make meaning of a change process.  These studies help illuminate 
 the role of resistance or barriers to change because changes are not well  
 understood or are considered poor by others in the organization.  Through these  
 investigations of other actors, interpretive studies also identify new agents of  
 change—without positions of authority—and demonstrate how they are part 
 of a shared or distributed change process (Kezar, 2012, p.188).   
 
As illustrated in Appendix F, two and a half months elapsed between the December 1, 
2010 forecast of future state revenues and Mountain University’s initial presidential 
announcement declaring the possibility of financial exigency. Though this timeframe 
coincided with Winter Break, budgetary discussions could have begun despite this 
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impediment.  Provided advances in technology, Mountain University could easily have 
distributed financial documentation and fiscal updates via institutional email accounts, 
website postings, or live streaming video.  Though Mountain University did make use of 
these communicative mediums, faculty members in the present study continuously 
decried the poor communication and mixed messages of institutional reorganization. 
Provided these assertions, future research avenues include more effective and transparent 
bureaucratic communication methods, with special attention given to communication 
during organizational change.   
 In a separate though equally important vein, several scholars have posited that 
institutional downsizing disproportionately affects liberal arts and creative disciplines 
(Brint et al., 2005; Brint et al., 2012; Christensen & Eyring, 2011; Ginsberg, 2011; 
Massy, 2001; Slaughter, 1993; Zusman, 2005).  As emphasized by Christensen and 
Eyring (2011): 
 The cutting of budgets and outright closure of university presses makes it harder  
 for scholars to publish books even through less prestigious channels. This matters 
 especially to tenure-track faculty in the humanities, for whom publishing books 
 is the ultimate test of scholarship (p.364).  
Moreover, in the exercise of competing for students, “many schools have invested 
heavily in lovely dormitories, dining facilities, and garages while closing language and 
philosophy departments for budgetary reasons” (Ginsberg, 2011, p.169).  Though a 
burgeoning body of knowledge strongly suggests that institutional resource reallocation 
favors investment in student services at the expense of the liberal arts, empirical 
scholarship could confirm or deny this critical hypothesis.  For example, a quantitative 
research design could longitudinally analyze institutional resource allocation over a fixed 
period of time (5 years, 10 years, etc.), examining full-time faculty lines, managerial 
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budgets, and graduate assistant/postdoctoral allocations, etc.  Further, non-parametric 
frontier modeling in the form of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has proven an 
effective means of gauging funding adequacy in the K-12 arena—with potentially 
promising applicability to higher education settings (Ruggiero, 2007). Alternative 
qualitative designs could generally mirror the case study methodology employed in the 
present study, with minimal adjustments for phenomenological or grounded theory 
approaches (Creswell, 2007).    
 Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the effect of institutional downsizing on 
students enrolled in eliminated departments/programs.  As referenced by Dr. Hayes on 
pages 130-131, Mountain University has increasingly turned to student workers to 
replace lost administrative support staff.  While part-time on-campus employment can be 
a positive and rewarding experience, Mountain University and colleges across the 
country must be careful not to exploit student labor in order to enhance institutional profit 
margins.  Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that students enrolled in eliminated and 
potentially eliminated departments/programs experience uncertainties equal to or greater 
than the faculty members housed in said units.  As reinforced by academician Bettina 
Drew: “Students are unsuspecting consumers in a financial endeavor in which their 
satisfaction plays no role” (p.B20). Collateral damage in institutional power plays, 
students often bear the burden of accelerated programs of study, diminished human (i.e. 
faculty, staff) resources, and emotional distress.  Future research angles may include 
individual/multiple case studies of student(s) in eliminated or potentially eliminated units, 
as well as phenomenological approaches to similar lines of inquiry.                
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Conclusion 
 A distressing development in American higher education, departmental and 
programmatic eliminations are by no means unstoppable phenomenon.  Though historical 
reflection reinforces universities’ “stubborn resistance to systemic change,” the continued 
commitment to this ideology may result in further erosion of the liberal arts foundation 
(Marcus, 2011, p.44). Referred to as “currency,” departmental prestige increasingly 
reflects entrepreneurial research orientation, with the greatest favor bestowed upon 
faculties with high volumes of external grant funding (Fethke & Policano, 2012, p. 172). 
In addition, branch campuses, such as the University of North Texas at Dallas, have hired 
management consultants to whittle the curriculum down to “a narrow set of career-
focused majors in fields like business, information technology, and criminal justice,” and 
refashion the academic calendar into a “year-round trimester” system (Blumenstyk, 2012, 
A14). 
 In a popular website entitled “Junct Rebellion” (in re: adjunct), an enlightened 
blogger summarizes “How the American University was Killed, in Five Easy Steps”: 
 First, you defund public higher education. 
 
 Second, you deprofessionalize and impoverish the professors. 
 
 Step #3: You move in a managerial/administrative class who take over  
 governance of the university. 
 
 Step Four: You move in corporate culture and corporate money. 
 
 Step Five – Destroy the Students     
A disenfranchised voice within the academy, adjunct professors must be seen as allies, 
rather than opposition, in the fight to reclaim shared academic governance. As 
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underscored by Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, and Finney (2012), the strength of America’s 
universities has high-stakes implications: 
 After remarkable gains in American educational attainment for the baby-boom 
 generation, more recent performance in higher education indicators has been  
 considerably less impressive. Whereas the United States had long been the  
 world leader in higher education participation and attainment rates, other nations 
 have now caught up and even exceeded the U.S. rates for young adults (p.5).     
Declines in the literacy and mathematical skill sets of U.S. college graduates portend an 
uphill battle for intellectual relevance in an increasingly globalized economy (Zumeta et 
al., 2012). Long at the forefront of American innovation, U.S. colleges and universities 
must again reclaim this intellectual high-ground, or continue to witness the decline of 
America’s preeminence in higher education.   
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “SAVED” DEPARTMENT CHAIR 
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated? 
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination? 
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination? 
3. Why do you think that this unit was saved from elimination? 
4. How have these events impacted you and the faculty in your unit? 
a.   Have reporting structures changed? 
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed? 
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?  
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?  
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “SAVED” FACULTY MEMBERS 
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated? 
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination? 
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination? 
3. Why do you think that this unit was saved from elimination? 
4. How have these events impacted you? 
a.   Have reporting structures changed? 
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed? 
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?  
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?  
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “ELIMINATED” DEPARTMENT CHAIR 
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated? 
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination? 
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination? 
3. Why do you think that this unit was ultimately eliminated? 
4. How have these events impacted you and the faculty in your unit? 
a.   Have reporting structures changed? 
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed? 
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?  
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?  
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “ELIMINATED” FACULTY MEMBERS 
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated? 
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination? 
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination? 
3. Why do you think that this unit was ultimately eliminated? 
4. How have these events impacted you? 
a.   Have reporting structures changed? 
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed? 
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?  
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?  
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APPENDIX E 
EXPLICATION OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Research Question Theme Type 
RQ1: How do individuals 
experience a potential 
departmental/programmatic 
elimination? 
Emergent 
RQ2: To what extent do strategic, 
structural, and job-related 
uncertainties manifest themselves 
during potential 
departmental/programmatic 
eliminations? 
Theory-Driven 
RQ3: How does the department 
chair affect faculty perceptions of 
strategic, structural, and job-related 
uncertainties? 
Emergent 
RQ4: How does strategic, 
structural, and job-related 
uncertainty differ between saved 
and eliminated units? 
Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Example of Emergent Analysis 
Dr. Covey: “It doesn’t do any good to whine.  That’s what I used to tell my kids. “We 
don’t whine in this house.” We fought a good battle and I came here to a very bright 
future.  It didn’t work out that way.  It’s okay.  I go home at night, sleep good.” 
 
I thematically categorized this statement as an example of the department chair’s realistic 
outlook, based upon Berg’s (2007) definitions of latent and manifest messaging.  
 
Example of Theory-driven Analysis 
Dr. Grant: “Because, you know, at this point in my career, I’m pretty secure in terms of 
being a tenured full professor and having enough financial resources that I could resign or 
retire, as they say, anytime I want.”  
 
I thematically categorized this statement as job-related uncertainty (job security), based 
upon the definitions advanced by Bordia et al. (2004).   
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APPENDIX F 
TIMELINE OF THE 2011-2013 BIENNIAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Date Mountain State Mountain University 
December 1, 2010 
Economic Forum forecasts 
precipitous decline in state 
general fund revenue for 
2011-2013 biennium 
 
January 20, 2011 
Governor submits 
Executive Budget to state 
legislature 
 
February 7, 2011 State legislative session 
opens 
 
February 15, 2011 
 President warns Faculty 
Senate of possible need to 
declare financial exigency 
 
Provost directs Deans to 
make vertical cuts to meet 
individual college budget 
reduction targets 
February 25, 2011  Dean’s budget reduction 
proposals due to Provost 
February 28, 2011 
 Mountain State System of 
Higher Education issues 
legal opinion on tenure; 
tenure resides in the 
department, not the college   
March 8, 2011 
 President announces first 
budget reduction proposal 
via email; meets 60% of 
funding reduction 
recommended by 
Governor’s executive 
budget 
March 22, 2011 
Joint legislative finance 
committee on higher 
education requests cut 
proposals from Mountain 
State System of Higher 
Education institutions that 
meet 100% of the 
governor’s recommended 
funding reductions. 
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March 28, 2011 
 Budget reduction proposal 
which meets 100% of 
funding reduction 
recommended by 
Governor’s executive 
budget due to the legislature 
March 29, 2011 
 Department/program 
elimination proposal 
discussed at special meeting 
of the Faculty Senate 
March 30, 2011 
 President announces second 
budget reduction proposal 
via email; meets 100% of 
funding reduction 
recommended by 
Governor’s executive 
budget 
April 8, 2011 
 President directs Deans to 
consult with faculty and 
staff as to how to best meet 
budget reduction targets. 
April 29, 2011 
 Dean’s revised budget 
reduction proposals due to 
Provost 
May 2, 2011 
Economic Forum revises 
state general fund revenue 
forecast for 2011-2013 
biennium; $274 million in 
additional revenue available 
to the state 
 
May 3, 2011 
 Provost announces third 
budget reduction proposal 
via email 
May 9, 2011 
 President announces 
Tenured Faculty Voluntary 
Separation Incentive 
Program (TFVSIP) in order 
to limit the need to 
terminate tenured faculty 
May 23, 2011 
 TFVSIP applications due; 
48 tenured faculty accept 
one-time buy-out of 150% 
of base salary 
May 26, 2011 
Mountain State Supreme 
Court rules that the state 
cannot appropriate monies 
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from cities, counties, and 
other localities for state 
general fund use 
June 1, 2011 
Legislature and governor 
approve 2011-2013 biennial 
budget.  
 
June 7, 2011 State legislative session 
adjourns 
 
June 8, 2011 
 President announces fourth 
budget reduction proposal 
at campus town hall 
meeting 
June 17, 2011 
 Mountain State System of 
Higher Education governing 
body votes to accept the 
tuition increases, budget 
reductions, and 
department/program 
eliminations proposed by 
Mountain University to 
meet the final legislative 
budget. 
July 6, 2011 
 President thanks TFVSIP 
participants and credits 
them with saving tenured 
and non-tenured positions; 
no new budget proposal 
announced to reflect these 
savings 
August 18, 2011 
 President announces that 
“for all intents and purposes 
the budget cuts are done”; 
no budget proposal 
accounts for the 
implementation of these 
changes 
September 9, 2011 
 Mountain State System of 
Higher Education governing 
body votes to accept 
additional 
department/program 
eliminations proposed by 
Mountain University 
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APPENDIX G 
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY MISSION STATEMENT 
[Mountain University] is a research institution committed to rigorous educational 
programs and the highest standards of a liberal education. We produce accomplished 
graduates who are well prepared to enter the work force or to continue their education in 
graduate and professional programs. Our faculty, students, and staff enthusiastically 
confront the challenges of economic and cultural diversification, urban growth, social 
justice, and sustainability. Our commitment to our dynamic region and State centrally 
influences our research and educational programs, which improves our local 
communities. 
Our commitment to the national and international communities ensures that our research 
and educational programs engage both traditional and innovative areas of study and 
global concerns. [Mountain University’s] distinctive identity and values permeate a 
unique institution that brings the best of the world to our region and, in turn, produces 
knowledge to improve the region and world around us. 
[Mountain University] is committed to and driven by these shared values that will guide 
our decision making: 
 High expectations for student learning and success; 
 Discovery through research, scholarship, and creative activity; 
 Nurturing equity, diversity, and inclusiveness that promotes respect, support, and 
empowerment; 
 Social, environmental, and economic sustainability; 
 Strong, reciprocal, and interdependent relationships between [Mountain 
University] and the region around us; 
 An entrepreneurial, innovative, and unconventional spirit. 
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APPENDIX H 
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY 
UNIT 3 & 4 COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
PEST ANALYSIS 
The PEST Analysis is a specific look at four areas critical to the development of the 
Strategic Plan.  The information draws from the individuals, groups and organizations 
that provided feedback.   
 
POLITICAL 
 Significant political battle between 
the governor and the higher 
education system over funding 
 Legislature is seriously divided over 
funding higher education 
 Concern that the politics of cutbacks 
and reductions are driving the agenda 
of the College and University 
 [Governing body] support is critical 
at this time to represent and advocate 
the value of higher education 
 Political pressure and tension is 
creating divisiveness in the 
University and the College 
 Proactive leadership at [Mountain 
University] and the College is 
important to build political/public 
support 
ECONOMIC 
 Continued weak national economy 
prolongs recovery of [the College’s 
discipline] in [Mountain State] 
 Protracted recovery mean fewer jobs 
available for graduates 
 State budget cuts are having 
significant impact on students, 
faculty, course availability, etc. 
 Rising financial costs for tuition, fees 
and books will prevent some from 
enrolling 
 Decreasing resources are impacting 
support for the students 
 The need for other funding sources is 
critical for long term success of the 
College 
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 Tremendous growth and prosperity in 
the past has made adjustment more 
difficult to the current realities 
SOCIAL 
 [Mountain University] is a 
“commuter school”- not a lot of 
social activities to keep students on 
campus 
 College has no central area, “hub” to 
stimulate interaction/gatherings 
 Many students must work while in 
school, don’t feel involved 
 Limited opportunity for 
faculty/student interaction outside of 
classroom 
 Location of offices and organizations 
that support students, spread out/not 
effectively located 
 Communication is 
inconsistent/ineffective in keeping 
College community 
engaged/informed 
 Limited use of social networks by the 
College 
 Alumni and industry leaders not 
actively involved enough given the 
location of the College 
TECHNOLOGY 
 Class rooms have limited technology 
to support student/faculty needs 
 College has a minimal IT 
infrastructure 
 The industry is utilizing state of the 
art technology, but the College does 
not have resources to support similar 
efforts 
 Use of technology and web based 
tools is increasingly important to the 
[College’s disciplinary affiliation] 
 Lack of state of the art technology 
marginalizes effectiveness of the 
College, faculty, staff 
 You can’t be a world class College if 
your technology is limited, obsolete  
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APPENDIX I 
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY 
UNIT 3 & 4 COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
SWOT ANALYSIS 
The SWOT Analysis is a specific look at four areas critical to the development of the 
Strategic Plan.  The information draws from the individuals, groups and organizations 
that provided feedback.   
 
STRENGTHS 
Location 
Proximity to [Unit 3 & 4 industry] 
Direct involvement with industry 
The “living laboratory” of [Mountain City] 
Students 
Motivated and dedicated 
Significant diversity 
Global perspective 
Faculty and Staff 
Strong and committed 
Extensive industry experience 
Leaders in the profession 
Knowledgeable and respected 
Research/Teaching/Service 
Excellent reputation 
Authors of leading publications 
Relationships – Alumni/Industry 
Over 11,000 graduates 
Industry leaders available/accessible 
Financial 
History of donations 
More affordable than many other 
schools/colleges 
Facilities/Space 
Have [strategic roadway] to use as annex to 
campus 
Organizational effectiveness 
Over 40 years of delivering quality 
education in the field 
 
 
Location 
Underutilizing location and proximity 
Students 
International students poorly assimilated 
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WEAKNESSES 
Course schedules, curriculum overly 
complicated/not user friendly 
Advisors often unavailable 
Faculty and Staff 
Divisiveness, bickering, “turf wars” 
Lack of faculty development 
Research/Teaching/Service 
Inconsistency in teaching effectiveness 
Research not well funded 
Not enough “hands on” learning 
Relationships – Alumni/Industry 
Not enough involvement with 
alumni/industry leaders  
Ineffective communication 
Financial 
Weak financial base, over reliance on 
eroding State budget 
Facilities/Space 
Facilities dated/not professional 
Few places for interaction among 
students/faculty 
Poor technology 
Organizational effectiveness 
Inefficient structure/Organization 
Limited support/training for staff 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Location 
Increase profile/visibility 
Improve interaction with leading [industry 
professionals] 
Students 
Can significantly increase their 
involvement with the industry 
Faculty and Staff 
Develop more training 
Provide more resources/support 
Research/Teaching/Service 
Research support could be significantly 
increased 
Improve teaching methods 
Relationships – Alumni/Industry 
More involvement can increase 
communication and teamwork  
[Strategic location] could be used much 
more efficiently 
Many alumni active in industry and still 
live in [Mountain City] 
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Financial 
Increase resources/support funding, less 
dependence on State 
Facilities/Space 
New academic building 
[Industry] campus 
Organizational effectiveness 
With budget cuts, chance to streamline 
Get back to basics/focus on core mission 
THREATS 
Location 
Failure to make changes will continue to 
erode support 
Students 
Lack of rigor will erode quality 
Poor assimilation of international students 
will impact all students 
A lack of focus on quality will prevent 
significant improvements 
Faculty and Staff 
Continued divisiveness/resistance to 
change erodes credibility 
Research/Teaching/Service 
Continued cutbacks prevent attracting new 
quality faculty  
Potential loss of existing faculty 
Relationships – Alumni/Industry 
Alumni and industry leaders might 
continue to feel uninvolved 
Financial 
Continued bad economy will effect 
programs/curriculum 
Bad economy limits jobs 
Facilities/Space 
Failure to build new academic building will 
be a limiting factor 
Organizational effectiveness 
Lack of new organization structure will 
impede effectiveness 
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